DÆDALUS

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

U.S. Defense Policy in the 1980s

Robert R. Bowie
Harvey Brooks
Richard Burt
William Hyland
William H. Kincade
Joseph J. Kruzel
Michael Nacht
Uwe Nerlich
George H. Quester
George Rathjens
Jack Ruina

UPSALA COLLEGE
LIBRARY
JAN 3 7 1981
EAST ORANGE, N. J. 07019



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Winter 1981 $4.00

Winter 1981: U.S. Defense Policy in the 1980s. Issued as Vol. 110, No. 1 of the Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

Stephen R. Graubard, Editor of the Academy and of Dædalus; *William H. Brubeck, Managing Editor; Marie Goldstein, Manuscript Editor; Theresa Jaskul, Executive Assistant; Cheri Titlebaum, Editorial Assistant; Ruth Taylor, Subscription Fulfillment Manager*

Board of Editors:

David Apter, Daniel Bell, Isaiah Berlin, François Bourricaud, Herman Feshbach, Paul Freund, Clifford Geertz, Lillian Hellman, Gerald Holton, Charles P. Kindleberger, Hans H. Landsberg, Martin Meyerson, Steven Muller, Carl E. Schorske, Judith N. Shklar, Jean Starobinski, Lewis Thomas, Robert Wilson

Editorial Office: Dædalus, *Norton's Woods, 136 Irving Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138.*

Dædalus *(ISSN 0011-5266) is published quarterly by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Subscription rate: $16.00 one year; $24.00 two years; $32.00 three years. All subscriptions and single copy orders and change of address information should be addressed to the* Dædalus *Subscription Department, 1172 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts 02134.*

Printed in the United States of America. Printing Office: 2901 Byrdhill Road, Richmond, Virginia. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 12-30299. Second-class postage paid at Boston, Massachusetts, and at additional mailing offices. *Copyright © 1981 by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

U.S. Defense Policy in the 1980s

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DÆDALUS

Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

U.S. Defense Policy in the 1980s

	v	*Preface*
MICHAEL NACHT	1	*Toward an American Conception of Regional Security*
GEORGE H. QUESTER	23	*The Superpowers and the Atlantic Alliance*
WILLIAM G. HYLAND	41	*The Atlantic Crisis*
ROBERT R. BOWIE	53	*The Atlantic Alliance*
UWE NERLICH	71	*Change in Europe: A Secular Trend?*
WILLIAM H. KINCADE	105	*Over the Technological Horizon*
HARVEY BROOKS	129	*Notes on Some Issues on Technology and National Defense*
JOSEPH J. KRUZEL	137	*Arms Control and American Defense Policy: New Alternatives and Old Realities*
RICHARD BURT	159	*The Relevance of Arms Control in the 1980s*
GEORGE RATHJENS AND JACK RUINA	179	*Nuclear Doctrine and Rationality*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WINTER 1981: U.S. DEFENSE POLICY IN THE 1980s

Issued as Vol. 110, No. 1 of the Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences

ADVISORY GROUP

Les Aspin, Robert Berman, Harvey Brooks, Richard Burt, Jorge I. Domínguez, Sidney D. Drell, Les Gelb, Colin S. Gray, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, David Holloway, Thomas L. Hughes, William Hyland, Paul Jabber, William Kincade, Joseph Kruzel, Robert Legvold, Pierre Lellouche, John Lewis, Jan M. Lodal, Michael Nacht, Uwe Nerlich, Paul Nitze, Richard Perle, Richard Pipes, George Quester, George W. Rathjens, Henry Rowen, Jack P. Ruina, Enid Schoettle

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Preface to the Issue, "U.S. Defense Policy in the 1980s" Volume II

THIS IS THE SECOND of two *Daedalus* issues on U.S. defense policy in the 1980s. Those who have known the Journal from its beginnings almost a quarter of a century ago will recognize how rare it is for the Editors to devote two consecutive issues to a single problem. Indeed, with respect to American public policy, this has been done only twice—with race in the 1960s and with American higher education in the 1970s. There is a certain appropriateness in the trinity now created: racial questions, even when neglected or ignored by the mass media, remain the single most urgent and recalcitrant domestic problem of American society; universities, for better or worse, carry an inordinate share of the burden for creating, protecting, and sustaining the intellectual capital and the professional competence on which the life of a modern industrial society like our own depends; defense capabilities, broadly defined, will to a large extent determine whether peace is maintained in the decades immediately ahead, whether the troubles of our own unhappy era are recognized, in retrospect, to have been the grim harbingers of an infinitely more terrifying world situation.

The temptation to choose between problems such as these—race, education, and defense—to establish some sort of hierarchy between them, and to imply that circumstances may make it imperative for an overwhelming commitment to be made to deal primarily with one, even as the others are necessarily neglected, is very real. It is easy to believe that a society, like an individual, does well to concentrate its energies and attention, and that nothing is more deserving of total commitment than issues that appear to touch the very survival of the human species. By such a criterion, issues of war and peace, particularly in a thermonuclear age, will always appear more urgent and more compelling than issues of social justice or intellectual creativity. The carving up of all human experience and social necessities into these neat categories—pretending that some can wait while others must be urgently attended to—shows a certain naiveté about both politics and society.

The sentiment that led many political and military leaders in World War I and World War II to imagine that issues of war and peace were divisible—and indeed needed to be kept so—that the problem was to win first and be concerned with peace later, showed an innocence that survives even today. Many in the United States persist in believing—though the evidence to the contrary is incontrovertible—that there are two discrete spheres of public policy, domestic and foreign, and that it is possible to operate fairly effectively in one, while failing utterly in the other, and that relations between the two are at best tenuous. This is of a piece with the folk wisdom that dwells constantly on institutional weaknesses without ever considering the intellectual failures that may lie at their base, which is not to say that institutional defects are wholly responsible for intellectual shortcomings or even that the reverse is true.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These two issues of *Daedalus* communicate a message about American defense policy that most readers will find grim, perhaps foreboding. It would be easy to suggest that the principal policy failures have all occurred recently, that they attach mostly to the insufficiencies of a single administration or of a small group of leaders. There is no such reassuring message in these pages; indeed, the implications of these volumes are considerably more distressing; they suggest massive failures—institutional and intellectual—that are not likely to be remedied quickly or easily. They suggest also that there is little consensus today on what must be done to restore confidence or competence, or where the effort ought to begin. Some—a few—may question whether these are the key issues at all, and whether the degree of alarm communicated by these essays is in fact as great as these introductory remarks suggest. An attentive reader of these volumes will, I think, recognize the gravity of our predicament, which is not to say that the authors are all equally alarmed or that their alarm is caused by the same conditions or expectations.

The issue opens, appropriately enough, with an essay on the United States, on how we today perceive questions of national security, and how these perceptions relate to recent American experience, both at home and abroad. The world of the 1950s and 1960s is lost irretrievably. There is an overwhelming sense of American decline, or, at least, of a relative loss of position in both the military and the economic spheres. Although no one would contend today that the kinds of "dominance" that the United States enjoyed immediately after World War II could have been maintained by any combination of policies, the fall from those heights can only be thought of as tragic. If, as is suggested, we have become a "wounded" nation, seeking relief in simplicity, panaceas, and jingoism, these are certainly the surface manifestations of deeper institutional and intellectual failure. What can the United States do to arrest its decline? What geopolitical goals should it strive for? What specific political and bureaucratic reforms must it be willing to contemplate? What new strategic doctrines need it consider? These are all elements of a puzzle that will defy resolution so long as there is no understanding of the many social, economic, and perceptual constraints that bind the nation, that make it unlikely that Americans will be able to do in the last part of the century what they did so effortlessly only a few short decades ago.

If the concern with American capabilities and intentions has become, in effect, a major international intellectual industry, the centers of inquiry are still overwhelmingly in those parts of the world that have traditionally maintained close relations with the United States, that have in one way or another accepted a certain "dependence" on the United States. There are compelling reasons why such societies must probe deeply into American intentions, why they must know with great specificity what they can count on. The reverse interest is also apparent. In its postwar passion to secure the peace, the United States—which for many decades had managed to avoid all "entangling alliances"—accepted what would once have been thought baleful political and military necessities by agreeing to a number of mutual defense agreements. This seemed a small price to pay for a very substantial prize. While many of these immediate postwar engagements exist now principally in memory—recalling "containment" and other doctrines that once justified their existence—the alliance with Europe (and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Japan) remains a cornerstone of all American policy. The existence of NATO testifies to a fidelity of purpose that extends beyond politics, that has assumed for some, in the United States and elsewhere, almost mythic proportions. This is not to suggest that the alliance has ever been either easy or untroubled; on the contrary, alarms about its conditions and prospects have been almost constant. There has never been a period when one partner or other did not fear for its long-term existence, concerned about its ability to withstand strains that often reflected the pride, power, and special interests of states accustomed to asserting their sovereign rights. Still, the existence of what has generally been perceived as a potential Soviet threat to the very heart of Europe has sustained the alliance.

Recent events in Iran and Afghanistan are now generally recognized to have had fairly adverse effects on the alliance. Whether one holds, as some do, that these events served principally to make obvious to the world what many already knew, that the United States and its European allies did not see eye-to-eye on many crucial issues and lacked any common strategy for dealing with crises outside Europe; or whether one holds a more short-range view, believing that the events contributed to a temporary deterioration in American-West European relations—European differences with the United States have long been common knowledge. Those who have been most attentive to the problems of détente have known for some time that whatever the differences between the Soviet Union and the United States on the obligations created by détente, equally large differences, not least between the United States and Germany, have existed on what benefits might be expected to follow from détente, and what a reasonable price for such advantages might be.

If in the first of these two volumes on defense policy it seemed important to describe and interpret the major regional hazards to security that now exist or are likely to develop in the coming decade, and what problems these are likely to create for the United States, a major purpose of this volume is to consider the prospects for the Atlantic Alliance. The crucial importance of the subject is indicated both by the number of essays commissioned—four—and by the extraordinary range of opinion reflected in these individual contributions. Although it would be too much, perhaps, to suggest that they vary from a view that is moderately sanguine to one that shows some measure of panic, readers will discover that neither is wholly an exaggeration. The preponderant opinion—and there is one—suggests that we are almost certainly witnessing not just one more of the now traditional "crises" between the United States and its West European allies, but that a more fundamental change is involved. If the United States is increasingly worried about the "Finlandization" of Europe, Europeans are openly shocked by evidences of American indecision and incompetence. Beyond all such differences, however—and their importance ought not to be underestimated—is the fact that few Europeans or Americans prophesied correctly the likely consequences of strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union, or the political, diplomatic, and psychological price for accepting (and indeed) promoting such parity. There is great concern that the Soviets, believing they enjoy a temporary military advantage, may choose to exploit the opportunities offered; there is worry also that the United States and its principal European allies share no agreed-upon diplomatic strategy for deal-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing with the Soviet Union. As for joint military planning in those areas outside Europe that are vital to our economies, this was never NATO's original province, and remains an unexplored territory.

If there is a large preoccupation in these essays with events in Iran and Afghanistan and how the United States and Western Europe comported themselves in these crises, this is not only because the record is bleak, filled with recriminations, both public and private. These recent crises brought to the surface long-simmering differences: to what extent are the United States and its principal European allies in agreement about basic global and regional issues; are their political systems still capable of setting a military/economic/political agenda that will have meaning for all of them and that they can effectively pursue together? Do they, in short, retain the cohesion and inventiveness in these spheres that they once claimed to have? Can their electorates be moved to accept policies that will often appear to be unpalatable, even hazardous?

It may be significant that the most anguished of the four alliance papers is written by a European; however cautious and restrained the argument may be, its meaning is clear. The United States, in some profound sense, is no longer capable of "speaking" to its European friends; the United States scarcely understands what Europe has become. Worse, there is little evidence that the United States correctly interprets Soviet policies or understands what its long-range purposes in Europe may be. In imagining that weapons provide the principal elements for the defense of Western Europe, the United States is scarcely conscious of what the Soviet diplomatic and political achievements have been. Although the military balance in Europe is certainly altered because of new Soviet weapons capabilities, it is changed also because of a new Soviet suppleness in understanding and dealing with the political forces now dominant in Western Europe. The Soviets, in both their military planning and in their political and diplomatic dealings, are certainly not constrained in the ways that the United States is. In theory, this gives the Soviets certain advantages; in fact, these need not have been all-important. What is most conspicuous about the recent American performance in Europe is its clumsiness, its ineptness in using to its own advantage political and economic circumstances that might have served Allied interests. Western Europe, eyeing critically its principal "defender" across the Atlantic, is worried; it is not only the objective military force situations that cause concern; American political and diplomatic initiatives seem confused and lame, lacking in imagination and insight. Substantial institutional reforms are required; a first-order priority is to conceptualize and implement new policies that will help to contain Soviet power while not requiring the West to retreat into its NATO shell. The initiative for all such efforts must be American, and they must win wide support in the United States. In the end, however, they must also satisfy America's European allies, who need to be seen as they are, not as rose-tinted (or blackened) glasses would have them be. If the United States is unable to make its policies comprehensible to its European friends, it is not likely to be successful with others.

An issue on defense policy that dwells so considerably on politics and diplomacy is itself an eloquent statement about how the problems of defense are now perceived. There is no excuse, however, for neglecting the more traditional defense subjects—arms, strategy, military planning, arms control, and the like.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Whatever the hazards of the future may be for the United States and its friends, they will not be resolved by politics or diplomacy alone; indeed, both presume a weapons policy and a military strategy acceptable to the electorate, comprehensible to allies, and effective in the kinds of contingencies now conceivable. Although it is possible to conceptualize the options that will exist until the year 2000 in the area of military technology, it is only of the next five years that one can speak with any real confidence. In that time-frame the country needs to be prepared for conditions in which significant increases in weapons accuracy make the problems of defense considerably more complex than any experienced when the United States enjoyed its nuclear superiority. America will be required to live with the kinds of insecurities Europeans have become accustomed to. Also, as advanced offensive weapons become increasingly mobile, and detection thus more difficult, new fears will arise about possible secret production and deployment of weapons. Many of the new arms, capable of serving both tactical and strategic purposes, will vastly complicate efforts to estimate either the strength or the intentions of one's presumed adversary. More versatile delivery systems carry yet additional hazards, making it unlikely that a war will in fact remain "limited," or that the traditional distinctions between nuclear and conventional ordnance can be maintained. All these technological developments give promise of new military uncertainty, producing, inevitably, new political fears. If better "battle management capacity" now ranks as a prime defense *desideratum*, aspirations to achieve this will amost certainly continue to outdistance actual performance. The sloppiness of battle, so common in conventional war in the past, is not likely to be less conspicuous in thermonuclear war. If it is true that we may expect soon to see "smaller, more flexible, more interchangeable, and faster weapons with greater firepower and more supple control mechanisms," and if the United States indeed has certain advantages in developing such technologies, this will in itself do little to diminish the hazards that now threaten.

Questions being increasingly asked about American productivity and capacity for innovation in civilian science and technology are now being raised also in the military fields. The confidence acquired in the post-*Sputnik* era—that the United States could meet and beat the Soviets in any major technological competition—is beginning to wear thin. Should the Soviets, surprisingly, show themselves capable of a major technological "take-off" in the years immediately ahead, the political shock to the United States and to the West more generally would be immense. Also, as the United States shows a diminished capacity to invent and make use of "simple" weapons systems, particularly with regard to conventional arms, substantial military problems are created. The weapons themselves become so expensive—indeed, so valuable—that their defense becomes a prime necessity; offensive systems are sacrificed to the proliferation of adequate defenses for intricate weapons too valuable to lose. Also, as the systems themselves become more complex, there are growing uncertainties about the adequacy of the military forces that are expected to be able to use these sophisticated arms. Problems of command and control become genuinely forbidding; with little simulated experience to provide the kinds of confidence that existed when new systems were easy to experiment with, additional reasons for concern are created.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Given all these ambiguities, it is scarcely surprising that the period immediately ahead seems so threatening. When one considers also that Americans seem more uncertain than ever of what can be achieved to increase national security through arms control negotiations—of whether the United States pursued reasonable goals in its recent dealings with the Soviet Union—of whether the SALT II accords merit ratification or ought to be shelved as highly imperfect compromises, the full extent of the nation's dilemma is revealed. Many feel disappointment with the whole negotiating process; others are unhappy with the relatively insignificant results achieved to date. The SALT process depended on the belief that strategic stability would be the inevitable consequence of mutual assured destruction; mutual vulnerability was thought to be the high road to military security. The Soviets were expected to emerge from the SALT process with the same general appreciation of the military situation that was common among experts in the United States. This does not appear to have occurred at all.

Instead, there is new doubt about what the Soviets intend, of what political, diplomatic, and military ventures they may be contemplating. Parity, to date at least, has not provided the tangible security that was once anticipated. The future of SALT—not only of the existing SALT II treaty—but of the process itself, is in doubt. There are many options; they range from wholly abandoning the effort to substantially altering the objectives sought and the modalities used in negotiation. The 1970s dissipated the easy confidence that came after success with SALT I; it is not likely that negotiations in the 1980s will at all resemble those that have recently taken place. The American approach may have been too "mechanistic" from the beginning. Other approaches and quite new attitudes may now be required. The most urgent need, however, may be for a vastly increased store of intellectual and conceptual capital.

If one considers the kinds of military and political challenges that the United States and its allies are likely to encounter in the decades ahead, it is reasonable to ask what role arms control negotiations and agreements can have in creating a more adequate defense of the vital interests of all. In this connection, there is no better record to consult than the recent one—how the United States has dealt with the Soviet Union since the end of World War II. What theories have we been most partial to? How have we thought about weapons, strategy, and the role of negotiations? Which of these earlier ideas survive today? Which would it be profitable to discard? What, then, ought to be put in their place? So that the reader of these *Daedalus* volumes may be prepared for some of the more radical propositions advanced in these pages, it may be enough to say that one of the two arms control essays, without seeking to be provocative, suggests that "the arms control debate has tended to revolve around obsolete conceptions of the Western security problem and the character of the Soviet-American arms race." A more incendiary statement can scarcely be conceived. If, as is suggested, there is confusion today about the purposes of arms control, of how arms control can be articulated with defense policy, rhetoric will do little to alleviate or resolve the problems that exist. Very specific military issues, which concern the alliance as a whole, must be confronted; there is no way to avoid them or to wish them out of being. Wholly new estimates need to be made of Allied military capabilities, and these will have to be based on something other than an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

arithmetical counting of warheads. If technological capabilities are important—as they are—so, also, are the tactical strengths that are measured in battle situations. If arms control "must take a back seat" while other of the more fundamental military issues are dealt with, this seems a wholly necessary step to at least one of those who have written for this issue.

That all such suggestions will raise controversy—that they are intended to do so—is the first and most important belief of those who have planned these *Daedalus* issues. When we first considered publication dates, we thought it important that both volumes appear before the election. As the electoral campaign proceeded, however, we recognized the utopianism of that idea. The notion that our quadrennial national political sport event can be used for serious intellectual purposes is evidence of rare innocence. If the "fun and games" have gone out of political party conventions, so have they fled from electoral campaigns, making a mockery of the idea that these are arenas of significant combat in which both seriousness and levity are possible. These have been grim months in the United States, and there is little reason to expect that those that now await us will be any less so. This, however, offers no excuse for continuing in our rhetorical ways. The issues discussed in these volumes are both pressing and real; there is no way to avoid them. They will affect our own lives and those of our children as few others can. We publish these volumes in the hope of inaugurating a dialogue; the last of the essays in this volume is the first contribution to such a discussion. We need other criticisms, no less pointed, even more outspoken, if we are to succeed in engaging those who understand the stakes that are being played for.

The Ford Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace made this issue possible. Our gratitude to them is considerable. With their assistance we have been able to accomplish what we originally set out to do—provide a forum for a wide range of opinions on highly controversial matters, that will not be quickly resolved, but that call out for serious discussion.

S.R.G.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MICHAEL NACHT

Toward an American Conception of Regional Security

AMERICA'S LEADERS HAVE ALWAYS FELT A NEED to articulate concepts that capture the direction of their foreign policy. In the early days of the Republic, Jefferson borrowed ideas set forth in Washington's farewell address to emphasize the avoidance of "entangling alliances," encouraging the development of the new American state free of European intrigues. The Monroe Doctrine—enunciated in 1823, named in 1852, first invoked in 1895, and recognized by other nations only in the twentieth century—was perhaps not what Lafayette, the great lover of America, called "the best little bit of paper that God had ever permitted any man to give to the World"; but it was a declaration that the United States expected the European powers to keep their "hands off" territory in the Western Hemisphere. Manifest Destiny, a phrase coined by a New York newspaper editor in 1845, provided political and theological license for the United States to possess the whole continent, "which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment in liberty and federated self-government entrusted to us." Neutrality as espoused by Wilson during most of World War I and Roosevelt's lend-lease formula prior to America's entrance into World War II each conveyed the fundamental thrust of U.S. foreign policy at critically important periods in international politics. And, more recently, containment—"the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points"—emerged as the American response to the international communist threat in the aftermath of the global struggle with fascism.

These concepts were more than slogans; they were expressions of commitment, reflecting both capabilities and intentions. For a conception of foreign policy to be credible both in a democratic society and to that society's allies and potential adversaries, it must relate well to the material strengths of the state and to the collective will of its people. A conception clearly inconsistent with material strength would weaken alliances and be ignored by adversaries. A conception markedly at variance with the will of the people would ultimately be overturned by public ridicule and opposition.

There are, of course, tensions between the general and the specific in the conceptualization of foreign policy. Too high a level of abstraction leads to meaningless phrases that cannot be tested against reality; too much specificity sacrifices comprehensiveness, and fails to take account of the unpredictable aspects of human affairs. Although no general formula for American foreign

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy can be derived that is analytically as rigorous as, for example, the Newtonian relationship between mass and acceleration, the total absence of conceptualization—the sheer promotion of a foreign policy based on "ad hocracy" and expediency, resistant to any form of generalization—invites confusion, inconsistency, and miscalculation by friends and foes alike. What must be found in a conception of foreign policy are guidelines for actions, the establishment of criteria that, once met, suggest unambiguous policy orientations.

Containment and Vietnam, and Its Aftermath

Containment rose to dominate American foreign policy from the late 1940s to the mid-1960s because it was interpreted in a reasonably consistent fashion and because it worked. Whatever the intentions of its authors—and there remains considerable dispute as to what these intentions in fact were—containment came to mean a network of formal military alliances and bases, and a tendency to use military force to prevent the expansion of communist influence beyond those territories seized by the Red Army at the end of World War II.[1] With the notable exceptions of China and Cuba, containment was a success; it commanded substantial support of all important segments of the American body politic—businessmen, politicians, journalists, labor leaders, scholars, the military. It was seen as potentially universal in its applicability, rather than region-specific, and provided the fundamental rationale for American political and military initiatives in international affairs.

America's traumatic experience in Vietnam, however, shattered public confidence in containment, at least as it had been applied well into the 1960s. To be sure, the lessons of Vietnam are different for different constituencies, as lessons from history always are, but there is little doubt that the "no more Vietnams" sentiment, in one form or another, is a principal reference point for American foreign policy, especially with respect to the developing world. And the influence of this sentiment is unlikely to disappear from America's political psychology unless and until a major new trauma is experienced or a staggeringly impressive achievement is demonstrated. For tens of millions of Americans—including many who grew up during the Vietnam war and who will assume high positions of public responsibility at the end of this century—Vietnam now rivals Munich and Pearl Harbor as the dominant memory, the most relevant analogy, to guide the future course of U.S. foreign policy.[2]

Even in the face of noticeably growing conservatism in the American mood, consequences of the Vietnam experience remain vividly evident. Many Americans, mindful of the excesses of the South Vietnamese regime against its own people, no longer believe that support for authoritarian regimes against their communist challengers should be an automatic U.S. policy preference. The intensity of the conflict within the communist world, principally Sino-Soviet, but also Sino-Vietnamese and Vietnamese-Cambodian, has broken down the American image of a monolithic communist threat. This, coupled with an appreciation of the ruthlessness and corruption of numerous noncommunist governments in developing countries, has made the American public far less confident of which side to choose, if any, in Third World conflicts.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The asymmetry of stakes has also emerged as an important lesson from Vietnam. In Southeast Asia, the United States was engaged in a limited war, and used limited means to achieve quite limited ends. The adversary, however, was waging *un*limited war, utilizing all the means at its disposal to achieve nothing less than total victory. The asymmetry of stakes was mirrored in an imbalance of incentives, and over the long haul, the military balance of power was less important than the disparity in political motivation.

The doctrine that a protracted limited war could be waged effectively by methods of controlled escalation was also largely discredited, at least as prosecuted by a democratic state with a penchant for public self-criticism through the news media. When blood as well as treasure is involved, open-ended commitments cannot be sustained if the objectives remain less than compelling.

Regional differentiation is still another by-product of the Vietnam experience. If in practice containment could be criticized for excessive reliance on military instrumentalities, the notion that it can be applied anywhere, irrespective of political, economic, cultural, historical, or topographical characteristics, also deserves censure. We now know that these characteristics do make a difference, that American military power and technological prowess cannot be applied in markedly different settings with a uniform probability of success.

The Vietnam debacle, moreover, not only affected the American tendency to intervene militarily in distant conflicts, it also dampened considerably the enthusiasm of Third World governments for American support. The death and destruction associated with American military intervention, the demonstrated unreliability of the duration of U.S. security commitments, the decline in American willingness to provide security and economic assistance, and the liability of being associated with a power that is often accused of being, and is widely perceived to be, supportive of the status quo and resistant to progressive economic and social development—all were serious warning signals for Third World leaders. Overseas military bases were closed and formal alliance commitments dismantled as a direct consequence of the desire of Third World governments to distance themselves from overt ties to the United States. In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, even where opposition to the Soviet Union is pronounced, having America as a physically and diplomatically visible ally is a luxury few governments think they can afford.

The United States went into a foreign policy tailspin after Vietnam, both conceptually and in terms of tangible measures of effectiveness. With it came a decline in American self-confidence that led to a polarization of views about the future contour of U.S. policies abroad. Some have argued that the organizing concept of American foreign policy should be the establishment and preservation of that great, intangible condition in international relations, the balance of power. The combination of a détente policy with the Soviet Union, the establishment of mutually accepted rules of conduct by both superpowers in the developing countries, and the maintenance of regional stability through reliance on selected regional hegemons was to be the essence of the American approach. But this "structure of peace" wobbled and then collapsed in the face of the unrelenting growth of Soviet military power, the utilization of Soviet proxy forces to promote regional change, the inherent political instability of several

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

key regional hegemons with which the United States was allied, and the inability of the concept of balance of power by itself, because of its intrinsic ambiguities, to command and sustain a foreign policy consensus among the American political elite.

Others have sought a formula in no formula, urging instead an *ad hoc* approach that expressly eschews any form of conceptualization, on the grounds that any foreign policy concept would fail to capture the complexities of the modern world and would lead to disaster, as containment had led to Vietnam. It was thought desirable to determine instead what our foreign policy objectives are and to resolve problems as they arise, issue by issue. The total absence of criteria, however, has led, understandably, to marked inconsistencies and incoherence that has surprised adversaries, angered allies, promoted cynicism among nonaligned states, and eventually, provoked confusion and disillusionment at home.

Finally, others seek to reconstitute containment, either in its original formulation or in a more limited anti-Soviet guise, as, once again, the guiding principle of American foreign policy. This approach, however, not only ignores the very real consequences of our experience in Vietnam; it also fails to address the reality that the conditions of international politics in the remaining decades of this century will be substantially different from those of the decades following World War II when containment was, for the most part, successfully applied.

The Changing Conditions of International Politics

The international order that prevailed from the late 1940s until well into the 1960s was marked by several distinctive characteristics. Of greatest significance was the domination by the United States over most facets of international military, political, and economic life. At the time, Americans often failed to appreciate the full magnitude of their nation's power and influence, but in retrospect, we now should see that it was a truly exceptional moment in world politics.

In military terms, the United States enjoyed substantial quantitative and qualitative superiority over its principal rival, the Soviet Union, in intercontinental-range nuclear weapons, nuclear systems based in Europe, naval forces, and airlift and sealift capabilities. The conventional force balance in Central Europe was seemingly the only arena of Soviet superiority, an edge fully nullified by the American capacity to maintain escalation control in the event of war. Furthermore, the willingness of the United States to intervene militarily in conflicts distant from its shores, although sometimes of dubious justification, reinforced the credibility of U.S. security guarantees that had been fashioned to contain communist expansion.

Politically, despite sporadic real differences with other alliance members, the United States dominated the Atlantic Alliance and, in particular, assured the maturation of strong, stable democratic regimes in Germany and Japan. The United Nations and many other international organizations were established by American initiative, supported by American funds, and were sensitive to American policy preferences. The United States more than any other country pursued a diplomacy that reached into every corner of the globe, from the preservation of entrenched American interests in the Western Hemisphere, to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the replacement—by itself—of the British colonial presence in the Middle East and substitution for the French in Southeast Asia. The United States was the unchallenged ideological leader of the capitalist world in the global struggle against communism.

American economic power was truly awesome. The United Staes alone produced more than 50 percent of the world's manufactured goods, maintained an enormous lead over all other states in terms of both gross national product and GNP per capita, and had an unrivaled standard of living. The international monetary system, predicated on a schedule of fixed exchange rates, was itself a product of American international economic policy. Moreover, the effective penetration of distant markets by flexibly organized U.S.-based multinational corporations provided unprecedented economic and political reach for potent private American interests.

The enormous tangible assets of American power coupled with the will to use them, as demonstrated by successive administrations over two decades, preserved an international order in which the Western industrial democracies flourished, with the freedom of action in political-military affairs of both Germany and Japan intentionally constrained. Communist influence was restricted to the territories occupied by Soviet armed forces at the end of World War II, with the sole additions of China and Cuba. During this period the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America were just beginning to emerge from their colonial pasts to function as independent, though necessarily weak, sovereignties. Even the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the period 1945-65 did not alter the post-World War II international order. The stability and relative cohesiveness of the West, the contours of the East-West political-military and ideological competition, and the establishment of independent perspectives among the developing countries were largely divorced from the spread of nuclear weapons programs and capabilities beyond the superpowers.[3]

The substantial reorientation of the international order in the next decade and a half, however, strongly suggests that the balance of the century will be markedly different. The first pronounced change in the international setting has been the retreat of the United States from its preeminent power position, due in part—but only in part—to the growth of Soviet military capabilities. The American superiority in intercontinental-range nuclear weapons is gone, perhaps permanently, and the United States faces the potential loss of escalation control in the European theatre. No longer does the United States alone maintain a global naval presence. Indeed, it faces a considerable challenge in certain regional naval balances, such as in Northeast Asia. Since the mid-1970s it has been the Soviet Union and its Cuban, Czech, and East German allies, not the United States, who have demonstrated the ability to intervene in distant conflicts rapidly and decisively. There is no doubt that American military power, although still awesome, has declined significantly in relative terms to that of the Soviet Union, and the propensity to use such power has declined even more rapidly.

Some of these trends could no doubt be temporary, and perhaps will be reversed in the years ahead. But it is worth noting one consequence that is likely to endure: the reluctance of the United States to use, or even to threaten credibly to use, nuclear weapons to resolve regional disputes outside Europe. At

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

several moments during the period of American nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union—the Korean War and the Quemoy-Matsu crisis in the 1950s, the Cuban missile crisis and the Khe Sanh seige during the Vietnam War in the 1960s, and the Arab-Israeli war in the 1970s, for example—the United States threatened, explicitly or implicitly, to use nuclear weapons as a coercive technique to further its policy preferences. But with the deployment of very large and sophisticated nuclear forces by the Soviet Union, a nuclear standoff of sorts between the superpowers has been reached. Assuming that this state will be maintained—a sensible assumption in light of the domestic forces that influence nuclear weapons policy in both countries—both sides have thus been denied the ability to exercise nuclear coercion against each other.[4] Not only would Soviet and American nuclear weapon use, or the threat of use, be absent from regional conflicts; both sides also would continue to exercise extreme caution to ensure that their general purpose forces did not engage each other in combat, for fear that such engagement would, or could, lead to a nuclear exchange. It must be noted, however, that the denial of the American ability to exercise nuclear coercion is a net loss in the capacity of the United States to influence the outcome of regional conflicts. It is of the highest priority, moreover, to prevent intercontinental and regional military balances from shifting to the point where Soviet leaders feel confident that they can utilize the instrumentalities of nuclear coercion to further their own regional objectives.

A concomitant decline of American economic might has been equally significant. By the late 1970s the United States accounted for less than one fourth of the annual value of manufactured goods in the world; in terms of GNP per capita, it had been surpassed by Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Kuwait, and was virtually tied with Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Denmark.[5] Chronic problems of economic productivity have plagued American economic performance, leading in turn to substantial balance-of-payments deficits, reduced rates of savings and investment, and a weakening of the dollar in international money markets within the system of flexible exchange rates established in the early 1970s. American-based multinational corporations faced stiff competition from aggressive and talented German, Japanese, and other non-American firms, and were welcomed less warmly in many developing countries than in the previous fifteen years. And with the emergence of Germany and Japan, in particular, not only as valued trading partners, but also as economic rivals of the United States, a divergence in their respective foreign policy interests not surprisingly developed.

There are two notable forces for change in the international order in addition to the relative decline of American military and economic power and the rise of Soviet military capabilities and the willingness to use them. These are the staggering growth in importance of the pricing and supply policies of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the increasing assertiveness of the developing states in protecting their own political and economic interests that largely disregards the East-West competition. Because none of the major industrialized states will likely escape being considerably dependent on imported oil for the balance of this century, the oil-producing states, especially in the politically volatile Persian Gulf, have in many respects become the center of gravity of the international political and economic system. The enormous

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

transfer of wealth to these states has contributed significantly to a pronounced and worrisome global inflationary condition. And governments throughout the world are suffering from severe political hypertension over the issue of security of energy supplies from states whose societies are themselves experiencing the clash between the pressures for economic and political modernization and the retention of traditional values and customs. The uncertainties of pricing and supply are so staggering, that maximal incentives have been created for the diversification of energy supplies and for the rapid development of indigenous energy sources, with states meanwhile tailoring their foreign policies to minimize the likelihood of precipitating disruptions of supply.

To this condition can be added the pronounced heterogeneity of interests within the community of developing countries and between these states and the industrialized world. The nonaligned movement and a variety of regional international organizations have become significant expressions of economic and political will that often bear little resemblance to the interests, values, and orientation of the West. And in military affairs there is a discernible trend for developing countries to establish their own armaments industries to satisfy both their defense needs and export goals.[6]

Because of the global reach afforded by modern transportation and communication, cooperation among subnational groups across international boundaries and, indeed, across continents has been greatly facilitated. Negative aspects of this cooperation are the rise of effective political separatist groups and the growth of international terrorism. Marked political instability within many developing countries—whether wholly derived from indigenous sources seeking to reconcile the forces of modernization with traditional norms, or induced by politically motivated external groups—can therefore be expected to be the norm rather than the exception.[7]

In sum, the network of nation-states, although becoming more interdependent in certain economic respects, is experiencing quite extraordinary political and military fragmentation, dichotomous trends that appear to be deep-rooted and long lasting.

American Domestic Constraints

It should not be surprising that the profound shifts experienced by the United States in world affairs in the last decade and a half have been reflected in major alterations in the character of American foreign and defense policy decision-making processes. Although it would be a gross distortion of the historical record to describe the period from 1945 to 1965 as the golden age of U.S. foreign and defense policy, the fact is that during this period the nation did possess four crucial assets: an organizing concept to guide its behavior in the world; military superiority over its principal adversaries; extraordinary economic strength; and deep and abiding national self-confidence. These strengths were reflected at home in a national consensus surrounding major foreign policy initiatives, in an executive-congressional relationship on foreign and defense policy issues that bordered on the hierarchical, and in a pervasive confidence in American society and in American technology that crowded out the most parochial motivations and policy preferences.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

By 1980, however, much had changed. Not only had the United States lost the organizing concept that structured and rationalized American foreign policy, but also Americans saw themselves as becoming number two militarily in the face of relentless Soviet expansionism. Americans and others perceived the United States as an economic power in serious decline. And, as important, Americans had lost, or were certainly losing, their self-confidence. The image of American marines raising the flag at Iwo Jima had been assigned to the historical scrap heap. It had been replaced by U.S. embassy officials fleeing from the North Vietnamese in the last helicopter to leave Saigon and by the wreckage of American helicopters in the Iranian desert, a symbol of the futile and inept attempt to rescue American hostages taken at the U.S. embassy in Teheran.

By 1980 the United States was a wounded nation. And wounded nations seek answers and relief in simplicity, in panaceas, and, dangerously, in jingoism. Presidential authority eroded. Specialized interests dominated congressional debates on weapons procurement decisions. Confusion reigned on the central precepts of American military strategy. And voices in the public debate deprecated U.S. capabilities and elevated Soviet effectiveness far more than the facts could justify.

Negativism has a momentum of its own that can be broken only by success. A sense of fresh leadership and competence, the stimulus of a major technological or conceptual breakthrough, or even a successfully handled international crisis would go a long way toward restoring American national confidence. Without such psychological renewal, however, no investment in material strengths could, by itself, convey coherence and purposefulness to U.S. defense policy.

Both in conceptual and organizational terms, the constraints operating on the U.S. policy-making process are far more severe than they were even a decade ago. Conceptually, three significant realizations had taken hold by the early 1970s around which consensus could be built. The first was the judgment that the United States and the Soviet Union were *not* engaged in a global contest for power that was "zero sum" in nature. Americans began to believe, influenced in part by Soviet behavior and by the emerging Sino-Soviet split, that limited cooperation with the Soviets was possible, and surely preferable to unbridled competition, and that the most important shared value was the desire to avoid nuclear war.

A second view, widely adopted, that stemmed from the early writings of defense intellectuals, was that numbers no longer mattered, or mattered very little, in the nuclear weapons business. Once the leadership was confident that a few thousand warheads could survive even the most well-orchestrated first strike and be delivered as part of a resounding retaliatory attack, it was felt that the conditions for nuclear deterrence would be satisfied. The buildup of forces beyond this point served no discernible military or political purpose.

The third was that military force was of limited value in achieving foreign policy goals, a lesson learned painfully in Vietnam. It became fashionable to believe that economic and other nonmilitary concerns would come to dominate a world of growing interdependence, and that traditional definitions of security were becoming passé.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The prevalence of these views laid the basis for domestic support for negotiated arms control with the Soviet Union, and permitted President Nixon and Henry Kissinger to use arms control as part of a strategy to enmesh the Soviet Union into the complexities of the international community—where the Soviets would find that, to achieve their foreign policy objectives, tradeoffs would have to be made. In this way they hoped to complicate Soviet decision-making processes and, ultimately, to reform Soviet behavior and reduce the aggressive and expansionist character of Soviet foreign policy aims.

The dispute that arose over the numerical disparities between Soviet and American land-based and sea-based missile launchers contained in the SALT I interim agreement signaled that numbers (of warheads or launchers) *do* matter, at least in the context of the American defense debate. Parity is a fine idea for Americans to subscribe to as long as they enjoy superiority. But once numerical parity is seen as having arrived, but then rapidly slipping away, it is virtually impossible for this deteriorating condition to be avoided as a subject of political debate, irrespective of the intrinsic merits of the numerical comparisons. Then, with the intensification of the U.S. debate at home and abroad, the numbers *do* take on at least political significance; American leaders *do* become less confident; our allies *do* become more uncertain about the credibility of U.S. support; and the Soviet Union's leadership *does* become more emboldened in its attitudes, pronouncements, and policies. In the 1970s the strategic nuclear balance, as measured by most static indicators, shifted dramatically to the Soviet advantage despite SALT, and the assumption that numbers do not matter was discredited politically.

Following the ratification of the SALT I agreements, the character of Soviet nuclear force deployments and the nature of Soviet policy in the developing countries undermined the assumption that the Soviets and Americans could cooperate. The litany of Soviet "transgressions" is by now regrettably familiar: the deployment of high-accuracy ICBMs, which pose a serious threat to the U.S. ICBM force and its command, control, and communication system; the deployment of high-accuracy IRBMs for use in the European theatre, which could deny NATO's ability to maintain escalation control in the event of a conventional war in Europe; the testing of antisatellite weapons; questionable adherence to certain provisions of the ABM treaty and of other arms control agreements; the development and maintenance of an elaborate civil defense program; the generation of military writings that concentrate on nuclear war-fighting; the use of Cuban proxy forces and Czech and East German military advisors in Sub-Saharan Africa; and the invasion of Afghanistan. Honest men can disagree about the significance of any one of these developments, but their cumulative effect has been to paint a picture for the American people of an adversary bent on destroying the West and whose leadership has *nothing* in common with the United States, not even the avoidance of nuclear war.

Moreover, in the aftermath of American disengagement from Vietnam, crises and conflicts continued to materialize, and the nature of American weakness was accentuated. The avoidance of a Soviet-American confrontation during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war; American inability or unwillingness to counter communist gains in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia; the humiliating hos-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tage situation in Iran; and the smoldering problems of political instability in Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and the Philippines, all accentuated the significance of the role of force in the modern world. And this realization produced a marked shift in congressional and popular attitudes about the need for growth in the defense budget, for rapid deployment forces, for a more potent naval presence to project American power, and even for serious reconsideration of the resumption of conscription.

But this marked shift in attitudes could not be readily translated into coherent policies and programs because of structural weaknesses in the policy-making process that has been termed a "crisis of competence in government," a crisis attributable to five major developments. (1) The disintegration of American political parties, brought on in part by the decline of party bosses and machine politics, which has weakened the party as a force uniting the president, the House, and the Senate. (2) The popularization, through state primaries, of the presidential selection process, which has increased the prospect that a president could be chosen with limited experience in, or knowledge of, national or international affairs: (3) The rejection of presidential leadership by the Congress, a consequence of Watergate and other perceived excesses of the "imperial presidency." (4) Severe limitations on congressional leadership, resulting from the breakdown of the seniority system and the large influx of newly elected officials who prefer political individualism to party loyalty. And (5) deterioration of administrative competence, owing to the increasing number of political appointees in top management positions chosen for reasons (e.g., policy views, constituencies represented, or political services rendered) other than the ability to manage.[8]

The net result of these developments has been increased *fragmentation of authority* throughout the federal policy-making process. This is not a new characteristic, of course. Fragmented authority is an inherent feature of the process that all public managers face, at least in the United States. Richard Neustadt pointed out two decades ago that presidential power resided primarily in the power to persuade. But the process is significantly more fragmented now. And in the foreign and defense policy arena, with the collapse of containment and the discrediting of détente, the challenges to policy coordination and integration are especially formidable.

A further impediment to the formulation and implementation of sensible, coordinated foreign and defense policies is the *sheer overworked condition of the senior figures* in the national security policy community. The overloading of responsibilities on a few key officials, it has been observed, has produced several deleterious effects,

> among them crisis management as a way of life and reaction to events rather than planning and initiatives; inadequate staffing of positions simply because the principals usually lack the time either to determine what kind of support they need or to absorb the results of the work that is done; the ability to handle only a very small number of issues more or less simultaneously; the tendency of the staffs to coordinate and compromise at the lowest common denominator rather than let issues escalate to their harried principals; the exploitation of this process by the ambitious to make their mark, expand staffs, and attract notice; and leaks as disaffected staffs become alienated from this interminable process or are unable to make their views heard. . . . Thus, to the extent that the Carter defense program (or practically any

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

other for the past decade) meets national needs, it is as much by accident as by design.[9]

This problem is just as severe at the highest levels in the Department of State and in the Office of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs. Indeed, Marshall Shulman, who served as a special assistant to Secretary of State Dean Acheson in the Truman Administration, and in a similar capacity to former Secretary of State Vance, estimated that the work load was ten times in 1980 what it was in 1950. With such backbreaking schedules, it is little wonder that government's top officials produce contradictory and suboptimal policies.

If these were not enough, significant additional impediments abound. One is the fundamental differences in outlook, amounting to essentially *irreconcilable ideologies*, held by key players who influence national security policy. In the late 1970s officials with impressive professional credentials trained their talents on foreign policy, defense, and arms control issues. They were graduates of America's leading universities, and they collectively represented expertise in a wide range of legal, political, military, and technical issues. But they disagreed sharply on virtually every fundamental question about national security policy: the delicacy of the strategic nuclear balance; the political and military significance of growing U.S. ICBM vulnerability; the political utility of nuclear weapons; whether the Soviet Union was motivated primarily by defensive or expansionist aims; whether Soviet foreign policy was opportunistic or based on a grand design; whether Soviet leaders were optimistic or pessimistic about the future and, as a consequence, whether a "window of vulnerability" would materialize in the 1980s; the meaning of strategic stability and the desirability of deploying high-accuracy counterforce weapon systems; what SALT had accomplished and what negotiated arms control with the Soviets could hope to accomplish in political, military, and economic terms. These views were deep-rooted, and gave rise to perceptions and self-perceptions that accentuated polarization within the community. Some saw themselves as latter-day Churchills doing battle against dangerously naive Chamberlains; others saw themselves as sophisticated foreign policy centrists at odds with simplistic, Neanderthal-like extremists who only saw military solutions to what were most often political problems. As a consequence of the fragmentation of authority and of the incompatibility of many of the prescriptions advanced, the policy process was marked by intense bargaining, most often yielding outcomes that reflected tradeoffs and contradictions rather than consistency of purpose.

Differences in perspective were dramatized by the endemically *conflicting organizational stakes* represented in the process. The secretary of defense is under constant pressure to perform such diverse and demanding functions as the formulation and articulation of military strategy, resolving the enormous problems of managing resources given the long lead times from research to deployment of weapons systems, commanding the respect and loyalty of the military services, and serving as a personal defense advisor to the president—assisted in all these functions by a staff with limited foreign area and political expertise.

The secretary of state, concerned with charting and implementing foreign policy, oversees a vast array of activities and personnel organized along both regional and functional lines. Diplomacy and negotiation are at the heart of his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

concerns. He and his colleagues, with limited technical and military expertise, tend to be reactive to, and often skeptical about, the utility of weapons systems that might be politically damaging to existing negotiations or to relations with other states.[10]

The director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency presides over a small, bureaucratically weak organization with a limited budget, conceived, in adversarial fashion, to "counter" the influence of the defense community in the making of national security policy. The organization is "product" oriented: its basic business is to promote, and assist in the achievement of, negotiated arms control agreements. Too often ACDA personnel see the Defense Department as the principal adversary, and project an image of seeking arms control for its own sake, irrespective of military requirements or foreign policy concerns.

The president's assistant for national security affairs has enormous influence by virtue of his proximity to the president and the close personal relationship that often develops between them, and by his access to perhaps the broadest array of sensitive information available to anyone in the U.S. government. This office has evolved considerably since the early 1960s, and its present day-to-day burdens are enormous. The assistant and his NSC staff of fewer than fifty professionals are occupied with virtually every serious national security and international economic problem confronting the government. Given the breadth of issues in which this office is involved, it seems unreasonable to expect that it will produce, on a sustained basis, foreign and defense policy guidance that could serve both America's enduring national security interests and the divergent needs of competing organizations.

We could add to this list:

- The Joint Chiefs of Staff, who oversee a vast military establishment that is torn by competing interests, priorities, and traditions, that is severely demoralized by the Vietnam experience and, more recently, by the failed rescue attempt in Iran, and that sees itself as unnecessarily and harmfully constrained by civilian leaders who use the military solely for selfish political ends.

- Officials of the Office of Management and Budget, who seek to influence policy through budgetary control over programs whose purpose and substance they appreciate only to a limited extent, and who are forced to make decisions in a highly inflationary and therefore highly unpredictable economic climate.

- Officials of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, who have witnessed the dramatic decline in influence of the president's science advisor in national security affairs since the days of Kistiakowsky and Wiesner, and who now play, at best, a marginal role on selected defense issues.

- The president, whose behavior often reflects the contradictory advice of his associates and the indecisive character of contemporary attitudes within the Congress and among the informed elite and the general public.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In addition to these varying and competing perspectives, a major constraint on the policy process is what might be termed the *clean slate phenomenon*. Every new administration seeks to make its mark by evaluating the major policies and programs it has inherited, by dismantling, when feasible, ineffective practices, and by introducing as many distinctively new initiatives as the system will tolerate. Wiping the slate clean and starting afresh guarantees a certain degree of discontinuity, at least from administration to administration. Given all of the above constraints, it would be naive to expect the policy process as it now works to produce mutually consistent foreign policy initiatives and defense programs on a sustained basis.

The Identification of American Regional Interests

In the highly volatile and complex international environment of the late twentieth century, the objectives of American foreign and military policy can be seen as, first, preserving the territorial integrity of the United States and, second, satisfying a variety of interests that are by and large region-specific. The first objective is primarily a matter of deterring a Soviet nuclear strike on continental United States and ensuring that American nuclear forces are sufficiently potent, flexible, and invulnerable to dissuade any potential adversary from striking the United States as a consequence of the escalation of a regional conflict. The definition of the force structure required to satisfy these criteria is a matter of some complexity that is outside the scope of this analysis.[11] The interests involved in the second objective can be most readily identified by considering ethnic, historical, economic, and geopolitical criteria.

The foreign policy of any democratic state, indeed of any state, is influenced considerably by the ethnic composition of its populace and the ties of these ethnic groups to their counterparts in other states. In the United States, ethnic ties that transcend American borders are reflected in public opinion polls, congressional attitudes toward specific foreign policy problems, and in the formulation of American policy positions by the president and members of the executive branch. As the ethnic composition of the population changes, American foreign policy must necessarily change as well.[12]

According to available data, roughly half the American population is of European (English, French, German, Irish, Italian, Polish, Russian) or Spanish-speaking (Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American, or other) ethnic origin, with the balance of the populace either indicating other ethnic backgrounds or (10 percent) not reporting.[13] These statistics mask certain additional influences on American foreign policy, particularly the strong ties between America's six million Jews and the state of Israel, the affinity of some influential black Americans for certain African independence movements, and the weight of the American Greek community in determining the U.S. stance toward the Greco-Turkish dispute. But this criterion suggests one of the sources for the continued powerful American interest in European security and, increasingly, as their percentage of the population rises, in Puerto Rican, Cuban, and Mexican affairs.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has fashioned explicit or implicit security commitments with a number of states, commitments that carry

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 1. Major Foreign Sources of Selected Minerals and Metals, 1974-77

State	Minerals and Metals
Algeria	Mercury
Australia	Bauxite, cadmium, zinc, titanium
Belgium	Cobalt, cadmium, zinc
Bolivia	Tin, tungsten, antimony
Brazil	Columbium, mica, manganese, tantalum, iron ore
Canada	Columbium, tantalum, asbestos, nickel, cadmium, zinc, potassium, selenium, mercury, gold, silver, tungsten, gypsum, iron ore, iron and steel, aluminum
Chile	Vanadium
China	Antimony
Dominican Republic	Gypsum
Finland	Cobalt
Gabon	Manganese
India	Mica
Indonesia	Tin
Ireland	Barium
Israel	Potassium
Jamaica	Bauxite, gypsum
Japan	Iron, steel
Liberia	Iron ore
Libya	Petroleum
Malagasy Republic	Mica
Malaysia	Tantalum, tin
Mexico	Strontium, flourine, cadmium, zinc, selenium, mercury, silver, barium, gypsum
New Caledonia	Nickel
Nigeria	Petroleum
Norway	Nickel
Peru	Silver, barium
Saudi Arabia	Petroleum
South Africa	Vanadium, antimony, flourine, asbestos, manganese, chromium, platinum
Spain	Strontium
Surinam	Bauxite
Switzerland	Gold
Thailand	Columbium, tantalum, tin, tungsten
Turkey	Chromium
Soviet Union	Chromium, platinum, gold, vanadium
United Kingdom	Platinum
Venezuela	Petroleum, iron ore
West Germany	Potassium
Yugoslavia	Selenium
Zaire	Cobalt
Zambia	Cobalt
Zimbabwe	Chromium

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

historical weight and symbolic significance. These include the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; bilateral pacts with Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines; the multilateral commitment to Australia and New Zealand (the ANZUS pact); and the implicit support for Israel.[14] And, despite the decision to transfer ownership of the Panama Canal to Panama at the end of the century, the United States retains its important historical right to unimpeded naval access through the canal. Given the high correlation between the preservation of these commitments and American perceptions of the power of the United States in world politics, there are strong incentives to retain every one of these security arrangements.

In economic terms, a far larger number of states is seen to be significant to American interests. Table 1 identifies those countries that were major foreign sources of selected minerals and metals in the mid-1970s.[15] American reliance on Brazil, Canada, Mexico, and South Africa for numerous commodities is most striking, although a single commodity dependence (e.g., Saudi oil) could of course be of equal or greater importance.

Imports as a percentage of apparent consumption (Table 2) have increased most appreciably (defined as at least 25 percent more in 1978 than in 1960) in cobalt, fluorine, cadmium, potassium, selenium, mercury, petroleum, and vanadium. Note that cobalt alloys are used in jet aircraft production, fluorine compounds are utilized to enrich fissionable uranium isotopes for nuclear energy, cadmium isotopes are found in control rods and shielding for nuclear reactors, selenium serves as a catalytic agent in certain petroleum products, mercury has application as a primer for explosives, and vanadium is utilized in nuclear energy applications.

It is a complex matter, however, to determine the extent to which import arrangements actually reflect foreign dependence on critical raw materials. Such determinations must take into account stockpile inventories, alternative sources of supply, the prospects of commodity substitution as a consequence of innovation or price elasticity, and the mutual vulnerability of bilateral trading arrangements, especially in light of the significance of the enormous American market to potential suppliers. In short, importation is not the same as dependency, and dependency does not necessarily imply vulnerability. Indeed, it can be argued that, with the exception of oil needed by the entire Western world, the United States retains the options to resist successfully the interruption of all its raw material importation arrangements.

In terms of volume of trade, the most vital American relationships have been with Canada, Japan, West Germany, Britain, France, and Italy. As opposed to its trade with several European states, American trade with the Soviet Union and other communist states has not developed to significant levels. (The sale of grain to the Soviet Union is one exception.) American direct investment in the developed countries (Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa) by the late seventies was three times as great as in the developing countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia.[16] America, therefore, is less dependent on the entire world economy than many would presume.

Finally, in geopolitical terms, a perspective based on concrete American interests rather than purely mechanistic anticommunist or anti-Soviet motiva-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 2. U.S. Imports of Selected Minerals and Metals as Percent of Apparent Consumption

Mineral	1960	1978	Differences (1978-1960)
Columbium	100	100	0
Mica	94	100	+ 6
Strontium	100	100	0
Manganese	89	98	+ 9
Tantalum	94	97	+ 3
Cobalt	66	97	+31
Bauxite	74	93	+19
Chromium	85	92	+ 7
Platinum group	82	91	+ 9
Asbestos	94	84	−10
Flourine	48	82	+34
Tin	82	81	− 1
Nickel	72	77	+ 5
Cadmium	13	66	+53
Zinc	46	62	+16
Potassium	—	61	+61
Selenium	25	61	+36
Mercury	25	57	+32
Gold	56	54	− 2
Tungsten	32	50	+18
Antimony	43	48	+ 5
Petroleum	16	47	+31
Silver	43	41	− 2
Barium	45	40	− 5
Titanium	22	39	+17
Gypsum	75	34	− 1
Iron ore	18	29	+11
Vanadium	—	27	+27
Iron and Steel	—	13	+13
Aluminum	—	10	+10

tions leads to the identification of dominant American interests, which may be summarized by region.

- North America—The United States has had the good fortune to have relatively weak states on its borders through most of its history. There are powerful incentives to maintain sound political and economic relations with Mexico, whose petroleum-derived wealth could lead to a Mexican self-assertiveness unknown to Americans since the mid-nineteenth century. With a history marked by territorial disputes and severe migration problems, Mexican-American relations could take on serious security dimensions late in the century. To the north, a more remote possibility is the success of a separatist movement in Quebec or the unleashing of other centrifugal forces, leading

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to the collapse or transformation of the Canadian federation and to the emergence of an economically weak and politically vulnerable new state on America's northern border.

- Central America and the Caribbean—Besides the resolution of the political status of Puerto Rico, a problem that has flared into violence both on the island and the mainland, the principal American problem is to contain Cuban communist expansion and to expose its economic weakness. This is best achieved through multilateral political and economic measures, but the American military threat remains present in retaliation for the use of Cuban troops as Soviet proxies.

- South America—The key state in this region is Brazil, enormously proud and becoming increasingly powerful, with a population that will equal America's by the end of the century. Brazilian leaders have regional and even global power aspirations, but preside over a politically volatile society. The great challenge for American policy in the Western Hemisphere in the next two decades may be to work out a political, economic, and military *modus vivendi* with Brazil.

- Western Europe—The maintenance of a sound relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany dominates American interests in this region. A militarily strong democratic West Germany closely allied with the United States is far preferable to a Germany either assuming an independent stance or pursuing policies conforming closely to Soviet interests.

- East Asia—U.S. interests with Japan are similar to those with West Germany. Among the most significant blows to America's international position would be the loss of Japan as an economic and military ally. The maintenance of Philippine and South Korean security, while valuable in their own terms, are fundamentally derivative of the American relationship with Japan.

- Middle East—American regional policy centered around the complex Egypt-Israel-Saudi Arabia triangle may be difficult to sustain, but there are few other options available. Internal political instability in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, rather than another Arab-Israeli war, is the key element to the unraveling of American designs.

- Sub-Saharan Africa—No state is crucial to the United States in this region, but Nigeria and South Africa would be significant opponents if dominated by pro-Soviet governments. The United States has almost no leverage in the region, and can benefit most from British and French diplomacy.

- Communist States—The United States should have as its objectives the discouragement of (1) a Sino-Soviet rapprochement; (2) Soviet control over Yugoslavia; (3) Vietnamese domination beyond "French" Indochina. No direct American mililtary involvement will serve these objectives. Rather, what is needed is a combination of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

military assistance, diplomatic skill, the enlisting of Chinese assistance to satisfy the third objective, the strength of local opposition, and luck.

Characteristics of a New Regional Security Approach

A conception of regional security is a bet on the future, a statement that "since we expect X, we intend to do Y." If X fails to materialize, Y could be hopelessly inappropriate, counterproductive, or dangerous. If the above summary of changing international conditions is accurate, and if the assessment of American domestic constraints and regional interests is close to the mark, a conception of regional security would have several distinctive characteristics.

First, the United States should seek to define the necessary and sufficient conditions for engaging in acts of preemptive deterrence. The purpose of such acts would be both to protect assets vital to American interests and to dissuade the Soviet Union from attempting to seize these same assets. Consideration of preemptive deterrence follows from the realization that a Soviet-American nuclear and conventional standoff necessarily leaves certain key areas vulnerable to political intimidation and military intervention. The precise military balance in these areas is less important than *who* is in control of *what* first. Consider, for example, the case of significant domestic political disruption of Saudi Arabia, disruption that threatens the flow of Saudi oil exports. By seizing vital oil fields and refineries, the United States would gain an immediate temporary advantage and would force Soviet leaders to contemplate a superpower conflict in order to take control of these assets. Prior to American intervention, neither side would necessarily be deterred from intervening, and indeed, there would be powerful incentives for each side to interfere in Saudi domestic affairs. Once one side had preempted, however, deterrence of direct involvement by the other superpower would likely be effective.[17]

This would be especially true in situations where the asymmetry of stakes favored the United States. It is vitally important that American action be restricted to those regions and situations where the intrinsic value of the assets in question and the motivation to acquire them are closer to U.S. security interests than to those of the Soviet Union or other potential adversaries, and that this asymmetry of stakes and motivation is widely appreciated by adversaries and allies well in advance of the initiation of military actions.

Obviously, it would be both foolish and dangerous to advocate a policy of preemptive deterrence except in the most favorable circumstances. Perhaps the quintessential illustration of the concept may be found in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979. Consider the problem from the Soviet perspective. The Afghan state had been under a communist government since 1978; has been desired by Russian leaders since the mid-nineteenth century; is populated by Muslims, who share characteristics with some of the Soviet peoples of Central Asia; is contiguous to the Soviet Union; and is both amenable to Soviet military penetration and remote from American military assets. In political and military terms, the asymmetry of stakes favored the Soviet Union to the disadvantage of the United States. No degree of American nuclear sabre rattling or economic or political sanctions is likely to dislodge the Soviets from their occu-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pation of Afghanistan, an occupation whose duration will be determined largely by local developments there and by the tangible costs and benefits to Soviet foreign policy in the developing world. The point is that, in political, cultural, historical, military, and logistic terms, the Soviets had the advantage. Other zones of application for preemptive deterrence may be less clear-cut, and there can be no guarantee that nuclear weapons might not be used in such a conflict, or that an act of preemptive deterrence, once carried out, might be difficult or impossible to sustain. But the more favorable the circumstances and the greater the asymmetry of the stakes, the higher the probability of success.

A related characteristic of American regional security policy should be *to increase reliance on naval power*, especially sealift capability, carrier-based aircraft, and the use of conventionally armed sea-launched cruise missiles. Naval power is flexible. It can be put in place and removed relatively easily from a potential conflict situation. If it is sensibly deployed, it can be insulated from large numbers of politically vulnerable basing arrangements. American naval power can project a military presence for political purposes, or introduce potent armed force into a conflict, without relying on the cooperation of any other sovereign state. Although it is very costly—indeed, in many scenario-dependent calculations for the Arabian Gulf, sea-based interdiction is the least cost-effective approach—it is politically and militarily more reliable than a strategy dependent on regional bases that are difficult to acquire and that are subject to the vicissitudes of local political moods. Moreover, American naval power, especially carrier task forces, are largely invulnerable except from direct Soviet attack. The United States should capitalize on the fundamental military advantage it enjoys vis-à-vis the Soviet Union: it is a sea power in competition with (primarily) a land power whose dominant strategic interest is probably the control of the Eurasian land mass. Only by exploiting this asymmetry can the United States hope to enjoy local military superiority in regional conflicts and be able to engage in preemptive deterrence when necessary.

This, in turn, suggests that American regional security policy should be guided by *selective, indirect activism:* selective, in that it recognizes quite explicitly that the United States has a hierarchy of regional priorities and that not all regional security problems are of equal value or interest; indirect, in that it avoids either the promotion of formal security commitments or the establishment of highly visible and therefore highly vulnerable military bases. But it should be an activism that conveys a strong commitment to protect American interests and to compete with the Soviet Union on the world stage. Selective, indirect activism, moreover, implies that universal principles should be eschewed, especially those that contradict each other or are inconsistent with explicit U.S. regional security interests. Further, it suggests that the emergence of independent regional power centers that might not toe the American policy line should be permitted and indeed encouraged to flourish, so long as these centers are independent of the Soviet Union as well.

It is not enough to articulate the elements of a regional security approach predicated on preemptive deterrence, increased reliance on naval power, and selective, indirect activism. It is necessary to build a domestic consensus around such an approach through repeated articulation and refinement of these con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cepts within the executive branch, in Congress, and among the American public. Only the consistent reiteration and justification of these ideas by high-level American officials will enable the approach to take hold.

Finally, it must be acknowledged that because of economic or domestic political constraints the United States may not be able to shoulder alone the protection of its own interests as well as those of the Western democracies. The time may be coming, sooner than most think, when West Germany and Japan—America's strongest economic allies—will feel compelled to deploy military forces far from home to protect their interests. Although such developments would cause highly adverse initial reactions within the Western world, among nonaligned states and in the Communist bloc—and would surely symbolize the end of the postwar international framework and require extraordinarily artful political management—the long-term effects need not be negative. A coordinated allied military force may be called upon to protect Western interests in the developing world in the next thirty years, much as the United States shouldered the burden virtually alone in the last thirty. This contingency should be confronted directly by American policymakers, and examined seriously with all its political, economic, and military implications. If strong political bonds could be maintained among all the democracies, this modality of protecting regional security interests would be highly preferable to the politically flawed and intellectually vague conceptions that have dominated American policy in the past.

REFERENCES

The author wishes to thank Robert Jervis and especially Steven Miller for their comments and criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper.

[1]George Kennan, the principal author of the concept, subsequently criticized its application on the grounds that the military dimension was overemphasized at the expense of the political. But in his attempt to clarify his original intentions, he addressed the tension between concept generality and specificity in a most confusing fashion. "What I said in the X-Article was not intended as a doctrine. I am afraid that when I think about foreign policy, I do not think in terms of doctrines. I think in terms of principles." George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950* (New York: Bantam Books, 1967), p. 383. According to Webster, however, a doctrine is "a principle of law established through past decisions" or "a statement of fundamental government policy especially in international relations"; and a "principle" is "a comprehensive and fundamental law, doctrine, or assumption." Presumably, what Kennan meant was that he had set out certain guidelines for government action at a rather high level of generality that in practice were applied selectively and incorrectly.

[2]This is an argument, admittedly contentious, that the post-Vietnam period of U.S. foreign policy will continue for many years, perhaps decades, beyond American disengagement from Southeast Asia, and that assertions of the arrival of a post-post-Vietnam phase in U.S. policy fail to appreciate the very deep psychopolitical scars this experience has left, not only on Americans, but on peoples everywhere.

[3]This observation, taking into account the Soviet, British, French, and Chinese nuclear weapons programs in addition to the American, could be challenged only with respect to the Chinese case. But surely the Sino-Soviet conflict, which provided the opportunity for Sino-American relations to improve, was a consequence primarily of other developments: the personal enmity between Mao and Khrushchev; the differing conceptions of how to organize and run a communist state; the conflicting interpretations of Marxist-Leninist theory and its application to developing societies; the rivalry for leadership of the international communist movement; border disputes that predate the establishment of the Soviet state; ethnic animosities between Russians and Chinese; and the tensions that would arise, seemingly inevitably, between two large and heavily populated states that share a 4,500-mile border. Soviet unwillingness to provide state-of-the-art assistance to the Chinese nuclear weapons program may have been the last straw from the Chinese perspective; and the subsequent acquisition of nuclear weapons and reasonably sophisticated delivery vehicles surely provided China with a strengthened ability to be militarily and politically independent from the Soviet Union, thereby altering the power alignment of international politics. But, given the deep-seated differences in Sino-Soviet relations, it seems highly probable that the rift between the two communist states would have materialized irrespective of the nuclear weapons issue. I address this basic obser-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vation at greater length in "The Future Unlike the Past: Nuclear Proliferation and American Security Policy," *International Organization*, Winter 1980-81, forthcoming.

[4]This judgment, of course, cannot be verified. The delicacy of the nuclear balance at the central strategic level has always been at issue, even among the pioneers of American strategic thought. But, at the regional level, I am impressed not only by the evidence of the last decade that this judgment is correct; I take note also of the views of two of the leading contributors to the literature on limited war, neither known for their softheadedness. Robert Osgood has stated that "outside Europe the credibility (in American eyes) of initiating the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances seem[s] to reach its high point in 1954, during the Quemoy and Matsu crisis and the fall of Dienbienphu, and has steadily declined ever since." See "The Post War Strategy of Limited War: Before, During and After Vietnam," in *Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age*, Lawrence Martin (ed.) (London: Heinemann, 1979), p. 104. William Kaufmann has stated: "Where both sides have large numbers of nuclear weapons (that is, thousands), it remains possible—at least on paper—for one side to achieve an exploitable military superiority over the other, although this kind of superiority is much more likely to be achieved at the strategic than at the tactical level. Despite this possibility, any nuclear exchange, strategic or tactical, would be fraught with the danger of escalation to unrestricted bombing and unprecedented civilian and military damage. . . . The idea that the United States, or for that matter the Soviet Union, is straining at the nuclear leash or is likely to launch nuclear weapons except in almost unimaginable circumstances is simply at variance with these realities. The decision is too hard, as anyone who has come at all close to it in the last twenty years knows only too well. Talk about an early use of nuclear weapons—even when it appears in supposedly serious Pentagon studies—is either the equivalent of cocktail party conversation or sheer bluff." "Defense Policy," in *Setting National Priorities: Agenda for the 1980s*, Joseph Pechman (ed.) (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1980), p. 294. Kaufmann, uniquely, has served as a principal consultant to the secretary of defense since 1961.

[5]See *World Development Report 1979* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1979), pp. 126-73. Although it can be argued that these are, for the most part, allies and friends of the United States whose economic strength reflects the success of postwar U.S. foreign policy, the relative decline of American economic power has led inexorably to the weakening of American political influence.

[6]These trends are developing during a period when the U.S. share of the international market in nuclear energy technology has declined significantly from the peak levels of the 1960s, and when the domination of the United States over the Soviet Union in the international arms trade shows signs of being reversed.

[7]The phenomenon of political instability in developing societies and the role of American policy in promoting or discouraging such instability is a vitally important and grossly underresearched subject of policy analysis. For the outlines of a research program to address these complexities and to develop a methodology for assessing the likelihood of regime changes in these societies, see Steven E. Miller, Stephen M. Meyer, and Michael Nacht, "Everything You Ever Wanted to Ask about Patterns of Political Instability in Developing Countries and Their Implications for American Policy but Were Afraid to Know," June 1980, mimeo.

[8]See James L. Sundquist, "The Crisis of Competence in Government," in *Setting National Priorities: Agenda for the 1980s*, Pechman (ed.), pp. 531-63.

[9]Kaufmann, "Defense Policy," pp. 285-6.

[10]A counterexample to this generalization, it should be noted, is the attitude in many State Department regional bureaus toward American conventional arms transfer policies. Seeing security problems from regional and country-specific perspectives, these officials have often been strong advocates of the supply of weapons to particular states.

[11]The wisdom of separating nuclear force posture considerations from regional security issues may not be apparent to all readers. But it can be defended intellectually if one accepts my judgment that if the United States and the Soviet Union swapped strategic nuclear arsenals, all of America's regional security interests, problems, and usable capabilities would be largely unaffected. Or, to put it more strikingly, if the United States land-based ICBM force were suddenly magically invulnerable, few observers outside the United States and the Soviet Union would care, and even fewer would be at all affected.

[12]The changes can be unanticipated, however. The Irish immigration of the late nineteenth century did not produce an American wave of anti-British sentiment during the days of President Wilson, nor did a large German population ultimately prevent the United States from fighting Germany in both world wars.

[13]These data, already badly out of date, are taken from the 1970 census, analyses of the 1980 census having yet to be published. See "Population, by Ethnic Origin—Selected Characteristics: 1973" in *U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1979* (100th edition) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 33.

[14]This commitment is based on a complex of issues that transcend ethnic considerations, including support for a Jewish state in light of the extermination of European Jewry during World War II,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and the desirability of having a politically stable Western-oriented democratic state in a turbulent and vital region.

[15]See "Net U.S. Imports of Selected Minerals and Metals as Percent of Apparent Consumption, 1960-1978, and by Major Foreign Sources, 1974-1977," *Statistical Abstract*, p. 754.

[16]See "U.S. Direct Investment Abroad—Direct Investment Position and Income by Country, 1970-1978, and by Selected Industries, 1978," *Statistical Abstract*, p. 851.

[17]Preemptive deterrence only addresses the superpower rivalry. It does not deal with maintaining the assets once seized or bolstering the military action with economic assistance or diplomatic initiatives.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GEORGE H. QUESTER

The Superpowers and the Atlantic Alliance

ARE NEW DOUBTS ABOUT THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT to its defense taking hold in Western Europe? To answer this, at least three kinds of evidence need to be considered. First, it is an undeniable fact that the relative advantage of the United States in strategic nuclear forces has eroded; the Russians now might even be perceived as moving into a position of "superiority." The abstract logic by which this is likely to upset our allies has been explored before, but it needs to be looked at again. Quite apart from such concrete changes in the strategic nuclear balance, we must note that U.S. foreign policy, in the aftermath of Vietnam, has seemed not only weaker and less committed, but also less coherent and organized; in a word, less competent. The question of how much this affects the NATO area is obviously relevant. Finally, we turn to the evidence of West European political behavior itself to see whether either of these changes in American "input" has as yet produced any alarming change of "output." Before Afghanistan, or after, are the Europeans more fearful of a Soviet attack than in the past? Have they made any clear concessions in fear of such attack? Or is it possible to say that the flow of concessions is going the other way?

Déjà Vu: *Eroding U.S. Strategic Strength*

Will a decline in U.S. strategic nuclear forces relative to those of the Soviet Union cause our European allies to lose confidence in our ability to protect them? A student of strategic affairs might easily respond with, "Haven't we been through all this before?" One can cite other moments in recent history when the same worried questions were asked, with no Soviet invasions of Western Europe or intimidations of the West European political system developing in the end.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The first Soviet atomic-bomb test, in 1949, obviously diminished American relative strength in this area. To lose a monopoly is to lose a ratio of advantage that can never be restored. The response of Paul Nitze and his staff, reflected in the NSC-68 document they prepared in 1949–50,[1] was fear that a substantial military threat to Europe and other allies of the United States would require extensive reinforcement of conventional and nuclear forces. The Communist armored invasion of South Korea in 1950 might be seen as confirmation of this fear (although the vagueness of American commitments to South Korea, as expressed by Secretary of State Dean Acheson or General Douglas MacArthur, had surely put Korea in a very different category from Europe then or now). The stationing of six American combat divisions in West Germany was a response to the Korean attack and perhaps, in part, an implementation of the logic and recommendations of NSC-68. A fuller implementation would have come with the implementation of the "Lisbon Goals" adopted formally by NATO in 1952, calling for the maintenance of a total force of ninety-six NATO divisions, but these goals never came close to fulfillment.[2]

A similar concern about the reliability of American nuclear-umbrella protection for Western Europe emerged after the launching of Sputnik in 1957, amid assumptions that the USSR had now moved far ahead of the United States in the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. These fears are sketched out clearly enough in the writings of Generals Maxwell Taylor, James Gavin, and John Medaris,[3] and in criticisms of the Eisenhower Administration by Senators Stuart Symington, Henry Jackson, Lyndon Johnson, and John F. Kennedy. Again the Russians were moving up on the United States, slicing away at what had been our strong suit in strategic nuclear weapons, perhaps even threatening to move ahead of us in this area. Whatever worrisome scenarios Paul Nitze and the Committee on the Present Danger can paint for us today for the end of the 1980s are not nearly as bad as those provided by certain analysts for the early 1960s. Soviet intercontinental and medium-range missiles, in the absence of similar missiles on our side, would be able to carry out a preemptive first strike on all our bomber bases, leaving us helpless—or at least intimidated by the very prospect of such a strike in all the future political contests of Central Europe.

The missile gap projected for the early 1960s turned out to be an illusion, as American deployments of submarine-based Polaris and land-based Minuteman missiles for a time created a "missile gap in reverse." After a time, arms controllers talked of a "plateau" of mutual assured second-strike forces, by which an advantage for either side would be meaningless—enshrined in our memory perhaps in the words of Secretary Kissinger: "What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?"[4]

The spectre of a meaningful Soviet strategic missile superiority was raised once again in the 1970s after the American distraction and defeat in Vietnam. Rather than hinging on the technological shift from airplanes to rockets (the Russians had looked ahead—illusorily—in rockets for a while in the 1950s), the new menace emerged out of a surprising Soviet determination to invest large amounts of money in the continued construction of large missiles, all the while carrying on negotiations with the United States on SALT I and SALT II. When the number and size of Soviet missiles is matched up with an almost inevitable

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

capacity for mounting more highly accurate multiple warheads on such missiles, we see that another shift has occurred in the distribution of strategic power, for a fraction of the total of Soviet land-based missiles could, if fired to target, destroy all U.S. land-based missiles. We must once again worry about political changes in the shadow of all of this, in particular among the Europeans who, ever since 1945, have been counting on American nuclear weapons as an important part of their protection.[5]

This recounting of earlier instances of such fears is not without importance, for our memories of past worries will inevitably shape somewhat the debate and discussion today. Novices will risk a great deal if they express their alarm today about possible Soviet threats in exactly the same words that were used in 1949 or 1959. In a sense, there is indeed "nothing new" when Europeans conclude that American strategic capacity against the USSR will be less next year than last; one can see this easily enough in comparing the opinion-poll predictions offered by Europeans in the 1950s and 1960s with those today.

Question: Which country in the world will be strongest 10 years from now? (World Gallup Poll, June 4, 1958)[6]

	Russia	U.S.	Other	No Opinion
Great Britain	36%	27%	16%	21%
Vienna	33	28	12	27
Paris	29	17	8	46
Brussels	39	27	23	11
Oslo	28	36	9	27
Milan-Rome	28	37	8	27

Question: Which of these do you think is likely to be true of 1979: A year when America will increase her power or a year when American power will decline? A year when Russia will increase her power in the world or a year when Russian power will decline? (Gallup International Research Institutes, December 1978)[7]

	Power Will Increase
West German polls	American, 20%
	Russian, 27
Netherlands polls	American, 24
	Russian, 32
British polls	American, 31
	Russian, 48

Have West Europeans translated this into a dread of Soviet attack, in a loss of confidence in American deterrence? They may not have. Compare the following two polls on expectations of Soviet power and of the quality of life toward the end of the 1960s. Since the great majority of West Europeans were not Communists rooting for Soviet power, a more complicated reconciliation had to be at work here.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Question: Which of these do you think is likely to be true of 1968: A year when Russia will increase her power in the world, or a year when Russia will decline? (World Gallup Poll, December 1967)[8]

	Increase	Decline	No opinion
France	45%	10%	45%
Italy	32	14	54
Norway	45	21	34
Sweden	40	18	42
Switzerland	57	20	23
West Germany	36	15	48

Question: So far as you are concerned, do you think that 1968 will be better or worse than 1967?

	Better	Worse	No difference, no opinion
France	36%	30%	34%
Italy	44	15	42
Norway	50	17	33
Sweden	36	19	52
Switzerland	38	10	52
West Germany	23	23	54

If we compare the trend over time of European expectations about future Soviet power (facing page), moreover, we would find, surprisingly, that European pessimism is not growing, but, if anything, is actually less than before the issues of comparative missile power began to provoke the current discussion.

What could possibly produce any continued European confidence in American nuclear guarantees when the objective trend is so continuously and steadily toward an erosion of U.S. strategic nuclear superiority? One possible counterweight to this trend comes from the sheer momentum of ongoing arrangements, a momentum that may increase in political impact as it continues over the years. As American strategic force strength has relatively declined, the continuity and normalcy of the American commitment may have actually expanded in the same years. What remains credible for a decade becomes more credible in decades thereafter, given the simple inertia of such things.

The American nuclear guarantee could have been challenged during the Eisenhower years. Yet forward deployments of American troops and American "tactical" nuclear warheads, combined with presidents' "jawboning" endorsements of American commitment and resolve, left the Soviet leadership always unsure whether it could invade Europe without suffering a nuclear devastation of Russian cities. The Russians have had the ability to destroy New York since 1949 yet have not tried to seize Hamburg or Paris under cover of this military capability. The American nuclear umbrella has somehow remained extended.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Question: Which do you think is likely to be true of (named year): A year when Russia will increase her power in the world or a year when Russian power will decline?[9]

	West Germany			Great Britain			France		
	Increase	Decline	Same/ Don't know	Increase	Decline	Same/ Don't know	Increase	Decline	Same/ Don't know
1960							59%	9%	32%
1961									
1962				45%	14%				
1963				31	27	42%			
1964				40	17				
1965				37	13	50			
1966				40	20	40			
1967	30%	23%	47%	42	15	43	53	9	38
1968	36	15	48	48	12	40	45	10	45
1969							34	23	43
1970									
1971	39	12	48	42	9	49			
1972	46	13	41	39	13	48	33	19	48
1973				29	21	50			
1974				35	13	52	37	13	50
1975				43	9	48			
1976	47	12	41	44	12	44			
1977	49	14	37	44	10	46	29	17	54
1978	33	8	59	39	9	52	23	20	57
1979	27	8	65	48	8	44	34	20	46
1980	28	9	63	41	6	54			

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

West Europeans have apparently made their adjustments in the past to seeming declines in American military strength from year to year, and may, by their comparative equanimity, bewilder younger Americans who would sound the alarm. Although no one was "crying wolf" in the earlier instances, the collective memory is nonetheless that the wolf never appeared at the door.

Yet, that similar fears went unrealized in the past is, of course, not any assurance that they now will go unrealized again. As the USSR chips away at the American strategic advantage—reducing it from monopoly in A-bombs to preponderence in bomber-carried H-bombs, then (after momentarily threatening an absolute Soviet superiority in missiles) to "essential equivalence" in missile-carried H-bombs, and, then to what some would call parity, others a Soviet superiority—do we not reach the point sooner or later where the Soviet military or political threat indeed becomes all too real?

Déjà Vu: *Nuclear Threats against Europe*

As the Soviet capacity for destroying American cities has grown, there has also been a continuing growth in the Soviet nuclear arsenal aimed at European cities. Once again we have to deal with a certain kind of *déjà vu*. When a sigh of relief went up in 1961 because the Russians had not built many ICBMs (as the United States now had a "missile gap in reverse"), we discovered that they had instead invested substantially in medium-range missiles capable of attacking Western Europe. It was the attempt to move some of such missiles to Cuba, to bring them within striking range of the United States, that produced the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

The heavy Soviet investment in the intermediate-range SS-5 and medium-range SS-4 by the beginning of the 1960s did not cause any tremendous stir in Europe or loss of confidence in American protection. Some of the current worries fasten on the next round of such Soviet deployments, however, as the mobile multiple-warhead, highly accurate SS-20 takes the place of the SS-5 and SS-4.[10]

Should we be so concerned about a Soviet capacity for laying waste to Western Europe, since we have always been most concerned about the attractiveness of an *intact* Europe to the Politburo? The alleged ability of Russian tank forces to roll into Hamburg and the Ruhr and Paris has always been the core of our problem, since the industrial potential that would fall into Soviet hands must always seem immensely appealing.

Indeed, it has been the very threat by Americans to escalate to nuclear war in the defense of such areas that has protected them. If the Russians try to seize some or all of Western Europe, a nuclear devastation of Western Europe (and of the USSR and North America) will follow; one result is that a Soviet ground offensive has never been launched here. As the Russians now become more able to impose such destruction directly on the prize of any aggression, as they did earlier with the SS-5 and SS-4, how much does this change? As long as the United States remains willing to escalate, in face of the destruction it itself would face, the nuclear deterrent remains in effect. The earlier shorter-range missiles were only more worrisome if large numbers of them could have been shifted to Cuba to become vehicles to be used against the United States. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SS-20 similarly would become more logically threatening were it to be converted into an intercontinental-range missile by the addition of another stage.

There is one form of linkage, however, that would make more sense here. A part of the credibility of nuclear retaliation against the USSR, if the Russians invaded only Europe (perhaps with the use just of conventional forces), comes not from the reiterated statements of American intention. It stems rather from the forward deployment of nuclear forces, forces that would come into use in the heat of battle, even if a "rational" American president in the end had not wanted them to be used. These forces take two forms: American "tactical nuclear weapons" and indigenous nuclear forces—those of the British, and most important, the French *Force de Frappe*.

The French discussion of the role of the *Force de Frappe* has been logically clear and blunt:[11] it is intended to make nuclear retaliation credible even when Washington and New York have not yet been attacked, even as Soviet tank forces are crossing the Rhine without having yet used nuclear weapons.

American discussion of the role of "tactical" nuclear weapons may not be as frank, but these weapons may be serving exactly the same purpose. The alleged intent of tactical nuclear weapons is to contribute to winning the war on the battlefield by helping to repulse Soviet tank columns. The real impact (and real intention, perhaps) is to make an escalation to World War III altogether likely—such that the Russians have one more reason to desist from such invasions, so that the logic questioning the American nuclear umbrella is muddled once more.

Perhaps we have a more plausible explanation of why the multiple warheads and accuracy of the new SS-20 could make a significant difference compared with the SS-4 and SS-5 it is replacing. What if the Soviet first strike was directed in a surgically clean manner at all the French, British, and American nuclear weapons in the European theater? Might this preclude immediate nuclear retaliation against Soviet forces and against targets in Eastern Europe and the USSR itself? Might this leave the rest of the European continent relatively intact and therefore make the aggression worthwhile? Might it leave the United States with the choice only of "irrationally" escalating with forces securely under presidential control or of backing out of its retaliatory commitments, given the overall strategic imbalance now perhaps also favoring the Russians?

There is obviously some reason to be concerned about this, and some of the European worry about the SS-20 may not be so farfetched. Yet such scenarios were also sometimes put forward about the preemptive possibilities of the SS-4 and SS-5 against the earlier forms of American tactical nuclear forces and the French *Force de Frappe*. For any point of this discussion, 1962 or 1982, it is necessary to discriminate between worries that grip the professional strategic analyst and those that preoccupy the rest of European political officials, or the man on the street. The European strategic planner perhaps is right in worrying about a Soviet preemptive first strike. But if his major reason is that his countrymen might be intimidated by the prospect, we have to know their feelings to see if in fact they are intimidated. American analysts are accustomed to hear European specialists on defense matters voice concern about the Soviet military threat, while European specialists in other areas of politics show very little awareness of this.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In any event, one major doubt remains on the SS-20 scenarios: the alleged surgical neatness with which such a Soviet preemptive strike could be carried through. Would there not be a great deal of radioactive fallout, together with a certain number of near-misses, no matter how well executed it was? Would this collateral damage against the people and economy of Western Europe not leave the area again worthless as a prize of conquest, with some of the fallout moving eastward (as the winds normally blow) into the Soviet bloc? Would not a few French nuclear weapons and American tactical nuclear weapons survive to be fired, with damage to the USSR and potential for a full-blown World War III?

It is possible that the average European intuitively accepts much of this and does not really feel any more anxiety about the SS-20 than he did about its predecessors. If war comes, he reasons, Europe will be a mess, the world will be a mess, the USSR will be a mess. So much the better, for war is therefore unlikely to come.

It may thus be harder to specify what differences the SS-20 makes. There is nothing really new in a Soviet ability to destroy European cities. The decision to move to more advanced missiles for such purposes can surely be viewed as contradictory to the spirit of détente and SALT that was said to grip the world in the 1970s, but this would be to discuss political impact at least as much as military impact.

NATO's Military Problem

We have thus far concentrated our attention on missiles and said less about the Soviet tanks that might actually roll to the Atlantic, but this may be appropriate. A great deal has been made about preparations for NATO defense, but this has been, uniquely, an alliance in which nothing is quite as it seems.

Preparations are allegedly made for conventional defense, with most analysts all along quietly conceding that such defenses would not work, but would serve instead as a trip wire for escalation to nuclear war (the results of which would be disastrous for the West and for the Soviets as well). But soldiers cannot admit to being trip wires; to do so would bring about a precipitous decline in morale, and, indeed, they could not then function well as trip wires. One prerequisite of the necessary likelihood of escalation has all along been not to admit to ourselves, or to anyone else, that this is what we are striving for.

Thus tactical nuclear weapons are added presumably to help us win battles without territorial escalation, but it is more probable that the true intention is to make such escalation likely. The strategy has worked thus far, precisely because it has worked by means opposite what is pretended. Leaders of the Atlantic Alliance countries officially complain about a lack of preparation for battle against ever more powerful Soviet tank columns. Yet, how worried can they be? Their *separate* national weapons development programs produce much less conventional battlefield capacity than would be the case from an integrated program.

Theater and pretense, rather than clear and candid logic, have defended Europe since 1945. Similarly, theater led the United States to continue threatening massive retaliation against the Russians when they developed their A-bomb, their H-bomb, and their first missiles. Cannot this theater, pretense, and obfuscation of logic continue to work in the future?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Having stipulated that relative Soviet strategic force strength is growing (and stipulating also a similar growth in Soviet ground, naval, and conventional air forces), we might now make a first attempt to assess the real seriousness of the problem. What would be a reasonable "worry list"? Worst of all, but perhaps still least likely, would be the outbreak of war through Soviet aggression, by attempting either a "splendid first-strike" World War III victory or just, with or without the use of Soviet nuclear weapons, a conquest of Western Europe. Although this possibility cannot be dismissed out of hand, it is not the central concern of those alarmed about current trends.

A second, more nagging worry is that the United States and Europe would become "Finlandized," a reference to the democratic government in Helsinki, which is not fully master in its own house but must from time to time bow to the wishes of the USSR. Americans and West Europeans might make concessions because they feared the Soviet ability to launch wars. Europeans who did not, might make concessions because they feared American fears, expecting the United States to back down even without an objective reason to do so.

A third worry, closely related to the second, anticipates not so much tangible concessions to the Russians but something more subtle and subliminal; Europeans (and Americans), without even thinking about it very explicitly, might bend their policy decisions to appease the USSR. Although there is little evidence as yet of open Finlandization, some analysts contend that the subliminal process is already at work, that the price of growing Soviet military strength and declining confidence in the American nuclear umbrella is being paid right now in the intellectual straitjacket Europeans are placing on their policy vis-à-vis the USSR.

The component of Soviet military growth that most concerns Europeans and Americans, at least with regard to the prospect of an invasion of Western Europe itself, is the missiles aimed at the United States and Europe. Yet there unfortunately has also been a growth in other forms of Soviet military potential. The impact of expansions in Soviet tactical ground, sea, and air forces on the NATO area (it will be argued here) is somewhat more roundabout. Since the trend is toward a relative growth in Soviet power, however, it is nonetheless also disturbing for our European allies.

The number of Russian troops deployed to Eastern Europe has not decreased in the years of the Soviet buildup along the Chinese border, but rather has somewhat grown; that is, the total of all Soviet army forces has been increased. Perhaps more important, the inventory of Soviet tanks and armored personnel carriers deployed close to the frontier with NATO has substantially increased.[12]

Soviet tactical air strength has also increased in the past decade. Most striking, perhaps, has been the growth of troop carrier and airlift capacity, so vividly demonstrated in the movement of Cuban troops into Angola and now in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There is, of course, no denying that the United States has similarly expanded its airlift capacity over the same years, but rather than neutralize each other, these expansions may induce in each power a state of nervousness about preempting, or being preempted by, the aerial deployments of the other.

Finally, the Soviet navy is now a very serious force on the high seas, which for many of the years after World War II seemed to belong entirely to the U.S.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Navy and the fleets of its allies.[13] The impact of naval power along the NATO central front might seem indirect for the first days of a war, but any prolonged battle would require the reinforcement of the West European "peninsula" by sea transportation. The flanks of NATO, specifically Norway, Greece, and Turkey, may feel a more direct impact of Soviet seapower, even before the outbreak of any major war.

Soviet naval and tactical air forces, and perhaps tank forces, may play a very important role some distance from Western Europe. Along with Japan, the West European states depend heavily on the Middle East for petroleum, and must thus be seriously concerned about the political instabilities of the region or about the advance of Soviet power there (or about the oil-rich states themselves, who might find it more profitable, eventually, to keep more oil in the ground).

Apart from energy, states such as Britain and France traditionally used overseas areas as a redoubt when faced with a military threat from their east. They traded space for time as Africa and the Middle East served as bases from which to push the invaders back while they mustered strength at home. With much of this area turned against them even before any tanks come rolling across Europe, what can we expect of the military planning and geopolitical psychology of such West European countries? And with the Soviet navy threatening interference with European access to North America, the other secure base of the past, their isolation will be complete.

These are perhaps the reasons West Europeans want American strength deployed into Arabia or Central Africa, quite apart from the prospects of political democracy in such places, so long as such American strength is applied effectively and competently.

Yet, just as the forms of European worry differ, so do the relevant forms of American strength. The totals of American or Soviet strategic nuclear warheads are of great importance for the deterrence of a Soviet tank assault on West Germany, but they matter less in securing oil supplies or in maintaining friendly regimes in Africa, where conventional forces will play the greater role. The nuclear threat has all along been less central here, simply because the value of the territory being defended is demonstrably lower for Americans; the value is also lower, and more indirect and complicated, for our NATO allies.

American Weakness or Incompetence?

To return to a basic question on the reliability of the American commitment to the defense of Europe: Is American political resolve in question, or is the problem a lack of sufficient military equipment? Those skeptical about the need to augment our tank or missile forces might argue that we need only find a worthy cause to have our resolve show itself. Additional military preparations to undo an alleged "legacy of Vietnam" would strike them as a great mistake. Yet their "either, or" is not logically well founded. No matter how just a cause, Americans are less likely to flag in a contest if they have more military trumps to play, and more likely to flag if the other side holds the trumps. One undesirable consequence of the Vietnam war may be that Americans chose to bet too heavily on détente, forgoing military investments they otherwise would have undertaken.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A different question may be more to the point. Is the doubt directed less at American military strength and more at American political competence? Are Europeans worried less about the total force strength available for their defense, or more about the way it is managed? They may worry less about whether Americans are able to intervene in remote corners of the world and more about whether such interventions are begun, only to lack follow-through.

This is an interpretation of doubts about the American ability to protect Europe that hinges less on our being weak than on being simply disorganized. The list of seeming inconsistencies since President Carter took office has become almost a litany for West Europeans who express concern about the reliability of the United States, including contradictory statements about the Middle East, gaps between State Department mainstream views and Andrew Young's statements about Africa and the world, the stop-start on the neutron bomb, the proposal to withdraw American troops from South Korea, and a fair number more. Carter's inept handling of Congress is added to the pattern; thus SALT II was doomed even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, as are Carter's more ambitious and farsighted proposals for U.S. energy conservation.

It is on such questions that responses in opinion polls often show the least confidence in the United States. A British poll showed the following:

Question: How much confidence do you have in the ability of the United States to deal wisely with present world problems?[14]

	May 1977	January 1978	January 1979
Very great Considerable	54%	33%	34%
Little Very little None at all	38	51	53
Don't know	8	15	14

Some of this negativism may be the straightforward and inevitable consequence of questions about American foreign policy priorities that emerged during the Vietnam war. Americans now entertain far more doubts about whether democratic government is preferable to Marxist regimes in Africa and Asia; the trauma that results from these new doubts is certain to produce a great deal of confusion, uncertainty, and many false starts. Gerald Ford and Richard Nixon were also criticized for lack of leadership and insufficient coordination of the government, so that the blame now cannot be simply assigned to a single man and his administration.

Finlandization or Economic Deterrence?

Most of these broader interpretations of a possible European unease with American protection fix less on such objective factors as the numbers of strategic missiles and more on subjective considerations such as American ideological evolution or our administrative confusions. Our NATO allies might surely be some-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

what dissatisfied on all fronts, wishing that we had not been so punished and confused by Vietnam, wishing that we were as certain as in the old days about what we wanted to defend in the world. Yet to cite American administrative confusion as a major concern for Schmidt or Giscard is somewhat to play down the salience of the Soviet menace here. Is Western Europe increasingly coming under the threat of Soviet military power, such that it openly or subliminally must bow to Moscow's dictates? Or could there be economic, social, and political processes at work to supply counterpressures; could the USSR now even be under more Western European pressure than before?

A seriously eroded American commitment should induce either European surrender to the Russians or an urgent search for alternative forms of strategic reinsurance. By the logic of the writings of Pierre Gallois, or of the British nuclear forces and French *Force de Frappe* (and American tactical nuclear forces), one of the earliest symptoms of greater Soviet threat might have come in the form of more extensive nuclear proliferation. Just as France, doubting (or pretending to doubt) American nuclear guarantees, invested in its own nuclear forces, we would now see such investments in West Germany and Italy, Sweden and Denmark, Yugoslavia and Greece. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has committed all these nations to forgo such weapons acquisition, but what would a treaty amount to should the threat of Soviet invasion become real?

Yet the evidence is clear that more than a scrap of paper is affecting attitudes in places like West Germany and Italy. There is no need for the United States to express continual concern about Bonn's own nuclear intentions, for West Germans are much more resigned to forgoing such weapons than they were a decade ago. They may be accused of being too careless and trusting, as they seek to earn foreign exchange in Brazil or Argentina, about the nuclear equipment they sell to others;[15] yet hardly anyone broods about a German desire to acquire bombs for the Federal Republic.

France and England will retain their nuclear weapons, swearing, as in past decades, that they are necessary because of worries about American nuclear umbrellas. Germany, Italy, and other NATO states in the path of Soviet tank divisions will not. If there is anything "new" here, compared to past decades, it is mainly that the man in the street in these countries is more adjusted to this nonnuclear-weapons status than ever before.

If we lack signs of imminent nuclear proliferation, do we see signs of European surrender? Is Western Europe now in any meaningful sense being Finlandized? All parties might agree in the end that this is mainly what the debate is about. But, as noted earlier, it is difficult to tell.

Finland is a nice enough place to live, only burdened somewhat by the explicit concessions it must make to Soviet demands, and perhaps by other implicit adjustments, simply out of fear of getting the Russians angry. Finland is certainly far better off than Bulgaria or East Germany in terms of being free of Soviet dictation. Yet it is worse off than Denmark or West Germany; one of the things we presumably hope to accomplish is to keep West Germany and Denmark from sliding over to the status of Finland. (As we discuss the trends of the 1970s and 1980s, we should not forget how much we might welcome the Finlandization of Eastern Europe: how nice it would be if countries like Hungary

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and Czechoslovakia only had to satisfy Moscow on matters of foreign policy and were allowed more and more to govern themselves domestically.)

When the Finns make such adjustments, it is clearly because of the threat of Soviet military action. Where people anywhere farther west in Europe vote Communist, however, is it for the same reason? Very possibly not, for issues of incumbent corruption or urban management probably account for much more of the leftist vote in Italy, France, or Portugal than the totals of Soviet missiles or tanks. In fact, Soviet military strength, whenever it becomes more visible, may prove an embarrassment to the Communists and an electoral plus for the Right. One might almost offer "Icelandization" as an alternative label for this phenomenon, as local issues strengthen the Communists, while any Soviet reminder of the brutishness of international politics hurts them. Communist gains in Western Europe have come more in the countries that are farthest away from Soviet tank divisions; they hardly show up at all in Germany and Austria, the states that would feel the first crunch of a Soviet armored attack.[16]

Those most worried about possible West European Finlandization will suggest that we must already take note of a number of symptoms of this, including the reluctance of the Netherlands and West Germany to accept new American missiles, or the continual extension of trade credits to the Soviet Union, or the seeming reluctance to punish Moscow for Afghanistan, or more generally the West German opening to the East ever since 1966 and Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*.

What was once an adamant rejection of the obviously unrepresentative East German regime became instead a sort of *de facto* diplomatic recognition by Bonn, accompanied by full diplomatic recognition by the United States and all the other NATO powers. Yet some West Germans might be quick to note that this last example shows how they have not been ahead of the United States in coming to terms with the Communist powers in détente, but merely in step. More generally, they might be inclined to trot out a list of concessions made by the East, including much less interference with access to West Berlin, the allowance of numerous personal visits to East Germany, and the release of substantial numbers of ethnic Germans from Poland and the Soviet Union.

Who is pressuring whom here? Who is winning the concessions? Sorting out such a question is, as always, a problem of finding a proper baseline from which calculations of concessions can be made. Should not access to West Berlin have gone unhampered all along? Anything offered in trade for it now amounts to a loss by the West, an example of Finlandization. Perhaps; but access to the enclave has never been as easy since 1961 as it is now. Should not the freedom to emigrate from Communist regimes be an essential human right for ethnic Germans and others? Blackmail should not have to be paid for exit visas. Perhaps; yet it has always been difficult to emigrate from the USSR and other Communist regimes. Bonn's winning of such exit visas has been a major accomplishment, and a major concession when it is compared with past Soviet practice—indeed, compared with the baseline of Soviet views on what is moral and right.

The deployments of forces on either side of the Iron Curtain not only shape the political events that follow but are themselves always the object of an intense political give-and-take, at least in those periods when irrevocable decisions have not yet been made, when military forces still can be withheld as easily as em-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

placed. In carrot-and-stick bargaining strategy, the question is often whether to deploy forces first and gain politically (and gain also the option of surrendering such deployments later on in exchange for matching concession by the other side). Or is it better to hold off on such deployments, lest we stampede the other side into matching them, locking both sides into levels of confrontation higher than either preferred?

Such may be the West European debate at the moment on whether to deploy updated tactical nuclear delivery systems. Such also may be the Soviet maneuvering in urging NATO countries to reject such deployments, and in announcing suddenly the withdrawal of some Russian troops and tanks from East Germany, with the suggestion that further withdrawals might be negotiable.

We will leave aside for the moment the question of whether it is better for NATO to hold the new tactical nuclear weapons back as a bargaining chip or whether to deploy them (since the Russians have already deployed the SS-20), prepared to dismantle them later in exchange for a dismantling of the SS-20. We can, however, address the broader question of what this entire exchange process shows about the current state of European intimidation. Does the mere fact that West Europeans might decide not to deploy such weapons show that such intimidation is already very advanced, a certain self-Finlandization having set in? Or does Moscow's need to open the very touchy question of Soviet troop withdrawals show that this is all, again, a two-way street, with possibilities of pressures and gains on either side, and even gains on both sides?

Finlandization as normally thought of means concessions flowing in the direction of Moscow only, prodded simply by the threat of Soviet armed attack. But a "new Rapallo," with Moscow in one way or another playing "the German card," calls into question something different. Also, it is not really Finlandization when increasing German and West European economic strength is brought to bear as a carrot or stick to win new Soviet concessions.

From one forum to another, the process of political engagement between our NATO allies and the Soviet Union lends itself to quite conflicting descriptions. The most pessimistic picture is of a subtle and subliminal self-Finlandization, by which the West European states are so eager to avoid trouble, that they give Moscow what it wants even before it has to ask for it, before it can even be made clear that there was a concession to force. A much more optimistic and complicated picture shows bargaining and exchange, the two alliances manipulating each other in ways that narrow each side's independence but also reduce mutually counterproductive activities.

We are in a sense asking whether the processes of economic interchange here (which, when both sides become very attached to them, are often now labeled "interdependence") may not outweigh in importance the comparisons of Soviet and American intercontinental missiles or the arrays of the SS-20 aimed at Europe in place of the SS-4 and SS-5.

The economic picture is, of course, not entirely separate from the military, and it is itself hardly uniformly bright. The numbers of strategic missiles available to each side may in roundabout ways influence how resolutely we defend our access to various scarce resources. As noted, the comparative power of naval, ground, and tactical air forces may more directly play a role here.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The USSR seems headed for an oil shortage in the next decade, comparable to that which has traumatized the West since 1973. Moscow may have to cease being an oil exporter; the impact of this on the Soviet economy, and on the economy of the East European satellite states, may be both depressing and destabilizing.

Will shortages of oil drive the USSR to tighten the belt now on military spending as well as civilian, ceasing to fritter away its GNP on new naval forces and tank battalions and missiles? Will the need to extract the very most possible from Soviet oil fields cause the USSR to invest more heavily in Western petroleum technology, producing an even greater dependence on trade and less willingness than ever to rock the boat?

Or will the Soviets try the military way out of their predicament, moving forces south through Afghanistan to try to win control over the oil fields of the Persian Gulf? Wars or other Soviet-American conflicts over oil control would upset our European allies for a host of reasons, even if any consequent threat of a direct invasion of their territory might always be indirect and more remote.

Just as we must have doubts about the efficacy of nuclear deterrence, we would have to acknowledge some doubts about an economic deterrence based on Russian requirements for West European imports and hard currency. Yet the evidence about current West European worries and concerns suggests they have some confidence in this kind of deterrence. Rather than brooding about a two-decade decline in U.S. relative strategic missile power, the average West European might be as much relaxed by the two-decade increase in trade with the USSR, a trade relationship that, by characteristics inherent in capitalism and "socialism," may always produce more leverage for the West than for the East.

West Berlin is perhaps the model. There surely has been no prospect of a successful defense of this enclave by conventional defenses or even by any astute application of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. The possible threat of an escalation to World War III should a sudden coup result in the seizure of the city has been an important part of the deterrent. Yet much more at the forefront, in the event of some sort of coup, or new Berlin blockade, has been the prospect that this would be followed by a suspension, as in 1948, of most trade between West Germany and East, between West Europe and East; this now, more than then, would hurt the East much more than the West. When one adds that West Berlin (despite the best efforts of the Federal Republic) has largely become a city of German pensioners and *gästarbeiter* (the fourth largest Turkish city in the world), the screen of deterrence becomes complete, sufficient to make most West Germans cease worrying about the safety of the city, even if there are more Russian tanks around it than ever.

The Uncertainties of Prognosis

How sanguine can we be, how confident that this mix of guarantees to our NATO allies, in which American military strength undoubtedly still plays an important part, can continue to work? Are there no reasonable scenarios for a military conflict in Central Europe itself (as opposed to the attacks in Rhodesia, Kuwait, Thailand, or Afghanistan, which bother the West European states in a geographically more indirect way)?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Military operations, of course, remain possible in Eastern Europe as long as a real Finlandization has not set in there, as long as Czechs and East Germans and Poles and Hungarians are denied the more satisfying domestic life-styles that a real lifting of Soviet domination would produce. The austerity that will surely result from Soviet oil shortages threatens a wave of serious disquiet, as material living standards, in decline again, can no longer substitute and compensate for the absence of political liberty.

If Russian tanks roll through East European capitals again (this may be one important purpose for so many being constructed), will this lead to a war between the forces we have been comparing in the Warsaw Pact and NATO? Most probably not; with relatively full West European agreement, we would most probably settle back to the same sad acceptance of such military repressions as in 1953, 1956, and 1967.

Because of special ethnic ties, West Germans will be particularly upset should Soviet military suppression of popular unrest occur in East Germany; the West Berlin enclave complicates matters. Would the Russians and East Germans see the enclave linked to such rioting and revolution? Perhaps; but the linkage would be less than it was before the Berlin Wall was built, when insurrectionists could retreat into West Berlin. For these reasons, it is more likely that West Berlin would not be seized or blockaded, but rather that East German and West German authorities would cooperate in insulating the Autobahn access routes from the insurrection.

There are less likely combinations that might make for more trouble here—for example, if the East German *Volksarmee* joined in resisting the Russians, and the West German people, government, and *Bundeswehr* found it impossible to avoid supporting their kinsmen. (A less worrisome, also unlikely, combination has perhaps already been suggested: if a Soviet premonition of such trouble in East Germany led to a dramatic playing of the "German card," exchanging a reunification for some concessions by Bonn—leading once more to a debate of who had been using or abusing whom.)

But other kinds of military troubles might be expected at only a short distance from the central front. It has long been expected that Tito's death could produce a political vacuum in Yugoslavia into which the Russians might be drawn, as in Afghanistan. The temptation of playing off one Yugoslav faction against another, in hopes of eradicating the original example of heresy in the Communist world, might be too strong for Moscow to pass up. This runs the risk of pulling in Western military intervention to counter that of the Soviets; at the least, it would set a very dangerous precedent if the Russians got away with it. The precedent could easily apply in Greece or Turkey if Marxist-affiliated domestic unrest supplied the pretext in either case, or in Spain or Portugal (or Italy?) should the Soviet navy wish to show it can assist revolutions as competently as the Soviet army.

On the far northern flank, alarms have sounded periodically at the Soviet military buildup just to the east of the Norwegian frontier, but there is no prospective domestic unrest there to set the stage for a Soviet armed attack; the Soviet base complex here seems much more connected with oceanic access for missile submarines and naval surface forces, and possible logistical connections to Cuba or Angola, than with any threat to northern Norway.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Not strictly a part of the NATO area, but certainly abutting it, we can, of course, never rule out the possibility of another round of warfare between Israel and some Arab states, either because Israel will not prove conciliatory enough, or because some Arab states will prove impossibly irredentist and revenge-minded, or because the Russians will supply such high-grade military equipment to their Arab clients that the simple strategic temptation of the attack will again emerge. Israel is close enough to Western Europe geographically to make our NATO allies fear for their own material safety in such a war, especially if rumors of acquisitions of nuclear weapons by Israel, Iraq, or others were to be confirmed.

Finally, is a Soviet military attack on the NATO central front itself so totally unlikely or so very easy for our allies to forget? Inherently it is not, for stranger things have happened. The armored invasion of South Korea in 1950 came as a shock and a surprise to the United States and its allies, as has the armored attack on Afghanistan in 1980. To be effective, surprise attacks by definition have to come when no one is expecting an attack. Our rules of thumb—"The Russians never intervene themselves, only by proxy," or "The Soviets only intervene in countries where their troops are already stationed, and where the Communist party is already in charge"—have been violated by each deviation. We will have to amend these rules, for the world is now required to worry about a slightly larger Soviet range of behavior.

It is perhaps inherent in the NATO alliance that some worry about Soviet intentions will always be with us. Western Europe (like South Korea) amounts geographically to a peninsula projecting out from the Eurasian land mass, a land mass dominated by the Soviet Union, a land mass from which large contingents of military force can emerge on relatively short notice to invade the peninsula.

Having listed this string of unhappy possibilities, how much true unhappiness do they actually add up to? Is the typical citizen of the Atlantic Alliance more bothered or intimidated by war threats than before? Are Europeans very worried about the evolving strategic balance between the USSR and the United States?

They certainly could be *less* worried. Had the fondest predictions of the supporters of détente proved right, had there been no real breakthroughs in accuracy or other offensive characteristics of strategic missiles, or had the Russians held back to a simple numerical matching of American missile and conventional forces, Europeans would have been happier.

Yet the West Europeans could also be showing much *more* sign of worry about the military balance. By and large, they still seem to believe that American retaliation can remain credible, that any Soviet investments in new missile strength may be redundant rather than productive of new political leverage, that economic, social, and political factors, as well as military weapons, can count in the balance of NATO versus the Warsaw Pact.

REFERENCES

[1]The text of NSC-68 has been published in *Naval War College Review*, 27 (6) (May-June 1975): 51-108. The best discussion of the drafting of the document may still be that provided by Paul Y. Hammond, "NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament" in *Strategy Politics and Defense Budgets*, Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder (eds.) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 267-8.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[2]Good overall discussions of the earlier years of the American commitment to NATO defense can be found in Robert E. Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), and Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).

[3]Maxwell D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York: Harper, 1960); James M. Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age* (New York: Harper, 1958); John B. Medaris, *Countdown for Decision* (New York: Putnam, 1960).

[4]Kissinger's comments can be found quoted in "News Conference at Moscow, July 3," *Department of State Bulletin* (July 29, 1974): 215. For a somewhat different appraisal of the situation by Kissinger, see his address to an international conference on the future of NATO in Brussels on September 1, 1979, reprinted in *Survival*, 21 (6) (November/December 1979): 264-8. A view more consistent with an absence of great concern here is expressed by McGeorge Bundy in an address on September 6, 1979 to a conference of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, also reprinted in the same issue of *Survival*, pp. 268-72.

[5]For good examples of the kind of analysis that now worries about a political impact in Europe as American strategic nuclear superiority fades, see Paul H. Nitze, "Deterring our Deterrent," *Foreign Policy* 25 (Winter 1976-77): 195-210, and Colin S. Gray, "The Strategic Forces Triad: End of the Road?" *Foreign Affairs*, 56 (4) (July 1978): 771-89.

[6]Polls reported in Helen Gaudet Erskine, "The Polls: Defense, Peace, and Space," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (3) (Fall 1961): 485.

[7]Polls reported in *Public Opinion*, 2 (2) (March/May 1979): 30.

[8]Opinion surveys reported in *Polls*, 3 (3) (Spring 1968): 93.

[9]Polls summarized in *Public Opinion*, 3 (1A) (February/March 1980): 33.

[10]See Gregory Treverton, "Nuclear Weapons and the 'Gray Area,' " *Foreign Affairs*, 57 (5) (Summer 1979): 1075-89, for an extended discussion of the implications of Soviet investment in the SS-20 missile.

[11]Still perhaps the clearest and bluntest, and most widely quoted, example is Pierre Gallois, *The Balance of Terror* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961).

[12]Good overall information on the increase in Soviet conventional force strength in Central Europe can be found in Henry Stanhope, "New Threat—or Old Fears?" in *European Security: Prospects for the 1980s*, Derek Leebaert (ed.) (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath, 1979) pp. 39-60.

[13]For a general discussion of the increase in Soviet naval strength, see *Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions*, Michael MccGwire and John McDonnell (eds.) (New York: Praeger, 1977).

[14]Polls quoted in *Public Opinion*, 2 (2) (March/May 1979): 14.

[15]On the current state of the nuclear proliferation question, see Ted Greenwood, Harold Feiveson and Theodore B. Taylor, *Nuclear Proliferation: Motivations, Capabilities and Strategies for Control* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977), and Albert Wohlstetter (et al.), *Swords From Plowshares: The Military Potential of Civilian Nuclear Energy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

[16]See Fritz Stern, "Germany in a Semi-Gaullist Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, 58 (4) (Spring 1980): 876-86, for a comparable interpretation of the political trends in Western Europe. Also Theo Sommer, "Europe and the American Connection," *Foreign Affairs*, 58 (3) (America and the World: 1979): 622-36.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WILLIAM G. HYLAND

The Atlantic Crisis

IN THE SUMMER OF 1980 the Atlantic Alliance seemed to be undergoing one of its periodic fits of disarray. There was grumbling in Washington about Europe's irresponsibility and failure to understand the gravity of the international situation. And there were similar mutterings on the other side of the Atlantic about the inconsistency of American policy and the lack of leadership. After thirty years of experience with the difficulties of a multinational coalition, there was a strong tendency to dismiss the controversy as a seasonal quarrel of no more than passing significance, certain to fade after the summer vacation or after the inevitable elections in the various NATO countries.

But this time there were reasons to take the controversy more seriously. Europeans themselves were more and more frequently using the term "crisis" to describe the situation in the alliance.[1] And some European observers were calling attention to the real substantive issues in the dispute. A *London Times* editorial commented on May 15, 1980:

> This is a week for trying to patch up the Western alliance. But more than patching up is needed. The cracks that have opened up over Afghanistan and Iran reveal stresses that cannot be removed by better management alone. There is a feeling that the ground is shifting in some significant way which nobody yet fully understands. For this crisis looks different.

The revolution in Iran—particularly the seizure of hostages—followed almost immediately by the invasion of Afghanistan, precipitated the Atlantic crisis, which possibly would have remained submerged for some time. But these inherently dramatic events, demanding almost instant, but far-reaching, decisions, revealed divergences in both interests and policies that had been simmering since the Yom Kippur War. For Europe, the Iranian crisis and the threat to Western oil supplies went well beyond the issue of hostages; it brought back to the surface the more fundamental question of whether Europe would be content to allow the United States to decide the overall thrust of Western policy in an area of vital interest to Western Europe. The answer, as it emerged in the weeks of bickering over Iranian sanctions, was that Europe would in fact follow only its interests, not only on the narrow question of sanctions, but on the broader questions of the Middle East as well.

If the divergences between the United States and Europe over the Middle East had their roots in the Yom Kippur War, Afghanistan revealed a new and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

potentially more serious split on the nature of the Soviet threat, supposedly the one issue on which there could be no genuine difference. But Europe saw the invasion not as a watershed in Soviet policy, as did the United States, but more as a continuation of a policy of domination over Afghanistan begun centuries before. Moreover, the real threat was not that the Soviet army would use Afghanistan as a "stepping stone" (as the United States termed it), but that the tensions would spread to Europe and upset the détente that had been so assiduously worked out since the late 1960s. In both of these crises, Europe seemed determined to follow its own analysis and therefore to pursue its own interests. America in turn seemed to be floundering, perplexed by a crisis it did not quite recognize or fully understand.

Atlantic Tensions

The period that began in 1970 with the negotiation and signature of the Soviet-German treaty, and extended through the Helsinki Conference in July 1975, proved to be decisive in transforming the European political situation. The German-Soviet treaty, followed by the Polish treaty, the four-power agreement on Berlin, and, finally, the intra-German state treaty settled the question of the European territorial and political status quo. Despite official disclaimers, the division of Germany was sealed. And at Helsinki, the general settlement was ratified by all of Europe and by the United States. In effect, the postwar peace treaty had been completed: Europe would remain divided into two blocs, but the division would proceed in a more conciliatory political atmosphere, marked by expanding European trade and contacts. Western Europe was well on its way to acquiring a considerable stake in a European détente, at a time when that superpower relationship was under increasing strain.

For Europe, there were increasingly tangible benefits to the relaxation of tensions (e.g., trade) and a psychologically more comforting atmosphere compared to the periodic crises of the 1950s and 1960s. But for the United States, détente was far more tentative, despite some inflated rhetoric: in part, it was a necessity produced by the tensions of Vietnam; in part, an experiment in superpower relations. A severe challenge to détente was bound to reveal that the United States and its allies were drifting apart.

One area where this divergence might be severe was in the attitudes toward military arrangements on the Continent. The political settlement in Europe did not extend to a military settlement. Despite the inauguration of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna, which were originally intended to parallel the Helsinki Conference, the military negotiations floundered. One reason, of course, was that they were clearly subordinate to SALT. Until the central balance was more discernible, the subsidiary balances could not be outlined except in the broadest terms; that is, the necessity for a stable equivalence in conventional force in Central Europe as proposed by the West, versus the necessity for ratifying the existing imbalance as insisted by the East. Moreover, at the level of theater nuclear weapons, new Soviet systems began to appear that were not covered by SALT and were not being met with counterprograms in NATO.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In this period, at the beginning of the 1970s, knowledgeable and interested observers of the alliance anticipated that there would come a point at which a mature and relatively strong Western Europe would develop interests that would inevitably clash with the interests of its American patron. Some saw this as mainly an economic phenomenon to be fought out in trade debates and tariff rates. This was indeed an early symptom, but containable, because it was primarily a symptom and not a root cause. Others saw the issue as a test of Gaullism, of whether Europe could express and exercise its autonomy, even at the risk of an eventual confrontation over Washington's insistence on hegemony. But even this was more of an abstract debate than a real clash of interests. Others saw it as more of a Rapallo-like venture, where Europe would explore a resting place between Moscow and Washington—a residual anti-Germanism, given an impetus by West Germany's *Ostpolitik*. And it was also seen as less of a challenge and more of an opportunity to restructure an alliance still based on common fears and aims, to develop new mechanisms and strategies that would reflect Europe's new strength, and to manage and shape the forces of international multipolarity and the consequences of a more powerful Soviet competitor in an era of détente.

This latter reasoning was more or less the idea animating the "Year of Europe" launched in April 1973 by Henry Kissinger. For many reasons, including a degree of insensitivity in Washington, the proposal met with both principled European resistance and quarrelsome French tactics. Not the least of the problems was the venomous French interpretation of American aims in its relations with both Moscow and Europe. The skillful maneuvering of Michel Jobert first deflected the proposal, and then robbed it of any significance after months of haggling. Finally, the Americans were irritated to the point where Washington lost interest in the project. But French obstructionism concealed a fundamental difference: a European interest in greater autonomy from Washington.

In any case, the Yom Kippur War dealt a mortal blow to the concept of the Year of Europe as a common enterprise, although it ironically proved the idea's original validity. The war revealed that Europe saw its interests outside of the NATO area in sharply different terms from the United States, and that it was prepared to act independently. At that time, Europeans were appalled at the prospect that their oil supplies could be terminated because of a conflict over which they had virtually no influence. They decided as a consequence to embark on a series of measures to insure their position, at the expense of common Western policy: an approach to oil producers for bilateral bargains; an attempt to organize a European-Arab dialogue; and, finally, the display of considerable sympathy for the PLO and a resolution of the Palestinian question. European Community declarations of this period represented a severe break with any common Atlantic policies in the Middle East. All of this cut across American efforts to arrange a disengagement agreement in the Sinai and to organize the Western industrial powers to share the burden of the potential cutoff in oil supplies. At a critical point America found itself confronting not only Moscow, but its European allies as well.

At that very time a second apprehension surfaced: when Washington put its missile forces on a temporary alert to dissuade any Soviet adventures, Europe

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was sharply reminded of its vulnerability to the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and its limited ability to influence the superpower relationship, on the other. In the aftermath, there were the customary pledges of renewed consultation, and the Year of Europe ended with a pro forma declaration issued in Brussels in June 1974. Nothing was really settled. There were sighs of relief that the project had been completed without any lasting damage. One commentary noted that while the Allies did not know precisely where they stood as a result of the Year of Europe, they did know, "for better or worse," that they were still allies, "bound together in their own self-interest by powerful ties."[2] While the mutual ties were indeed strong, the superficial declaration also reflected the fact that on neither side of the Atlantic did the partners want to examine the crisis they had just passed through.

The declaration, for example, noted the fact of approaching nuclear parity, but ignored the unpleasant fact that this would have severe consequences for a defense strategy worked out in an era of superiority. Moreover, no attempt was made to explore the meaning of European behavior in the Middle East. It had been erroneously assumed that Europe would be preoccupied with building its own institutions and that the United States would tend to the global balance. Vietnam had seemed to vindicate this interpretation. Europe had doubts and reservations about Vietnam, but stopped short of challenging American leadership. But this analysis reckoned without the oil crisis of 1973-74 and its stunning impact in Europe; the Middle East was once again considered a region where Europe could, and should, play a hand—thus demonstrating why there was such resentment to Kissinger's phrase relegating Europe to a "regional" power.

The events of 1973-74 thus warned of the crises to come. In the intervening years the divergences were papered over (i.e., the neutron bomb fiasco), only to be revived with a vengeance by events in Iran. European reaction to the Iranian crisis was one of ambivalence. Sympathy and legal support were of course offered to the United States, but there was a growing reluctance to press the crisis. The Europeans wanted to contain the crisis and protect their oil supplies, and they argued (partly correctly) that the ultimate beneficiary would be the Soviet Union, which could not fail but to emerge as Iran's patron and protector. The United States countered this argument by pointing out that failure to take a united stand in Iran would only encourage further radicalization of the revolution.

There were also underlying considerations that gradually became more and more prominent after the Afghanistan invasion. The Europeans concluded that there were two principal dangers to be dealt with. The first was the danger of a superpower confrontation, which had to be avoided. In this instance both the United States and the Soviet Union seemed equally dangerous and irresponsible; hence, the German chancellor warned of the analogy to 1914 when two blocs were sliding toward an unwanted war. Both superpowers had to be restrained in 1980. Thus a new evenhandedness was appearing in European attitudes, in which little differentiation was made between the two superpowers:

> In Schmidt's own party there is a growing inclination toward a topsy turvy world-view, in which America is seen as a dangerous war-mongering element and the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> Soviet Union as a guardian of stability. In this atmosphere President Carter's call to let the Soviet Union feel the world's abhorrence over the rape of Afghanistan is transformed into an act of the Cold War.[3]

The second danger was the possibility that the Iranian crisis would prove to be an infectious virus, destabilizing the area and jeopardizing the oil supply line. Sanctions against Iran for the hostages or against the Soviet Union for Afghanistan were rebuffed as dangerous overreactions. Indeed, it was argued that the real danger was a revival of Muslim fundamentalism, which could provoke a general breakdown, as evidenced by the raid on Mecca. Such a contingency could be tempered by a shift of West European policy to demonstrate to the Arab world European sincerity in the pursuit of peace. The result was a completely independent European position on the Arab-Israeli dispute, issued June 13, 1980, despite pleas and warnings from Washington. The actual content was mild enough, simply a call of "associating" the PLO with the negotiating process. It was the declaration of independence, and the flat defiance of the United States on an issue well within its negotiating competence, rather than the substantive content of the declaration that signaled a breakdown of alliance coordination and policy in an area of vital importance.

The second collapse of common policies was potentially more serious: a divergence in assessments of the Soviet threat—supposedly the bedrock of the alliance. In January 1980 the United States came to the conclusion that a watershed had been reached: for the first time the Soviet Union was using massive military forces outside the Warsaw Pact area. Washington decided that a harsh response was mandatory for two reasons: first, to exact a price for the invasion and, second, to deter further adverturism. Détente and SALT—already weakened by domestic American debate and Soviet recalcitrance (e.g., on Cuban troops)—would be the principal casualties of the Afghan invasion. Washington assumed that Europe would see the Soviet threat in the same terms. But in the period after President Carter's retaliatory steps were announced, the United States was confronted by a skeptical and increasingly alarmed European reaction. Détente in Europe could not, and should not, be abandoned because of a crisis in a country that had long been in the Russian orbit, and, indeed, had passed under more direct Soviet influence in April 1978 when local Afghan Communists had seized power. Soviet aims were supposedly "defensive," or only an effort to demand equality from Washington. Europe, therefore, would not join in the American counterattack; it would condemn Soviet aggression, but it would localize the crisis and impose no price in Europe. The European commitment to a divisible détente had grown much deeper than realized in Washington. Chancellor Schmidt summed it up succinctly in his address to his party congress in Essen on June 9, 1980:

> After a pause caused by the shock, an international discussion about taking the edge out of the Afghanistan crisis has begun. That is progress vis-à-vis the dangerous lack of communications that lasted well into May. The Federal Government has pressed for and helped in many ways to bring about this progress. We remain involved without pushing to the foreground, and without forgetting that we do not stand between the camps in this conflict but that we are and want to remain part of the Western alliance such as the North Atlantic Pact and the Euro-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> pean Community. We have made great efforts in past months to make sure that, despite intensified tensions in the world, the détente process in Europe would not be damaged but further developed.

The underpinnings of the European détente had become impressive. West Germany was the leading trade partner outside of the Soviet Union for most of the East European members of the Warsaw Pact. Soviet and East European indebtedness to the West had grown to over $70 billion. Most of the major industrial projects financed by sources outside of the Warsaw Pact were being undertaken by West European firms. Germany had a special place: Berlin traffic was numbered in millions; emigration of ethnic Germans had reached about two hundred and fifty thousand. State visits and return visits and various broad declarations issued between the Soviet Union and major West European countries had become a common feature of East-West diplomacy. Europe and America had in fact developed different relations with the Soviet Union.[4]

To be sure, the Europeans argued that the growing differences with Washington were produced by a breakdown in American leadership: there was no clear strategy evident in the series of punitive measures against the Soviet Union announced in January. Moreover, the Carter Doctrine and the resultant new demands for a greater European defense effort were part of no discernible strategy. Indeed, even prior to the resignation of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance there was some evidence that Washington itself was split. Some wanted to insulate SALT from the deterioration, and negotiate for the "neutralization" of Afghanistan (an idea eagerly embraced in Europe); others wanted a broad freeze on relations. The only means to avoid this potential disaster was to keep the line to Russia open. This was the argument heard most frequently in France and in Germany. By the spring the argument had been reduced to absurd bickering: whether to meet with Gromyko in Vienna or Brezhnev in Warsaw.

The Security Problem

The foregoing is part of the background to the debate on European security initiated by Chancellor Schmidt in October 1977 in an address in London. Schmidt's concerns reflected an acknowledgment of a fundamental fact: the strategic balance no longer favored the United States, and SALT had constituted the political acceptance of this fact—"SALT neutralized [the U.S. and the Soviet Union's] strategic nuclear capabilities."[5] For Europe, Schmidt concluded, this new situation magnified the disparities in both conventional and tactical nuclear systems. And his operational conclusions were:

> It is of vital interest to us all that the negotiations between the two superpowers on the limitation and reduction of nuclear strategic weapons should continue and lead to a lasting agreement. The nuclear powers have a special, an overwhelming responsibility in this field. On the other hand, we in Europe must be particularly careful to ensure that these negotiations do not neglect the components of NATO's deterrence strategy. . . .
>
> Strategic arms limitations confined to the United States and the Soviet Union will inevitably impair the security of the West European members of the Alliance vis-à-vis Soviet military superiority in Europe if we do not succeed in removing the disparities of military power in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Implicit in Schmidt's address were two tracks: a military program to offset Soviet programs in the European theater, and a negotiating position to avert a competitive race in Europe. The SALT II negotiation accelerated both tracks. In the new SALT agreement the Soviet Union remained free to deploy its long-range theater nuclear forces, while in some sense the United States would be inhibited from countering with compensatory systems. The protocol to the SALT II treaty, which would last through the end of 1981, stipulated that no long-range cruise missiles (over 600 km) would be deployed on land bases, even though development and testing would be permitted. This simple restriction, even though a temporary arrangement, raised some questions. Was it likely that it would become a permanent prohibition, thus depriving the alliance of a potentially valuable weapons system? If not, how would its modification or termination be handled in light of the unrestrained buildup of Soviet systems (e.g., the Backfire bomber and the SS-20 mobile IRBMs)? Would there be a new negotiation, a new competition, or some combination?

This more specific aspect became increasingly complex as NATO completed its decision on the deployment of the very systems that were limited by SALT but meant to counter the Soviet regional buildup. It was eventually decided that the United States would deploy in Germany 108 new Pershing II missiles with an extended range, plus 464 intermediate-range cruise missiles (which were the subject of the SALT protocol) deployed in Germany, Italy, the Benelux countries, and England. As the final NATO decision took shape in 1979, Soviet political pressures and blandishments increased. On October 6 Brezhnev offered to reduce the number of Soviet medium-range missiles if there was no American deployment. It turned out that a Western counteroffer was not only advisable, but was in fact the price demanded by the smaller countries, Belgium and the Netherlands, as a condition to the American deployments. Thus a substantial reduction in theater nuclear weapons was proposed in the framework of SALT III. At the time (December 1979) this approach seemed to pose no insurmountable new problems. The issue seemed almost procedural: Would the new negotiation be between the United States and the Soviet Union, and thus folded into SALT III as proposed, or would it proceed separately, perhaps developing as a variant of the moribund Vienna negotiations, or even in the French idea of a European Disarmament Conference?

The negotiating scenario was at once more complicated and promising, because both sides had moved toward a linkage of theater nuclear weapons with the conventional balance. Brezhnev in October had announced the withdrawal of 20,000 Soviet troops from Germany along with 1,000 tanks and a "certain amount of military hardware." The West was in the process of altering its position as well. A new, "simplified" Phase One agreement in the Vienna MBFR negotiations was presented on December 20. The Western position was now to be closer to the original Soviet proposals; that is, manpower reductions of about 13,000 (U.S.) and 30,000 (Soviet), without any reference to reduction of equipment or nuclear forces. Thus the West finally retreated from its earlier position of trying to induce a Soviet withdrawal of tanks by offering to place a ceiling on U.S. theater nuclear systems. Ironically, the Soviets were meeting the original Western demand for unequal reductions in part by unilaterally reducing the imbalance in manpower and in tanks. The final irony was that the United States

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unilaterally withdrew 1,000 nuclear weapons at the very time it agreed to the long-term buildup of Pershing and cruise missiles.

The net result was a great confusion over the East-West negotiations when the Iranian crisis worsened and the Afghan invasion occurred; SALT was deferred, and the Soviets launched a propaganda barrage against NATO's nuclear decision. For the Europeans, the situation was suddenly transformed. What had seemed a leisurely negotiation with Moscow, possibly extending over three years, now suddenly became a matter of some urgency. It was one thing to proceed with a buildup of NATO theater nuclear forces to offset the Soviet deployment, but it would be quite another matter to do so in an atmosphere of heightened tensions. Thus it is not surprising that Chancellor Schmidt broke ranks, in effect, by offering a temporary freeze on theater nuclear deployments on both sides while negotiations began. It was rationalized as proposing little more than what would happen in any case, since NATO could not deploy any new Pershing or cruise missiles until the end of 1983. A freeze or moratorium would in reality only affect the Soviets and thus create a good Western bargaining position; at least this was the argument in Bonn. Washington saw it differently; it seemed an unwise and potentially disastrous concession, especially coming at a time of alliance differences over sanctions against Iran and punitive measures against the Soviets because of Afghanistan. If accepted by the Soviets, they would stop at between 100 and 150 SS-20s, but production could continue on the remaining 100 to 150 probably intended for Europe. The West could not propose a production ban without destroying its own program, but could be entrapped by a deployment moratorium that would almost certainly be prolonged if the Soviets could manage it. The Europeans countered that Bonn's initiative came at a time when it appeared that SALT II might be dead. Moreover, the absence of any negotiating channel, especially at a time when the Soviet leadership might change hands, was considered much too dangerous in Europe. This was the justification not only for the Schmidt offer, but also for the surprise Giscard-Brezhnev summit and Schmidt's visit to Moscow. European apprehensions were, of course, appreciated in Moscow, which put on additional pressure against actual deployments, but hinted at a negotiating offer.

The situation seemed to be that Europe would try to protect its concerns, even in separate negotiations. But is it feasible for the alliance to think of creating a Euro-balance if the central strategic balance is unhinged by the final collapse of SALT? Is the balance divisible in this sense? In France there has always been some interest in a European deterrent built around French nuclear forces, of course. But not much weight is given to such an alternative, even by informed French analysts who are beginning to become more concerned about the conventional imbalance. But the concept of a Euro-balance does raise one question of interest for the alliance: What will be the role of the British and French nuclear forces in an era of strategic parity or Soviet advantage? Could these forces be the basis for some kind of balance with Soviet forces? Would America offer some assistance in upgrading these forces (i.e., by supplying the Trident I missile for the British or French Polaris submarines)? Would this be a means of restoring the link between a European theater balance and American strategic forces, or would it confirm that the two had in fact been decoupled?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

More pertinent is the ultimate fate of the theater nuclear force built around the proposed American deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles. The deployment itself contains some odd aspects. What is the military rationale for the configuration of the deployment? Is it psychological reassurance, or counterforce, or some political middle ground? The 108 Pershing II missiles, despite their longer range, are to be one-for-one replacements for the Pershing I. Is there any sense to such a simple replacement? What would be the new targets for the newly extended range? What weapons would cover the old targets previously allotted for the Pershing I? And what of the 464 cruise missiles, a slower weapons system, but with great accuracy? What targets would they cover? And why 464 (116 launchers), when the number of targets may be closer to one thousand? Unfortunately, it appears that the NATO deployments have been chosen for political feasibility—an unenviable position to be in, in coping with a Soviet competitive response or entering a negotiation.

But, assuming there will be negotiations, what would be an acceptable outcome? How many SS-20s are tolerable to Europe?—which, after all, has lived for twenty years facing the cruder SS-4 and SS-5 MRBMs and IRBMs. The fact that the SS-20s contain multiple warheads complicates the calculus; 108 Pershings II would certainly not be equitable compensation for 108 SS-20s. Schmidt has spoken of a sufficient counterweight rather than pure parity. Would the Soviets settle for a limit on missile warheads? Would NATO?

Such questions cry out for analysis, but, again, they are not the core questions. More to the point is the overarching question: Can there be a credible NATO strategy for nuclear weapons in the present era of Soviet strategic parity? After all, Henry Kissinger and others have bluntly announced the end of the automatic American nuclear guarantee. What doctrine will substitute for it? Is flexible response valid in the new strategic circumstances? Would the appearance of NATO theater capabilities invite a preemptive Soviet attack in Europe, thus guaranteeing that the battle would become a nuclear one even in the initial stages? Would NATO be better served by a different mix of weapons, more ballistic missiles that might neutralize the SS-20, or at least pose such a threat? Or would the opposite be more effective: to rely more heavily on cruise missiles that would be retaliatory in character, and thus "stabilizing," and that could be built up rapidly? Would the Soviets be reassured by such a mode? Finally, what is the relationship of theater weapons to central systems? The Soviets, after all, have made it clear that they will engage in some crossruffing, trading reductions in one category against another.

The consequences of a lack of precision in defining the objectives and strategy for the alliance will be worsened by the new strains on the resources of the United States as it tries to create a new strategic theater in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. A new defense concept is evolving. Its effect is evident in the reduction of the Mediterranean fleet and carrier deployments in the Pacific. It looks increasingly likely that the United States could not cope with the famous one and one-half wars the strategy calls for (if in fact it ever could). But for Europe, the consequences may also be far-reaching. There have already been demands for a greater European contribution to meet the new challenge, especially by building up stockpiles in Europe. A new burden sharing in Europe has

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

some attraction and may indeed be feasible, but it runs into chronic problems, first, by reinforcing the presumption of a conventional, nonnuclear battle in Europe; second, by creating the probability that the alliance will become predominantly "Germanized." And extending the political reach of NATO or, more precisely, of certain NATO countries beyond the alliance area also raises problems. Although there is some European political interest in engaging more directly in regional diplomacy, there still is no mechanism to coordinate the policies of the alliance members and the United States. Moreover, there remains the more basic problem of sharply divergent interests and tactics, as evident in the handling of the Iranian crisis and the European Community overtures to the radical Arabs and the PLO.

Finally, there is the troublesome concept of an American rapid deployment force that exists now largely on paper. If and when it comes into operation, it will raise some further questions about NATO. Will the United States use conventional forces for the Rapid Deployment Force that are earmarked for NATO reserves? Is it realistic to plan for a clash with the Soviet Union in the Persian Gulf on the assumption that NATO's central front remains completely quiet? What about the equipment to be produced and stockpiled for the Rapid Deployment Force: will it be at the expense of the central front in Europe? At this very early date the most that we can speculate is that American commitments to a new strategic area, as enunciated by President Carter and supported by a series of new base agreements, will add to the strains in the alliance and aggravate the problems arising out of a lack of strategy for a new era.

In the summer of 1980 NATO finds itself in a difficult position. There is a growing imbalance of forces that can only tempt the Soviets to raise new pressures. There is no commonly agreed strategy for Western defense, or for negotiations, and opinions diverge on whether to preserve a degree of accommodation with the Soviet Union.

The nightmare that seems to be haunting Washington is that this rift is the beginning of the more profound process of Finlandization of Europe, the old bogeyman that no longer seems so farfetched. The prospect was put eloquently by one of Europe's master strategists, Raymond Aron:

> What is much more to be feared is the possibility that European nations, grown conscious of their weakness and yet unable to awaken any sense of concern or danger in the population, should gradually submit to the will of the strongest, the world's greatest military power.[6]

This particular nightmare may be softened by a few shadows of a more favorable nature.

First of all, the process of accommodation, negotiations, and/or containment is bound to be played out over a number of years. It will thus coincide with the period of the Soviet leadership succession. Although it seemed a few years ago that this particular passage might be negotiated without an upheaval, it looks more and more likely that there will be a difficult period of Soviet dislocation as the generations finally change. Brezhnev and his comrades have aged, without daring to undertake the delicate process of engineering the advancement of a younger generation. Now it may happen with a rush.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moreover, the situation of the Soviet Union is changing as well. Détente has been exploited to postpone and defer some fundamental Soviet economic decisions. Outside assistance has been forthcoming to such a point that the external debt of the Soviet Union is between $16 and $17 billion. Earning hard currency to maintain, let alone expand, this debt will be a prodigious task, especially if Soviet oil exports, which have been the principal source of hard currency, collapse. Importing more and more sophisticated Western or Japanese technology, however, is mandatory in light of declining productivity, diminishing manpower, and scarcer resources for investment. Thus it may be that a bizarre situation of mutual vulnerability is shaping up between Europe and Russia. Europe finds itself without the certain nuclear protection of its American ally and therefore vulnerable to the Soviet menace. But the Soviet Union may find that to exercise this unparalleled leverage over Europe, it jeopardizes both the stability of its East European dominions (who, incidentally, are displaying a new nervousness about Soviet policies) and the foreign economic foundation of its domestic structure. But even such a standoff is only possible if Europe recognizes its potential strengths and forms a partnership with America under a common strategy—which, unfortunately, at this point does not seem likely. Perhaps more than ever a new Harmel Report is necessary, in which the alliance will reexamine its twin pillars of defense and détente.

REFERENCES

[1]J. W. Apple, *The New York Times*, April 14, 1980.

[2]Editorial, *Washington Post*, June 6, 1974.

[3]Christian Kind, "Moscow's Pressure on Europe," *Swiss Review of World Affairs*, June 1980.

[4]See James O. Goldsborough, "Europe Cashes In on Carter's Cold War," *New York Times Magazine*, April 27, 1980.

[5]Printed in *Survival*, January/February 1978.

[6]Raymond Aron, " '1984': Will Europe Survive So Long?" *Encounter*, January 1980, p. 27.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ROBERT R. BOWIE

The Atlantic Alliance

FOR THREE DECADES THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE has been the foundation for security, stability, and peace in Western Europe. In addition to countering the Soviet threat, its existence has provided the framework for European renewal, for integrating the Federal Republic into the West, and for the building of the European Community. Wider cooperation among the Allies has been essential to the vitality and growth of the Atlantic economies. Now, facing the 1980s, both sides of the Atlantic are concerned about the disarray in the alliance. At issue is whether current divergences among its members will so erode their mutual confidence and cohesion as to prevent them from taking the joint actions that will be necessary in dealing with the grave threats to their security and well-being that lie ahead.

Friction is not new to the alliance; indeed, from the beginning it has been more the rule than the exception. Still, it has not kept the alliance from achieving its central purposes. Hence, some observers dismiss the current troubles as more of the same. They may prove correct. Certainly, the Allies continue to have vital interests in common that call for close cooperation in the 1980s at least as urgently as in earlier periods. For others, however, the present tensions seem more serious, and their consequences more uncertain than in earlier periods. From this perspective, an assessment of the future prospects of the alliance suggests three questions: What was the nature of past cleavages? How do the current tensions differ? What would be required to surmount them?

Past Differences

Tensions and disputes were virtually inherent in the alliance from its origin. The members were united by their shared interest in the security of Western Europe and the economic vitality of the Atlantic region. But they differed widely in size, history, geography, outlook, and internal politics, and in the impact of the war. Many of the European members still held, or were seeking to recover, colonies in Asia and Africa. The United Kingdom, a victor, saw itself as a global power and a "special partner" of the United States. France, defeated and liberated, was struggling to regain its earlier standing. The Federal Republic, gradually emerging from occupation, was disarmed, and initially not a member, although the most exposed. But most significant by far was the disparity in power between the United States and its European allies. Unravaged by the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

war, it was unique in the enormous scale and dynamism of its economy, its small, but awesome, nuclear monopoly, and its capacity for global reach.

Yet at the start, the conditions that prompted the formation of the alliance fostered consensus and minimized strains. Stalin's repression of Eastern Europe, the take-over of Czechoslovakia, and the Berlin blockade had evoked a profound fear of the Soviet Union with its massive armed forces just across the Iron Curtain. The shared lesson of the 1930s was to unite to head off aggression before it occurred. U.S. nuclear weapons offered the only ready means to counter the threat. In their weakness, the Europeans were eager to commit the United States to their protection. Indeed, the primary purpose of the alliance was to extend the deterrent of the U.S. nuclear umbrella to the European members. And allied cohesion was reinforced by the common effort to revive the European economies under the Marshall Plan.

Within a year, the Soviet atomic test and the Korean attack challenged some of the initial premises. Although they enhanced the sense of threat and the vital need for the alliance, these events provoked extended controversy about how to respond. For the United States, they made it essential to bolster the alliance by bringing in the Federal Republic and rearming its forces. For the Europeans, the primary aim was to reinforce the nuclear guarantee by deploying in Europe U.S. forces, whose involvement would be the automatic trigger for U.S. response to any Soviet attack. The proposal to rearm Germany was divisive within both France and the Federal Republic (and elsewhere). Four years of debate and negotiation were required to work out an acceptable basis for entry of the Federal Republic and for settling the structure and basic strategy of the alliance: an integrated military headquarters, headed by an American; and reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent, supported by substantial conventional forces, including about five U.S. divisions in Europe.

In the 1950s and 1960s tensions arose owing to the gradual erosion of U.S. strategic superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The growth of Soviet military strength, especially its capacity for nuclear attack on the United States, repeatedly raised questions about both the adequacy of the U.S. deterrent and the revision of NATO strategy. Would such vulnerability inhibit U.S. use of strategic nuclear strikes in case of an attack on Western Europe? Would the United States put New York in jeopardy for Frankfurt? In theory, the question arose as soon as the Soviet Union had any strategic nuclear forces, but it became a live issue in 1959-60 with the coming of ballistic missiles, the "missile gap," and the deployment of Soviet SS-4 and SS-5 IRBM missiles targeted on Europe.

The issue sparked a variety of reactions. For Britain and France, it was used to justify their national nuclear forces. Yet these small forces were of doubtful value against Soviet attack, and did nothing for other allies. General Norstad, then NATO commander, proposed a NATO missile force. To counter the divisive effects of national forces, the United States suggested a multilateral force (MLF) composed of missile-carrying vessels, with mixed crews under joint command. While placing nuclear missiles in the European area under joint command, neither the Norstad plan nor MLF could fully meet the issue of U.S. reliability, since the United States, along with others, would retain a finger on the trigger. The Federal Republic favored the MLF joint force, but Britain resisted it, and

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

France rejected it as a threat to their national forces. After extended discussion it was dropped by President Johnson. Instead, the alliance formed a Nuclear Planning Group for closer consultation.

The alliance also adopted a revised strategy of "flexible response," at the urging of the United States, but with hesitation by the Allies. In essence, the alliance continued to rely ultimately on the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter attack, but increased its capacity to respond initially by conventional means and then by tactical nuclear weapons. The theory was that the Soviet Union would be deterred by the certainty of a NATO response, including U.S. forces, and by the grave risk that hostilities would escalate to the strategic nuclear level in the struggle to prevent the loss of Western Europe. Logically, U.S. strategic superiority during this period did not overcome the effect of its vulnerability, since it could not disarm the Soviet Union; but, psychologically, superiority reinforced confidence in the effectiveness of the deterrent. The strategy might not satisfy theorists, but political leaders were prepared to live with it into the 1970s.

In the first two decades of the alliance, the more general question of how to deal with the Soviet Union was not divisive. In the Cold War period foreign ministers, lower officials, and experts met repeatedly with Soviet counterparts, and there were even summit conferences. But the Allies were united on what they wanted from the Soviet Union regarding Germany, exchanges, arms control, and other issues, and were not under undue domestic pressure to make agreements for their own sake. Thus failure to reach agreements did not cause recriminations. And as détente gradually became a catchword in the late 1960s, the Allies were able to concert their views regarding its purposes and relation to defense in the Harmel Report. While de Gaulle, under the umbrella of the alliance, made his own approaches to the Soviet Union in pursuit of an independent role for France, these were deemed to be mainly shadow play.

The recovery and revival of Western Europe, especially the Continent, in the 1950s and 1960s created political problems within the alliance. German, French, and other economies (except the British) were more dynamic than that of the United States. The European Economic Community began to rival the United States in aggregate gross national product and to act as an entity for trade and some foreign economic purposes. It might well have evolved into an effective partner of the United States for political as well as economic issues, but for the policy of de Gaulle, who, paradoxically, claimed to want a strong Europe. His veto of the belated effort of Britain to join the EEC in 1963 kept that alive as a disruptive issue in the Community for a decade. And in the mid-sixties, he stalled the progress of the Community toward greater unity. With its power declining, Britain was forced reluctantly to adjust to a more modest role, but still sought to preserve some vestige of the special relation with the United States, most notably in assistance for its nuclear force. The terms Britain obtained from President Kennedy at the Nassau meeting were rejected by de Gaulle as not compatible with the independent French role. De Gaulle's withdrawal of France from NATO (but not the alliance) and his ejection of NATO from France cost money and energy, and left unclear the French role in defense, but the alliance managed to adapt without serious disruption of its functioning. Similarly, his effort to exploit Adenauer's yearning for intimate ties with France

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in order to loosen Germany's links with the United States caused more embarrassment than permanent harm.

Finally, interests and events outside the alliance area caused some discord. In the 1950s the Allies with colonies felt that the United States often made their problems more difficult by its anticolonial attitude. The maneuvering during the last stages of the French-Indochinese war aroused concern about U.S. intervention. In the 1956 Suez Crisis, Britain and France felt betrayed by the United States, which in turn resented their deception. Many of the Allies thought the United States was mistaken about Quemoy-Matsu and Vietnam. In the Cuban missile crisis, however, the Allies, including de Gaulle, were fully supportive, even though they were only informed after the U.S. decision was taken.

Many of these disputes were bitter and divisive, but they were surmounted without undermining the functioning of the alliance. The reasons were various. For much of the period the Soviet threat was felt to be imminent and serious. Keenly aware of their security dependence, the Allies gave highest priority to maintaining the alliance. (Even after Suez, the United States and Britain moved rapidly to repair the damage.) Given that priority—the predominance of the United States and its central role for security—the Allies took U.S. leadership for granted and most were usually willing to adapt their positions to those of the United States. Moreover, in its exercise of leadership, the United States was generally seen as seeking to take account of the wider interests of the alliance rather than its own more parochial interests, as in its support of the European Community. Aside from Suez, Britain was disposed to cooperate. Germany, despite its growing strength, was still inhibited by past history from asserting itself, and was especially anxious, by reason of its division and exposed position, to maintain close links with the United States and to avoid any rifts in that relation. Thus de Gaulle was a special case.

Doubts about strategy tended to be submerged by the conviction that the U.S. military capability and its firm political commitment were adequate to deter Soviet aggression. On the general approach to the Soviet Union, there were few divergences; de Gaulle's initiatives were not taken seriously enough to be worrisome. And, with the advent of détente in the late 1960s, the Allies were able to concur on a common approach. Outside Europe, the shedding of colonies removed a major source of contention; many such issues were seen as peripheral and primarily the responsibility of the United States or of interest only to specific allies. Insofar as the United States became involved in Asia and elsewhere, the Allies' main concern was that the United States not be diverted from primary attention to Europe.

All these factors together did not prevent serious discord as the Allies adapted to changing conditions in the 1950s and 1960s. But they did make it possible for the Allies to surmount such divergences or to subordinate them in the interest of the shared purposes. Will that be so in the period ahead?

Current Tensions

During the 1970s strains of four distinct kinds developed and reinforced one another.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Parity and Beyond

For the last decade or more, the United States and its allies have not kept pace with the steady Soviet military buildup, which for nearly twenty years has been consuming 11 to 13 percent or more of their GNP, and growing at a rate of about 4 to 5 percent a year. That effort is now having its impact on the relative balance of military power. Inexorably, the Soviet Union has been expanding, modernizing, and developing its military capabilities across the board, including strategic offensive and defensive weapons, new theater nuclear weapons, conventional capabilities, and forces to project power abroad.

No longer can it be assumed that the Soviets are seeking only parity. By 1982 the counterforce capability of the SS-17, the SS-18, and the SS-19—with three to six times more throw-weight and four to ten warheads (each larger than the three of the Minuteman), and with accuracy approaching U.S. levels—will put in jeopardy the U.S. strategic arsenal, except for missile submarines at sea and B-52s on alert. In addition, the number of Soviet missile submarines, though of lower quality, exceeds by 60 percent those of the United States. In Europe, in addition to the general improvement in Warsaw Pact forces and equipment, the Soviets have deployed since 1977 some 160 of their new SS-20 MRBM, which has three warheads, and continue to deploy about one a week; and they are producing the Backfire bomber at about three per month. At least as ominous has been the expansion of Soviet capability to project its military power to distant areas.

Three years ago Chancellor Schmidt opened the debate about the impact on deterrence of strategic parity and the growing Soviet capabilities. In the United States, the SALT II debate forced a decision to proceed with 200 MX missiles, with ten warheads each of counterforce capability, and mobile among twenty-three shelters. But deployment will be completed only toward the end of the 1980s, leaving the Soviets what has been called a "window of opportunity" against the Minuteman ICBM from 1982 till then.

Yet the significance of this "strategic window" is debatable. Would a Soviet leader actually be tempted to attack the vulnerable Minuteman, knowing that even if his own missiles performed perfectly, the United States would still retain submarines and bombers with tremendous strategic destructive power? Would any sane Soviet leader assume that these weapons could not, or would not, be used in retaliation? As for NATO, despite the relative balance, will not the uncertainty about how hostilities might escalate continue to inhibit aggressive action in Europe as it has for several decades? Even so, an imbalance cannot be ignored. It might cause Soviet leaders to underestimate the U.S. response to other forms of expansion. And concern about it might open the way for political leverage against U.S. allies or friends impressed by the seeming Soviet advantage. They might also be troubled by the fact that the United States allowed the imbalance to develop without taking timely measures to counteract it.

NATO responded to the modernizing of the Warsaw Pact by launching a long-range defense program, based on pledges by the members to increase defense spending by 3 percent annually. Some have fulfilled their pledges, some have not. In late 1979, to offset the SS-20 and Backfire, NATO also decided to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deploy, starting in 1983, Theater Nuclear Forces under U.S. control, consisting of 108 Pershings and 464 cruise missiles. The details of that decision reveal much about the politics of the alliance. To achieve consensus, the ground for the decision was carefully prepared by two special NATO committees during 1979, and the decision to deploy the missiles was coupled with a proposal to the Soviet Union for negotiations to restrict theater nuclear forces before NATO deployment began. Chancellor Schmidt, himself a TNF proponent, was then able to get Social Democratic party (SPD) backing despite its left wing. The Federal Republic, however, conditioned deployment on its territory on similar acceptance by another Continental ally (Italy agreed, as did Britain). But Belgium and the Netherlands, facing domestic opposition, deferred a decision for six months and two years, respectively.

Again, the logic of the decision is not unambiguous. For twenty years the SS-4 and SS-5 have been targeted on Western Europe. True, the SS-20 is more accurate, mobile, and MIRVed. But the earlier missiles were countered by U.S. strategic forces. If parity might inhibit the United States from retaliating with its strategic forces, why would it be ready to fire theater nuclear forces in Europe? The Soviet Union would hardly accept the distinction and therefore treat the United States as a sanctuary. Yet, whatever its military logic, the TNF decision probably responds to a political need by manifesting again the U.S. direct commitment to the defense of Europe.

But, clearly, the TNF issue has not been finally disposed of. The Soviet Union will surely seek to use it to foster discord among the Allies, especially in view of the ambivalence of certain of them. It initially spurned the NATO offer to negotiate unless the decision to deploy was reversed, apparently hoping to open up divisions within the alliance. That having failed, the Soviets, on Schmidt's visit to Moscow, proposed to negotiate if all forward-based systems were included. That could create difficulties.

Détente and Beyond

For some years the Allies have not had a coherent policy on relations with the Soviet Union or a common view of détente—the ambiguities of détente themselves cloaked the differing emphases and interests of the Allies. But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought them into the open.

Each ally has seen détente in the light of its own specific interests and domestic politics. De Gaulle (and his successors) saw it as the means to establish the independence of French policy and the importance of France, and possibly to outflank the French Communist party. Exploiting both the security provided by the alliance and the Soviet hope of fostering divisions within it, de Gaulle pursued a special position with the Soviet Union. Since he asked for little more than symbolic charade, the Soviets were glad to play the game for whatever it might produce.

For the Federal Republic, *Ostpolitik* was a more explicit bargain. In exchange for acceptance of the German Democratic Republic and the Oder-Neisse line, the Federal Republic obtained specific benefits in terms of unimpeded access to West Berlin, improved relations with East Germany, the movement of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe, and substantial trade. Focusing on these advan-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tages from détente, the Federal Republic viewed the restraint of Soviet expansion outside of Europe as mainly the task of the United States and unrelated to *Ostpolitik*. And for the SPD, détente has been a source of electoral support.

The Nixon Administration presented détente in quite different terms, relating it to the global rivalry. The Nixon-Brezhnev summits of 1972 and 1973 were depicted as a historic watershed in U.S.-USSR relations, moving toward a new era of "normal relations" and a "stable structure of peace." Both sides would now conform to an agreed code of principles committing them to exercise restraint and to seek no "unilateral advantage at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly." It also committed them to renounce the use or threat of force and to head off conflicts that might increase international tensions. All of this was to be buttressed by a series of agreements—economic, scientific, and cultural—that were supposed to constrain Soviet conduct. The overselling of the significance of détente fostered illusions at home and abroad about Soviet policy. Taken at face value, this view of détente conveyed the impression that the Soviet Union was now interested in stability and the status quo. That prospect was politically popular, especially for an American public weary of Vietnam and the burdens of a global role.

But the Soviet concept of détente was very different. For them, it was a form of peaceful coexistence suited to their needs and opportunities. It would provide Western technology, advanced equipment, and credits, discourage Western defense spending, and confirm the regime in Eastern Europe. While détente implied a low-key policy in Europe, the struggle to expand Soviet influence and power elsewhere, whenever feasible, would continue unabated, taking advantage of instability in the Third World and the decline in U.S. power. The political spillover from détente would reinforce the impact of Vietnam in making U.S. reaction less likely.

The Soviet concept was soon manifested in their actions. After SALT I they continued their steady military buildup across the board. From the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 on, their activities never conformed to the "Basic Principles" that Brezhnev had solemnly signed in 1972, but sought instead to achieve unilateral advantage wherever feasible. For some time the strategy worked. Exploiting Third World turmoil, through Soviet advisors, materiel, and logistics, and Cuban forces, they established themselves in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan, where pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist regimes became dependent on Soviet support for survival. The West protested, but continued to expand trade with the Soviet Union, supply advanced technology, extend credits, conduct exchanges, and negotiate SALT II. By 1978 NATO reacted to growing Warsaw Pact strength with its long-range program of modernization, and in late 1979, its TNF decision. In the United States, the SALT II debate, which highlighted both the military buildup and the expansive conduct, further discredited détente.

The Afghan invasion brought the issue to a head. This direct aggression by Soviet forces toward a nonaligned state radically altered President Carter's view of the Soviet Union. It also jolted European leaders: they too denounced the invasion as an unacceptable violation of international law and demanded the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

Beyond that, their views diverged. Calling the invasion a "threat to world peace," the president promptly announced the Carter Doctrine, declaring the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Persian Gulf region to be a vital U.S. interest to be defended by force if necessary. Further, he imposed sanctions to "punish" the Soviet action by cutting trade in grain and high technology, called for a boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics, and suspended hearings on congressional approval of SALT II. The Europeans were reluctant to follow the U.S. lead, though the British were generally supportive, and Schmidt backed the Olympic boycott. They hoped to preserve détente in Europe despite Afghanistan. Détente, in general, and *Ostpolitik*, in particular, were still paying dividends that the Europeans did not want to forgo. Some feared that the Carter Doctrine might provoke a confrontation with the Soviet Union for which the United States and the West were ill prepared. Some asserted that the president had overreacted, or argued that the sanctions would not get the Soviets out of Afghanistan.

Giscard's trip to Warsaw and Schmidt's to Moscow showed their ambivalence. Both perhaps were genuinely concerned to keep open channels of communication. For Giscard, who did not consult the Allies, it also fostered the image of an independent French policy and a special relation with the Soviet Union, and may have improved his position with the French Communists (though the trip was sharply criticized by others). Schmidt doubtless also gained Party and electoral benefits. And while he declared that Afghanistan threw "a long shadow over East-West relations in Europe" and called again for Soviet withdrawal, the Federal Republic signed a major long-term trade pact to cooperate with the Soviet Union on automation, computers, and energy, and foreshadowed a deal for a $13-billion gas pipeline to West Germany. Business as usual, despite verbal protests, seems more in keeping with a misdemeanor than a major crime.

In receiving both leaders, in notifying Giscard personally of the small withdrawal from Afghanistan, and in modifying its rejection of any TNF negotiations, the Soviet Union showed clearly that it will pursue a selective détente with Europe, with the hope of opening fissures between the United States and its European allies.

What is apparent is the lack of an effective strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union that gets beyond the ambiguities of détente. Now there is not even a common appraisal of the implications of Afghanistan. Calling the invasion "unacceptable" does not say what, if anything, will be done to try to counter it, or to deter or deal with similar or other Soviet efforts at expansion. Indeed, Schmidt and Giscard act as if Afghanistan is a special case, a misstep, which does not imply a heightened threat or greater Soviet boldness, or suggest anything about future Soviet policy. The Carrington proposal for neutralizing Afghanistan will become relevant only if other reasons lead the Soviets to reverse their decision to maintain a puppet Communist regime there against Afghan wishes. If this happens, it will be because of Afghan resistance, not Western policy. Do the Europeans really believe that resisting Soviet expansion in the Third World is not their concern? But, whatever its motivation, the Afghan invasion is a potential threat to the Persian Gulf and its oil, a vital interest of Europe and Japan.

President Carter's statements and actions are also not adequate policy. The sanctions were a valid way to demonstrate disapproval, but they should not block other aspects of the relations. The United States cannot break off talking

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with the Soviet Union. One of their few genuine shared interests is to manage their relations to minimize the risks of nuclear war. That requires communication, especially when relations are tense or in periods of crisis. In principle, equitable and balanced arms control, if achievable, should be kept separate from other aspects of competition, but flagrant aggression strains that principle to the limit.

The Carter Doctrine for the defense of the Persian Gulf was an appropriate step for "drawing the line." But its implementation will call for a much more concrete program. Beyond that, what is needed is to settle on a concerted strategy for relations with the Soviet Union, and especially for constraining its efforts to expand in Third World areas. Can the West hope to orchestrate trade, technology, and credits to make them incentives for restraint? Can aid to Third World nations for defense and development be used more effectively to help them achieve orderly change and resist infiltration and subversion? Can regional groupings like ASEAN help their members maintain independent regimes? What kind of mobile military power is needed? How far can allies like Britain, France, and Japan shoulder some of the military burden?

The Middle East and Energy

The dependence on imported oil, much of it from Gulf producers, confronts the United States and its allies with a complex challenge that could become highly divisive. For the first time, Europe and the United States (and Japan) share a common, vital interest in an area outside Western Europe. The method for ensuring the supply of Middle East oil and the security of this critical region raises difficult questions—political, economic, and military—for which neither the United States nor its allies has ready answers.

Indeed, they have been extremely slow in facing the issues. In 1973 the oil boycott and the quadrupling of oil prices by OPEC underscored the vulnerability of the West. Yet attention focused mainly on managing the effect of the price rise on allied economies and balance of payments, and the recycling of the large revenues of the OPEC producers. Those tasks were accomplished, and the International Energy Agency was formed to allocate oil in case of a future cutoff.

The security of this critical oil supply was virtually ignored. Several factors fostered a misplaced confidence. For five years oil imports flowed smoothly, and real prices actually fell (owing to the impact of inflation on steady oil prices). The dominant output of Saudi Arabia, which wanted U.S. support for its security, gave it leverage in OPEC and a potential for making up a shortfall if it chose. Iran, under the shah, was considered a bastion against Soviet influence. And the initiatives of President Carter and then of President Sadat seemed to offer hope for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.

By 1979 events had dashed the hopes and deflated the confidence. Because industrial oil importers failed to develop adequate energy programs, rising demand reduced Saudi leverage in OPEC. The fall of the shah in early 1979 undermined the security bastion, drastically cut the supply of Iranian oil, and created serious concern about the stability of other Middle East regimes. The seizure of American hostages in Iran posed the problem of seeking to obtain their release without provoking counteractions or pushing Iran into Soviet arms. The Camp

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

David accords had divided Egypt and other moderate regimes, including that of Saudi Arabia; and the stalemate in the negotiations on the Palestinian issue, exacerbated by the Begin settlements policy, was feeding tensions within the region and Arab resentment against the West. Finally, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of the year raised the spectre of Soviet influence and manipulation.

Even before Afghanistan, the events of 1979 seriously strained relations among the Allies. First, reacting to Iran, the oil importing nations launched a mad scramble for oil, which disrupted markets, created an artificial shortage, and led to a doubling in the OPEC price.

Second, the hostage issue was divisive. The United States resented allied resistance to sanctions on Iran to coerce release of the hostages. The Allies, judging sanctions to be ineffective, were afraid that U.S. pressures or force might drive Iran toward the Soviets or alienate others in the region.

Third, for the Europeans, the U.S. handling of the Arab-Israeli conflict seems to jeopardize their vital interest in a secure oil supply. Fearing that the Palestinian issue, if not resolved, will continue to endanger stability in the region and impede cooperation with the West, the Europeans press for a settlement based on a homeland for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza in return for Palestinian acceptance of the state of Israel and guarantees for its security. Although Begin, determined to hold onto the occupied territories, rejects any such solution, the United States continues its subsidies and support, prolongs the Camp David process, and seeks to block any initiative by the Europeans, who are not under the same domestic political pressures.

Finally, the Allies have been impatient with the U.S. energy program. To them, the United States is an oil glutton; its heavy imports contribute greatly to the market conditions that have enabled OPEC members to raise prices. They have been irritated by the delay both in allowing domestic oil prices to rise to reduce the profligate use of oil and in developing coal and nuclear energy as alternatives. The U.S. attitude toward nuclear power, especially its hostility to the breeder reactor, has seemed to the Europeans, who have little domestic oil (except for Britain) and limited coal and uranium, to ignore their predicament.

U. S. Leadership

The effects of these divergences on alliance cohesion are greatly exacerbated by the problem of alliance leadership. For years U.S. leadership was the backbone of the alliance and the primary source of necessary initiatives. That leadership and the confidence of the Allies in it have seriously declined.

One factor has been the relative decline in U.S. power. The lopsided U.S. economic dominance of the postwar period, the result of the war's disruption of the other major industrial economies, could not last; its reduction was inherent in the revival of Western Europe and Japan and was hastened by their rapid growth. Today, Europe's GNP is about equal to that of the United States, and Japan's will soon be nearly half. The European Community has further enhanced the relative power of its members in the trade and economic fields, and they are moving toward more common positions on specific foreign policy issues. This diffusion of power should be a source of Western strength, although adjusting to its implications may cause friction, especially since the dependence

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on the United States for security continues. The U.S. global position has also been eroded by the growth of Soviet military strength, the rise of OPEC, and the weakening of the dollar.

A second cause is more troubling. During the 1970s many Europeans began to question the capacity of the American political system to govern effectively. The decade of Vietnam left a legacy of doubt about our ability to define our interests and to act in keeping with them. The continuing decline of the dollar and the persistent balance of payments deficits and inflation have raised doubts about the dynamism of the economy and its productivity, and of our capacity to manage it. The fumbling efforts to develop a coherent energy policy showed the power of special interest groups, the public refusal to accept the reality and seriousness of the problem, and the lack of both discipline and responsibility in the Congress. Other allies, except perhaps France, had not handled the issue with decision and expedition, but U.S. attempts seemed notably inadequate, especially in view of the wasteful use of energy in the United States and the potential there for alternatives to oil. All these issues, and others like the handling of SALT II, seemed to be evidence that the United States could no longer fill the role of superpower and leader of the advanced democracies.

Finally, President Carter drew criticism from the Allies for vacillation and confusion (troop withdrawal from Korea, neutron bomb, Soviet troops in Cuba, UN vote on Israel, etc.), for the multiple voices in foreign affairs (especially in U.S.-USSR relations), and for failure to consult or take adequate account of allied interests (nonproliferation). These perceptions, like the poor chemistry between the president and some key allied leaders, compounded the more basic causes for loss of confidence.

Yet the Europeans are much more adept at criticizing the lack of U.S. leadership or the character of U.S. proposals than at either reaching the decision to cooperate in pursuing them or at offering practical alternatives. The call for leadership is not matched by readiness to follow; the call for partnership, by the willingness to participate. Indeed, it often appears that the criticism is an escape from the necessity for analysis or prescription of their own.

The Agenda for the 1980s

The major challenges facing the West in the decade ahead are formidable: (1) how to cope with a Soviet Union with military parity or better and its capacity to project its power to exploit turmoil and rivalries in the Third World; (2) how to assure the reliable supply of vital oil from a Middle East vulnerable to internal instability and external pressures and manipulation; and (3) how to manage their own and the global economies to foster vitality and growth at home and in the Third World, and cope with the direct and indirect effects of rising oil prices and uncertain supply. These tasks are inherited from the 1970s, but each will be more complex in the 1980s, in part because of the failure to deal with them more effectively in the last decade.

The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union will be a less predictable adversary. With Brezhnev age 73 and ailing, the issue of succession could arise at any time. That is likely to be

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a two-stage process, first with a weak secretary-general and elderly collective leadership from the existing Politburo, followed by younger leaders as the older Politburo members depart the scene. The transition will probably take place during the period of the strategic window (1982-86), when the Soviets may consider they have an advantage in strategic and conventional strength and growing projection capacity.

Yet in this period the growth of the Soviet economy will be slowing down substantially, possibly dropping below 2 percent by 1985. Both the labor force and capital stock will be expanding more slowly; the infrastructure needed to exploit Siberian resources will be costly; and by 1985, despite large reserves, the Soviet Union may shift from exporting oil to needing some imports. Finally, inefficient agriculture and low productivity appear to be endemic to the system of central planning, management, and rewards. While the succession process will tend to inhibit major economic changes or defense cuts, the Soviet leaders will face hard choices in allocating tight resources among investments for energy and producer goods, for consumer goods needed for worker incentives, and for military spending.

What policies is this mix of economic pressures, military strength, and changing leadership likely to produce? Will the need for technology, trade, and credits to cope with economic problems push the Soviet leaders toward closer economic relations with the West? If so, how much Western leverage will that provide to inhibit expansionist activities? Or will a perceived military advantage be exploited for expansion or political influence in the Middle East, Africa, or elsewhere? Or will new Soviet leaders try to combine both courses, as Brezhnev has done, stressing economic links with Europe and seeking to divide Europe from the United States? How far can clear Western policies influence Soviet choices?

The Middle East

For the 1980s, the security of the supply of Middle East oil will be one of the most urgent and difficult problems facing the Allies. Containing regional rivalries, bolstering shaky regimes while assisting orderly change, and warding off or countering Soviet interference and influence will require a mosaic of economic, diplomatic, and military measures. Agreement on an effective strategy and on the role each member of the alliance will play in carrying it out will test the skill and capacities of the Allies.

The Middle East will be more unsettled as a result of Iran and Afghanistan. The odds are very high that domestic turmoil, regional disputes, or subversion will cause serious disruptions in the supply of oil during the decade. Domestic ferment or outside subversion might upset regimes like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or Egypt. Local rivalries may break out into hostilities—as they have between Iraq and Iran, and might between Israel and the Arabs. Or the Arab oil producers may curtail supply to exert pressure for a Palestinian settlement. Even the efforts to foster stability or security may prove disruptive: regimes that identify too closely with the West may weaken themselves internally. And bases or facilities for deploying outside forces could become magnets for agitation. The

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Union will doubtless seek to exploit local turmoil or discontent, and may gradually expand its presence and influence in the Yemens, Iran, or Baluchistan.

Economies

Managing the economies of the industrial nations and of the developing countries, and the relations among them, will be extremely difficult. Even if the major oil importers rigorously conserve, substitute other fuels, stockpile, and organize to allocate oil if necessary, the prospect is for constantly rising prices and substantial risk of severe shocks from supply disruptions. The result will be continuing inflation, slow growth, and serious payments deficits. Those conditions will impede investment and capital spending needed to improve productivity and efficiency and to develop other energy sources, and will encourage protectionist pressures damaging to the advanced economies, but even more so to the developing nations. And that is by no means the worst case. In a grim analysis of the oil outlook, Walter Levy has said:

> At best, it would appear that a series of future emergencies centering around oil will set back world progress for many, many years. And the world, as we know it now, will probably not be able to maintain its cohesion, nor be able to provide for the continued economic progress of its people against the onslaught of future oil shocks—with all that this might imply for the political stability of the West, its free institutions, and its internal and external security.[1]

This brief analysis underscores three points: First, the stakes are hard to overstate. If the West fails to cope with these challenges adequately, that failure could literally change the course of history for the long future. The spread of Soviet control into areas vital for the West, or extended disruption of energy supply for any reason, coupled with severe and prolonged depression and its social and political impact, could put in jeopardy the social and political order of the West and its capacity to control its own destiny. Second, effective responses to these problems will require complex strategies that combine military, economic, and political measures, and will have to be pursued consistently over an extended period. Even then success is not assured. Third, none of these problems can be handled by the United States alone or by some or all of the Allies without the United States. Joint action will be indispensable. That does not mean that all must follow identical policies, ideal as that might be. But it does mean that the Allies must concert their policies and actions to make them coherent, so that they will reinforce rather than cancel each other.

The Outlook for Concerted Action

Will the United States and its allies be able to overcome their discord and work out and pursue a coherent set of common policies for the coming decade? That involves two questions: How far are their basic interests parallel or in conflict? Have they the capacity to develop the necessary consensus on what to do and how to do it?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Interests

On relations with the Soviet Union, the Allies differ not so much regarding interests as to how to conduct the relation. In general terms, there is probably a consensus that the aim of Western policy should be to affect Soviet choices by shaping their options, specifically by raising the costs and risks of their continued pursuit of military advantage and expansion, and by increasing the benefits from their suspension or abandonment of those policies. Making the options clear will be especially critical during the succession.

The United States and its allies do not appear to differ on the need for measures to strengthen the deterrent, both strategic and regional, and to develop mobile forces for safeguarding the Middle East and possibly other areas. If the United States and its allies carry out plans now underway, that will go far in this direction, but these plans will require heavy added funding over five to ten years and will doubtless produce debate about burden-sharing. Similarly, no one contests the necessity for U.S.-USSR efforts to manage their relations to avoid risks of nuclear war and to achieve balanced arms control agreements, if feasible. (In practice, the Allies are uneasy if such efforts appear either unduly intimate or too conflictual, and may criticize arms control agreements as taking too little account of their interests.)

Views diverge, however, on some aspects of how to counter Soviet expansion, whether done by proxy, as in Africa, or more directly, and brutally, as in Afghanistan. Many measures will not provoke dispute: strengthening the ability of exposed nations to make aggression costly; more assistance to combat poverty, corruption, repression, and other conditions propitious for subversion and take-over; helping to resolve local conflicts; and improving U.S. and Western capacity to support those threatened.

The 1980 British White Paper, in discussing this problem, put it well:

> The best answer is to try to remove the sources of regional instability which create opportunities for outside intervention. In some circumstances, military measures will not be appropriate at all; in others, they may form only one component of the total response. Diplomacy, development aid and trade policies will usually have a great contribution to make. . . . Nonetheless many forms of defense assistance can and should play a part in the support of friendly nations. . . . Over and above this, the West must make it clear to the Soviet Union and its allies that it is capable of protecting essential interests by military means should the need arise.

On most of this there will be agreement, with some divergences regarding the emphasis on different components and the specific roles of the various allies.

But a serious conflict seems sure to arise from the desire of the Europeans, especially the Germans, to isolate East-West relations in Europe *(Ostpolitik)* from global issues. No one wishes to curtail the existing links with East Germany and Eastern Europe or even the Soviet Union for personal travel, emigration, access, and so on. In practice, the question largely comes down to the use of trade, credits, and technology as potential levers against Soviet expansion. The Afghan invasion poses it. The French and Germans, although calling for Soviet withdrawal and recognizing the threat to Middle East oil, still resist trade sanctions.

If the Allies allow the Soviet Union to obtain these economic benefits while continuing its expansionist activities, they will forfeit one of their few levers for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

influencing Soviet choices. As the Soviet economy gets tighter, the Soviet need for such economic links will increase, and new leaders might well assess their value highly enough to constrain or forgo such expansion if that is the price. But for that to happen, the Allies, the Europeans especially, will have to act in concert in putting that choice sharply to the Soviet leaders. Although painful for the firms affected, the economic costs of threatening to forgo some or even all of this trade (amounting to less than 4 percent of total trade) are modest, and a bargain if they reduce the threat to Western security. But the Europeans, especially the Germans, will also weigh the risks to personal access that this interruption of trade might provoke, and will probably not reconsider their position until and unless the Soviet Union becomes a more explicit threat to the Middle East.

On the Middle East, there appears to be a developing consensus on the need for a Western strategy that would seek to fit together contributions by the various allies. It will have to cope with all the problems already discussed: fragile regimes, local rivalries, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Soviet threat. And the strategy must have many strands: a deterrent or defense against Soviet power, now only 300 miles away, through naval and mobile forces, with some local facilities; bolstering local strength as feasible; and seeking to contain or resolve local tensions.

Only Britain and France are likely to join the United States in any military precautions. But others could assist in other ways, including carrying a greater share within NATO. Again, devising a strategy seems sure to generate differences among the Allies about the relative priority of military and other measures and the means for carrying out the strategy. But the main point of contention will be the Arab-Israeli conflict, most particularly the issue of Palestinian autonomy and the West Bank and Gaza. Resolving the Palestinian issue will not assure stability—too many sources of turmoil would remain; but failure to do so seriously impedes the effort to assure the security of oil supply. Again, Europeans consider that the United States is risking their security interests by its failure to press Israel to trade the occupied territories for its acceptance and guaranteed safeguards for its security. Perhaps the debate now beginning in the United States (and Israel) on this issue may tend to narrow this split after the election.

The second aspect of oil security for the advanced industrial countries is internal—the need for energy programs to reduce the dangers from the current and prospective dependence on imported oil. No program can free Europe or Japan or even the United States from the need for Middle East oil, but reducing the degree of dependence and other measures would ameliorate the risks of short supply and tight demand.

The effort to develop a Western energy program creates some divisions. In general, neither the United States nor Europe nor Japan has given the energy problem the priority and urgency it deserves. But the Europeans have considered the United States to be especially derelict, though recent U.S. actions have partly mitigated these concerns. With the completion of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), the United States may move toward a less rigid attitude on the breeder reactor, which the Allies are anxious to develop. Since all the Western nations, however, will be very vulnerable to supply dis-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ruptions unless they do far more, any such crisis could well produce severely divisive clashes.

As this brief review indicates, there are conflicts of appraisal and interest between the Allies. Yet they are far outweighed by the common interests and the shared need to cooperate to advance or protect them. These conflicts do hinder joint policies and action, but they do not seem to me to be the core of the problem.

Capacity for Action

Much more troubling is the question whether the United States, Western Europe, and Japan will face up to the threats to their security and economies, and accept the burdens of an effective response. These nations have the resources, talent, and motives to do so. But are their political systems capable of defining the tasks, setting the priorities, and marshalling the resources for a steady common effort for much of the decade? Or will complacency, bickering, and political deadlock leave them exposed to sudden Soviet action or oil disruption, which could be catastrophic.

The experience of the last decade is hardly encouraging. True, NATO and the United States have finally decided to reinforce their military deterrent, and there seems to be growing acceptance that energy is a serious problem. But the 1970s also showed how prone Western electorates and leaders are to look away from disagreeable realities and to put off unpleasant action. At bottom, that brings us back to the issue of leadership in these nations and within the alliance, and the disillusion and doubts about the U.S. role and the ambiguity of the Allies about their own.

In a speech to the Trilateral Commission in London last March, Kiichi Miyazawa, the former Japanese foreign minister, analyzed the problem perceptively. American leadership remains essential, he said, but its modalities must evolve to reflect the economic strength and political potential of Europe and Japan. The United States must share global responsibility with its allies, but they must accept that responsibility, and redefine some national interests, by submerging secondary differences, to make them mutually compatible. The corollary is that the interests of the alliance will be defined collectively, though the United States will still have to take a leading role.

The need is to move closer to a sort of collective leadership among the advanced industrial societies. The summit meetings that have been held since 1975 have been groping toward such a practice in the fields of economic and energy policy. The practical results have fallen well short of the rhetoric of the communiqués. But these meetings are at least a start toward concerting or coordinating measures to cope with the common problems of inflation, stagnation, energy, and North-South issues. Their scope might be extended regularly to security and political issues in order to develop common appraisals and joint action.

For that to work, however, the United States must first restore its credibility and the confidence of its allies. It will have to demonstrate once more the capacity to clarify its goals and to pursue them with reasonable coherence and consistency. One test will be whether, after the election, the United States carries

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

out an adequate longer-term defense program, completes an effective energy program, and copes with stagflation, low investment, and poor productivity. If it does, that will go a long way toward reviving the confidence and restoring the cohesion that will allow the Allies to make the adjustments and compromises necessary for consensus on a coherent strategy.

Admittedly, the prospects for that outcome do not look too encouraging. The electorate may now be prepared to face the realities of our predicament and to support many of the actions needed to cope with it. But it may well be ahead of its representatives, who are still unduly responsive to single-issue and other pressure groups. Certainly, Congress would have to act more responsibly than it often has in recent years. There is no substitute, however, for presidential leadership, which in part implies the ability to elicit support from Congress. And in forcing a choice between the known shortcomings of President Carter and the untested abilities of Reagan in foreign affairs, the process for selecting a president has hardly been reassuring.

The U.S. political outlook makes it doubly important for the Allies to accept a broader responsibility for developing an adequate response to the challenges ahead. Doing so is necessary in any event, and while no substitute for U.S. leadership, it could encourage and facilitate it. On the basis of the past, such an allied initiative seems unlikely.

Many allies have able national leaders—Schmidt, Giscard, Thatcher, and others—but no individual will be accepted as a leader for Europe; any leadership will be by coalition. And as the European Community shows, that is a hard way to produce proposals or decisions from a European perspective. On budget share, agriculture, regional fund, or other matters, the members tend to approach the issue from national viewpoints, which are reconciled by tradeoffs and package deals.

Nevertheless, the European nations have drawn closer to one another in foreign affairs in recent years. Since *Ostpolitik*, leaders of the Federal Republic have developed more confidence in taking initiatives and asserting the German interest. Giscard is more flexible than his predecessors in working with NATO and in cooperating within Europe. And the British leaders, despite the budget dispute with the Community, want to play a European role. Thus there is the potential for greater European initiative within the alliance. But three decades of relative passivity in many areas, and of looking to the United States to lead, have ingrained habits that will have to be outgrown if that potential is to be realized. Still the Europeans have already found their voice and have made themselves heard on several political and military issues. They did so on theater nuclear forces and are seeking to do so on the Palestinian issue. A more comprehensive effort for a coherent strategy might be provoked by sheer necessity.

REFERENCE

[1]Walter J. Levy, "Oil and the Decline of the West," *Foreign Affairs*, 58(5) (Summer 1980).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

UWE NERLICH

Change in Europe: A Secular Trend?

AT THE OUTSET OF THE 1980s, Western Europe is deeply uncertain over whether it is going through just another period of American turbulence, like Vietnam or Watergate, that will certainly pass, and after which things will, though slightly damaged, fall into place again, or whether a secular trend toward political change has begun.

Europe more than ever is "where the two principal alternative concepts of modern society most directly compete."[1] As Raymond Aron has reminded us, both these concepts are profoundly European.[2] Although responses in Western Europe and, to some degree, Eastern Europe will certainly have some influence on Soviet and American approaches, and even on their designs, the masters of Europe's destinies clearly are on the European periphery, as numerous farsighted individuals envisaged many years ago. When Tocqueville wrote that Russia and the United States each seems "marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe,"[3] he did not prophesy either the nature or the character of the competition between them; today it is obvious that the competition is intense and enduring.

Some thirty years ago NSC-68 stated that Western Europe "can eventually become a positive increment to Soviet power."[4] In 1980 the Soviets know that "Europe is the main thing,"[5] if only because it remains the highest stake in the Soviet-American competition. Meanwhile, there is a growing sense of frustration in the United States over what is felt to be inadequate West European cooperativeness—above all, during the recent crises in the Middle East—that combines with a traditional American parochialism, displayed perhaps most conspicuously in the way the public responds to energy issues. Notions of stability in the West still derive from a sense of shared values and mutual interests, which often leads West Europeans to take the American involvement in Europe for granted; once in a while it induces Americans to discipline Western Europe, treating it as an unruly friend. It is no longer certain how long such attitudes will continue to translate into sustainable policies of cooperation on either side of the Atlantic, or how much compatibility there can be in the interests of these two worlds. Political cycles in America and Western Europe tend to be increasingly out of phase. Given the leading role of the United States in Western affairs, the most distressing aspect of the current political reality is that the United States no longer propounds a concept of world affairs within which Western Europe could play roles at all commensurate with its inner dynamics.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In fact, U.S. policies no longer follow any design; they are guided by crisis behavior as the occasions arise, without sufficient instruments to control the outcomes. Inevitably, there is a growing concern on the part of America's partners everywhere about the dependability of the United States and the risks that an alliance with it create.

In a controllable moment of truth all doubts over shared values would surely evaporate. There may, however, not be such a moment of truth with real choices to be made. Rather, we may witness a slow secular trend or even coercive discontinuity. This is certainly the Soviet design. On the one hand, it regards Western Europe as "nothing but a fraction of the area covered by the military preparations conducted by the U.S. aggressive elements on a global scale [which] at this particular moment has become the key, main area";[6] on the other hand, it views "Europe as a whole," a "Continent of peace"[7] where Western Europe will slowly, but steadily, sort out its genuine long-term interests within a framework that the Soviet Union would increasingly hope to control.

By and large, the American body politic seems scarcely aware of such issues, of what may turn into a change of truly secular importance. Except for spontaneous outbursts of premature suspicion, and without any understanding of how its behavior may be contributing to such undesirable outcomes—and certainly without any notions of how such issues ought to be dealt with in the future[8]—the United States continues on its way. It is indeed conceivable that at some time it will favor a retreat into a Fortress America/Project Independence posture, particularly once changes in Western Europe and elsewhere impress themselves sufficiently on the American public. It could also reinforce the retaliatory moods that looked so dangerous to West Europeans during the Middle Eastern crises. Either way, the growing West European political assertiveness takes on certain qualities of desperation. Without the support of the United States, no viable political order in Europe is conceivable; yet association with the United States appears to be contributing little to the creation of a durable political order, and may in fact be inviting a political or military catastrophe.

It is in this perspective that current divergences between Western Europe and the United States must be seen. As James O. Goldsborough wrote recently, "European and American differences today concern the very centerpiece of the NATO structure: the Soviet Union and the Soviet threat to Western Europe,"[9] a line almost joyfully echoed in Soviet comments—"The issue of relations with the Soviet Union now marks the main dividing line between West European countries and the U.S."[10] There is little evidence today that governments on either side of the Atlantic—in Washington or in West European capitals—are fully aware of the implications of the Soviet approach. This is not just another threat that we may expect West Europeans to respond to, characteristically, with political solutions. Nor is it simply a long-term design for political normalization, Soviet-style, that could be met, also characteristically, by the United States with military power at one moment, narrowly conceived arms control negotiations at another, and always without any broad or fundamental understanding of the European process.

As Jacob Burckhardt correctly observed, interactions and entanglements between world powers may be slow and steady, but they are also capable of accelerating into crises that stem "from one cause, yet [are] driven by the powerful

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

momentum of other things."[11] Both Western Europe and the United States may not yet fully recognize the "other things" from the past that inject themselves into the present European situation. If the Soviet Union has not yet masterminded what may turn into this "accelerated process," there is no doubt that it understands the long-term implications of the Soviet approach to Western Europe, the nature of the Atlantic connection, and the divorce of West European influence from power.

Atlantic Alliance: A Keyboard for Soviet Policy in Europe

For more than twenty-five years Soviet diplomacy has worked, slowly, but unswervingly, to change political priorities in Western Europe—to reverse the processes that tied West Germany to the United States, the United States to Western Europe, and that, by and large, excluded direct Soviet influence from West European political affairs. The Soviet Union could not prevent the emergence of a political order in Western Europe based largely on shared vital interests, some directly related to the prospects of Soviet hegemony on the Continent. But, from a Soviet perspective—by definition, a long-term perspective—what seemed promising was that, ever since the mid-1950s, Western powers have time and again engaged in "caucus races" that showed profound divergences over what political priorities the West ought to pursue. Many issues were involved: the recognition of the new Soviet imperial borders in Europe; the nature of West Germany's ties with the West; the balance between desirable American leadership and feasible West European autonomy; the role of military power in West European integration; the strategic utility of nuclear deterrence; the political approach toward the Soviet Union.

The Limits of Soviet Preventive Diplomacy

Soviet preventive diplomacy failed to exploit these divergences fully because Soviet offers—from Beria's opening in 1953 to Khrushchev's courting of West Germany prior to his downfall, to Brezhnev's "initiative" in East Berlin on October 6, 1979—were either self-defeating, loaded with uncertainty, or held too little promise for the West. Also, Soviet pressures—from the missile threats of 1956-58 during the Suez War and the Jupiter controversy to Brezhnev's campaign against the neutron weapon (ERW) and NATO's decision to modernize long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF)—tended to be counterproductive.

Not a single major Western decision with implications for the fabric of the alliance was determined by direct Soviet leverage. Although the last three decades are replete with precarious Western adaptations to self-inflicted failures to improve the structure of cooperation—failures that as a rule favored Soviet interests—the Soviet Union, after each major twist in West European affairs, from the ECD in the early fifties to, presumably, the CDE in the early eighties,[12] had to face up to reconsolidated Western positions that required new Soviet approaches. Western policy divergences, competitive dealings with the Soviet Union, and the countervailing trends in American and West European political cultures[13] prevented the Soviet Union from having to go on the defensive; in fact, it offered opportunities to the Soviet Union that could not possibly have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stemmed from Soviet policies. Yet the Soviets failed during the last decades to establish a genuine bargaining power in Europe that could be brought to bear directly on Western decisions.

Soviet Diplomacy in Europe: The Indirect Approach

Despite their lack of success, Soviet political influence in Western affairs has grown steadily and recognizably in indirect ways since the early sixties. Once the Western alliance was fully developed, Soviet policies were designed to reduce the range of Western choices and to shape the framework within which Western decisions were made, notably on issues of international security. First, the steady, systematic Soviet military buildup since the early sixties has increasingly limited Western deterrence options, and has in fact driven NATO into a posture of self-deterrence in ways that profoundly affect Western expectations of stability.[14] Second, the occasional exercise of Soviet military power—in Cuba in 1962, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in Afghanistan today—always tended to improve, rather than diminish, the chances for détente, Soviet-style. The missile crisis led to superpower-bilateralism; the invasion of Prague made Eastern Europe safer for European détente, as the Soviet defined it; Afghanistan resulted in a policy of West European reassurance vis-à-vis Moscow, which reflected graver concerns among the Allies over potential American responses than over Soviet aggression. Third, Soviet policy plays on the autonomous domestic needs of the United States and certain West European countries for openings toward the Soviet Union. From the MLF/NPT (Multilateral Force/Non-Proliferation Treaty) controversy, to the Vietnam war, to the issue of LRTNF negotiations, to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the Soviets have sought to change either American (as with the NPT) or West European priorities (as with LRTNF negotiations) to favor dealings with the Soviet Union.

Fourth, Soviet diplomacy cannot rely on pro-Soviet constituencies in the West, but it has increasingly succeeded in committing the West to its own negotiating policies, which as a rule were designed to serve some internal purpose in key countries or in the alliance as a whole; these policies were never intended simply to shape political relations with the Soviet Union. A major example, perhaps, is the way the Soviet Union agreed to the principle of parity in MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction): it locked NATO into a negotiating position but left the Soviet Union free to define parity in its own way, as something that already existed rather than as something that would result from MBFR. Thus the West has engaged in a negotiating process that is essentially confined to self-binding agreements for the West; it is perceived increasingly as a high-priority matter, intended to create stakes in its mere continuation, with penalties for revision, let alone disruption. While these negotiations contribute little to political normalization in East-West relations, they are seen today in most Western capitals as important instruments for managing the alliance and, indeed, as providing legitimacy to NATO's defense efforts.

Soviet diplomacy, which tried first to prevent formative developments within the Atlantic Alliance, was anxious then to encourage bilateral détente efforts of individual Western countries in order to tear apart alliance structures. Even-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tually—after the Western recognition of Soviet imperial borders in Europe—it came around to utilizing existing multilateral frameworks in the West and developing multilateral frameworks in East-West relations to generate a controllable process of change in East-West relations, turning the Atlantic Alliance into a vehicle for restructuring political relations between the Soviet Union and the West. Soviet support for the Nixon Administration's efforts to prevent unilateral American troop withdrawals from Europe in May 1971, and its outrage over the American effort in March 1977 to reorient SALT toward the objective of strategic stability, indicate the boundary conditions of this Soviet approach.

Exacerbating Western Tension

Changes in Western Europe throughout the 1970s have been rather profound. Even its radical Left claims today that there "must not be a destabilization of the existing balance of power in the world" and that one "must not escape from American influence only . . . to fall under Soviet" hegemony.[15] Although such opinions tend to reduce Soviet leverage, there is yet a propensity in all nonconservative West European parties to claim that a balance still exists. NATO, on the other hand, is no longer just facing the perennial dilemmas inherent in its military posture; it must also confront the conflicting requirements that are increasingly controlled and exacerbated by the Soviet Union. The continued growth of the Soviet military threat deployed against Western Europe requires dramatic Western efforts to regain deterrence options, in terms of capabilities as well as doctrine and organization. However, the continued negotiating process tends to deprive the alliance progressively of options to restructure its military posture, thereby displaying a more basic Western predisposition to self-restraint (e.g., ABM in SALT I or cruise missiles in SALT II).

The tension between Western defense needs and constraints resulting from ongoing negotiations is bound to lead to a point where the very rationale for the Atlantic Alliance is at stake. Only the United States can take the lead toward a restabilized military relationship with the Soviet Union; in doing so, however, it threatens to weaken the political support for the alliance in most West European countries, the more so since most initiatives of this kind during the last twenty years turned out to be short-lived at best. The United States would appear to be the power that tends to jeopardize whatever degree of normalization might have been achieved in East-West relations.[16] On the other hand, all substantive negotiations with the Soviet Union require that the United States play a central role. Most of the time the United States tends to dominate these negotiations in ways that reinforce West European reluctance to embark on more vigorous defense efforts.

As Kissinger explained, it remains to be seen "whether we are doomed to oscillate erratically between excessive conciliation and excessive bellicosity."[17] While cyclic recurrences have always been deeply rooted in American political culture, these cycles have not only become shorter, but the oscillations tend to become built into the political process, creating a competitive policy-making environment in Washington that deprives the alliance of serious chances to restore a sustainable security policy to meet the Soviet challenge. Recent experi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ence is replete with discouraging evidence. These oscillations, which reflect not only a constant American predilection for change, but also a declining quality of the American governmental system, tend to disaggregate progressively the political basis for alliance support in Western Europe. The Carter presidency has wretchedly exacerbated what seems to have become a secular trend.

There is no longer broad consensus that could provide the resilience in West European bodies politic to absorb the impacts of erratic political swings in the United States. The reduced political reliability of the United States renders almost hopeless efforts by West European governments to maintain a broad support for the alliance. Virtually all West European governments have to maneuver in ways that almost rule out sustainable security policies unless a strong partner, with a longer-term perspective, imposes urgent requirements.[18] Although Western economic summits increasingly display evidence of more genuine partnership, and may in time become more conducive to building a Western consensus on viable issues—the more so as European Community mechanisms lend themselves more easily to these undertakings than to alliance decision-making—they fail to establish priorities with regard to the Soviet Union. These may require commitments that can evolve only with much more formal organizational frameworks.

Managing the Process: Leverage without Bargain

It is important to recognize that this Western condition meets Soviet desires perfectly. As John Van Oudenaren observed, the Soviets don't view their objectives in Western Europe statically in terms of "Finlandizing" West European countries and splitting Western Europe from the United States; rather, they think in terms of a European system within which

> various countries are at various "uneven" stages of development in their progression from détente to "irreversible détente." . . . Different countries reflect different levels of integration in this emerging all-European order. . . . In the preferred Soviet vision of Europe, the norms of peaceful coexistence take precedence over the Atlantic Alliance. In the Soviet view, then, it is the US, in attempting to engineer a return to the cold war, that is doing the "splitting," not of the alliance but of the new all-European order.[19]

In earlier stages the Soviet Union needed, but did not possess, the bargaining power necessary to shape outcomes in the West—the more so, since for systemic reasons she still required Western recognition of her imperial gains in Eastern Europe. In the 1970s, however, she could hope to create eventually the conditions in Europe for a process in East-West relations that neither the United States nor Western Europe, let alone the Atlantic Alliance at large, could control in the longer run, increasing the chances for Soviet leverage without genuine bargains, simply by managing the process her way. The Soviet Union may still need to escalate its military involvement in Afghanistan drastically and thus reduce the momentum in European East-West processes again, especially after the American and German elections. But the fact remains that Western Europe chose to reinforce these processes as a way to mute the impact of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan on Europe.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Normal" Partnership: A Soviet Dilemma

Creating a pattern of "normalcy" in Europe is of paramount importance for the Soviet Union. To this end, it must become accepted in Western Europe as a dependable partner with whom stable relations and a degree of normalization can be achieved. Soviet emphasis on reaching agreements on principles and on long-term frameworks, particularly in respect to trade, is intended to serve this purpose. The more the Soviet Union can portray itself as a "normal" partner, the more it can hope to control the process of change in Europe. In this regard, however, Soviet policy faces a basic dilemma so long as it is guided by the ideology it is designed to serve, which tends to "render the Soviet Union unreliable as a 'normal' partner in world affairs"[20] and to reduce severely the capacity for others to cooperate with it.

Moreover, the Soviet military buildup—one of the controlling factors—can eventually become counterproductive, although this would still leave the West with a major disadvantage. Up to now, threat perceptions in Western political elites have been governed by preferred notions of relations with the Soviet Union rather than the other way around. Experience over the last fifteen years can hardly have discouraged Soviet leaders. Still, as a background factor, the shadow of Soviet military power reinforces existing concerns over Soviet political reliability; it could easily combine with whatever assertive action the Soviet Union might take somewhere to reduce further the chances for Western cooperativeness.

Why Negotiations Matter

Negotiations, therefore, are crucially important to the Soviet Union. Although "peaceful coexistence" is designed to mute the impact of Soviet ideology on Western bodies politic, so that it will appear to be insulated from political affairs without reducing its steering power, negotiations tend to condition Western governments to change policy frameworks institutionally and conceptually, with regard to national security in particular. They meet the West's yearning for compromise and stable relations. They generate frameworks within which problems are defined in terms of negotiability, thereby creating a new universe of political discourse within which political relations with the Soviet Union are construed more in terms of established negotiating objectives than in the pursuit of useful military options. They tend to legitimize Soviet military power both in Eastern Europe and vis-à-vis the West, while they create opportunities to have Western defense efforts discredited in Western electorates as potentially dangerous to ongoing negotiations. They shape perceptions of Soviet military power in terms of abstract margins of tolerance rather than military options the Soviet Union can exercise for political ends. And they create, in Albert Wohlstetter's phrase, a "mad-momentum" of arms control, simply because the Soviets insist on maintaining terms of reference. The process cumulatively produces self-binding effects for the West that further reduce whatever options for Western defense policies are left. Although discouraging Western political initiatives is the Soviet way of managing the process in a depoliticized, businesslike manner, as John Van Oudenaren has put it, Soviet complaints over American in-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ability to deliver on presumed negotiating commitments may at times—as in late 1979—be genuine, even though they also serve Soviet purposes, given the West European stakes in steadiness.

Once governing parties in the West have developed a stake in the continuation of such negotiations, and then convert them into a matter of domestic controversy, the Soviet Union is likely to profit; tolerance is generated for the growing discrepancies between worsening military imbalances and for the emerging political superstructures for military parity-regimes. Political constituencies are created whose fortunes the Soviet Union can crucially determine. Engagement in a process with uncertain outcomes is sufficiently distinct from pro-Soviet commitments, so that Western parties who have a stake in this can support it without political risk; from a Soviet perspective, however, it tends to serve some of the same purposes. In this sense, arms control does indeed soften the Soviet dilemma of "normal" partnership in most advantageous ways—possibly to the point where Western governments no longer recognize viable alternatives to negotiations. Few West European governments could possibly disagree with Helmut Sonnenfeldt's observations that, should the West fail to offset the emerging military imbalance, "there is not the slightest hope to ever enter again into talks with the Soviet Union and to establish together with her rules of the competition in which the West and the Soviet Union are engaged."[21] In this perspective, negotiations for the Soviet Union are indeed "political instruments to be used in conformance with Marxist-Leninist analysis of social and international development for achieving the triumphant purposes of Marxism-Leninism."[22]

Stability of Values versus Change through Policy

From a Soviet vantage point, the emergence of an all-European order is a long-term process. Soviet diplomacy is itself anxious to set the stage for a steady process of "normalization" and persistent policies. In fact, Soviet policy may be more reflective of existing vital interests shared by Western nations on both sides of the Atlantic than is usually the case with Western diplomacies, which tend to be based on beliefs in long-term common interests, but which time and again display a potential for suspicion and recrimination that easily feeds back to the public.[23] There are even occasional convergences between Eastern and Western views on this point. Eastern predictions claim that "existing and partly increasing contradictions notwithstanding, the alliance will remain characterized—in different areas with varying degrees—by a dominance of common purposes,"[24] whereas Western pledges insist that the common interests of Western nations are "so central to their existence that they cannot afford not to collaborate."[25]

If, in fact, Western policies had been guided in the past by common interests, the "clouds of danger" over Western Europe today would not exist. What is worse, hardly any Western government turns to its electorate with a plain description of what the risks are and what the demands are going to be. Paradoxically, this tends to ignore the apparent readiness of electorates in at least certain major Western countries to confront these challenges and demands. Cautious governmental policies may well turn into tragically self-fulfilling

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prophecies. Thus shared vital interests in the West and, indeed, shared values reflective of the most developed political cultures in human experience may well fail to be translated into the policies and political will needed for their preservation. Given the scope of Soviet political analysis, Soviet leaders are likely to see this potential for divorcing Western policies from Western values in ways that eventually deprive West European and North American nations alike of the options to resist the Soviet challenge.

The Two Key Countries in Soviet Perspective

Although the Soviet Union takes a systemic view, two Western countries—the United States and West Germany—are of central importance in any Soviet design for political change in Europe. The American connection with Western Europe is based on shared values and mutual interests, but not on geography. It is therefore dependent on political institutionalizations of a kind that are inevitably susceptible to policies of change. Germany's role in Europe, on the other hand, was always determined by geography, in a way that led Thomas Mann to refer to the "German loneliness between East and West, the *Weltanstoessigkeit* of Germany."[26] Germany's perennial inability to establish itself as a mature partner—with fixed relations to neighbors based on shared values—led eventually to catastrophe. It was superseded by a need to build itself into a multilateral structure, if only to escape the disadvantages of the past. West Germany, simply because of the division of Germany, "is the only Western country that still depends heavily on the international structures of 1944-45."[27] Partly for the same reason, West Germany, like no other Western country, seeks, without ever having fully established its identity, to find its role within the multilateral frameworks that have developed over the last three decades. Without the attachments of both the United States and West Germany to multilateralism, the Western community of nations would cease to be viable. Both the American connection with Western Europe and the West German ties to the West require functioning Western multilateral frameworks.[28]

Soviet policy in Europe has long recognized the central importance to the alliance of the United States and West Germany, the unique requirement of each for multilateralism, their unique role as stabilizers of Western multilateral frameworks, and therefore the centrality of the U.S.-West German connection. The Soviets have tried progressively to deny American protective options for Western Europe, hoping to undermine the very rationale of the Atlantic Alliance, while engaging the West in negotiations on the structure of military relations in Europe. These necessarily focus essentially on American elements in NATO's deterrence posture; they tend therefore to separate the American role in Europe increasingly, in a process in which West European governments develop stakes, where they are expected to urge the United States to participate in the continuing dialogue, even though American self-isolation may lie at the end of the road. While the United States had to establish its role in the CSCE process (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), MBFR focused on American (along with West German) forces, and the Soviet view on currently considered LRTNF negotiations is that these ought to be confined exclusively to American systems.[29] What is worse, different American components of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NATO posture are being settled at different negotiating tables; this tends only to exacerbate the separation of the American protective role from the West European political fabric.

Next in importance to the denial of American military options, the Soviet Union is anxious to constrain West German forces to the greatest extent possible. However, unlike the Soviet approach to the U.S. role in Europe, designed principally to lead to eventual American self-isolation, Soviet policy toward West Germany pursues other objectives also. First, it seeks to induce West Germany to accept a role as broker to mediate between the Soviet Union and the alliance, and to become a vehicle for European change to weaken the multilateral structures on which West Germany depends.[30] Second, it facilitates, however cautiously, the development of some sort of intra-German special relations that—its precarious ambiguity from a Soviet perspective notwithstanding—would strengthen West Germany's stakes in giving increasing priority to relations with the Soviet Union, in ways that it would be difficult to protect by multilateral consensus in the West.[31]

Social Democracy: Obstacle or Vehicle?

On the state level, the United States and West Germany are the main obstacles to Soviet designs for Europe; they are also the main negotiating partners the Soviets expect to use to drive the United States to self-isolation, and West Germany into its role as a mediator in East-West relations. There is, however, yet another dimension; from a Soviet perspective it appears profoundly ambivalent, but it is certain to be central in any Soviet approach to Western Europe. As Robert Strausz-Hupé observed,

> One of the most important remaining obstacles, second only to the strategic equation, to the achievement of the Soviet purpose in Europe is social democracy. The social democratic regimes in Northwestern Europe . . . have shown that it is possible to reconcile the demand of public welfare with the requirements of national defense; a high degree of economic and social equality with individual freedom and enterprise; the quest for improved relations with the Communist states of Eastern Europe with a firm Atlantic Alliance. . . . All regimes which are likely to emerge in these countries from future electoral contests will be social democratic, irrespective of their labels. Indeed, social democracy might prove more durable than the political parties traditionally associated with it. . . . This is the real, the most wounding challenge to Soviet rule in Europe.[32]

Ever since the SPD's resistance to communism in the late forties, this has been obvious to the Soviet Union; it was the most important circumstance binding West Germany to the West.

Given its moderate image, which does not lend itself to Soviet claims of aggressiveness, as well as its potential attractiveness in Eastern Europe, a predominantly social democratic Western Europe that continues to reconcile its conflicting requirements is indeed not only an obstacle to Soviet designs in Western Europe, but a threat to Soviet rule in Eastern Europe as well, the more so as interparty cooperation across Western Europe (for example, in averting a Communist take-over in Portugal) and, increasingly, in other areas such as the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Middle East or Latin America (for example, through the Socialist International) makes itself felt increasingly on important issues that affect Soviet interests.

Here again, then, the Soviet objective is one of neutralizing a threat and creating vehicles for political change. There are three elements in West European social democracy on which Soviet policies can play. First, social democratic parties seek negotiations with the Soviet Union on security issues. They do so partly as a matter of principle, partly in order to deny conservative parties the domestic advantages of a more confrontational stance. The changes that have occurred during the 1970s—from euphoria to the shock of Afghanistan—have not affected this commitment to negotiation. Second, reformism—especially after 1973-74—tends increasingly to compete with demands for national security; this creates difficult choices for social democracy. Priority for reform would reinforce negotiating incentives if only to cut defense expenditures; priority for defense would deprive social democracy of its attractiveness and would, in fact, tend to fractionate it.[33]

These elements often combine with another. Although in certain important cases social democratic parties in Western Europe pursue "Atlanticist" policies more unambiguously than their respective conservative counterparts, their stake in negotiations and reformism tends to be quite alien to the American experience, and at times even runs counter to American preferences.[34] Thus there is a potential for political estrangement between the social democracies of Western Europe and the United States. Yet the only way the Atlantic Alliance can persist is through social democratic support.

On all three levels, East-West negotiations provide the Soviet Union with some means to influence outcomes in social democratic parties, whether through increased military power that induces social democratic parties to become even more committed to negotiations to avoid the domestic consequences of a matching effort, or through negotiations that may increasingly induce notions of "partnership" in social democratic parties.

Soviet Choices: Stability versus Process

Although social democracy provides a major obstacle to extended Soviet control in Europe, it is also less genuinely committed to Western multilateralism. It always favored both a common defense posture in the West and less preclusive organizations. In this sense, social democracy has always generated broader support for a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union on the Continent, although towering conservative leaders like Adenauer and de Gaulle have in fact gone farther in that direction, one to create a fallback position in case the United States "might eventually strike a deal with Soviet Russia at the expense of Europe,"[35] the other, because he hoped to trade some elements of the American connection for Soviet acceptance of a viable European structure that would keep West European nation-states intact.

It is not inconceivable that the Soviet Union would have adapted to a stronger Western Europe if ties with the United States were loosened, just as the case can be made that it was with such a contingency in mind that the Soviet Union appeared at times to prefer some degree of American control, which meant

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

severe constraints on West European power. The Soviets accepted some formal basis for the American engagement—above all, the Four Power Agreement on Berlin—and it is possible to argue that Soviet policy on such issues is guided less by principles and more by traditional statecraft. The Soviets can be expected always to choose the more promising avenue.

Although in Soviet perspective a *modus vivendi* negotiated with conservative West European governments would virtually eliminate opposition to normal relations with the Soviet Union—except for domestic political cycles, as evidenced during the Watergate crisis—and would therefore be more durable, it would also reduce the scope for Soviet political influence in Western Europe. Indeed, de Gaulle, for example, was profoundly convinced that "Communism, whether generated within or penetrating from outside, can endure only in the shadows of a national catastrophe."[36] He saw this as virtually ruled out by the state of West European societies. Adenauer went even further: he believed that the Soviet Union would eventually realize that its internal weaknesses set limits to expansion.[37]

With social democratic governments, a *modus vivendi* would be less dependable because it would remain a matter of domestic controversy and because such governments would have to be cautious to not jeopardize their power base. Still, Soviet opportunities to channel, if not to generate, political processes in Western Europe are considerably greater in these contingencies. This is so not only because of the inherent propensities of social democracies to negotiate with the Soviet Union, but also because competitive policies for dealing with the Soviet Union have offered opportunities time and again that the Soviet Union knew how to seize. Moreover, the more limited social democratic commitment to Western multilateralism leaves a gray area for Soviet diplomacy.

Limited Atlantic Partnership

If social democracy as the major barrier against extended Soviet control in Europe has inherent limitations, so does the other force, the United States. The American requirement for multilateralism renders the American engagement in Europe susceptible to Soviet influence in ways that induce Soviet diplomacy to involve the United States in a process of self-isolation without releasing the American constraints on potentially emerging West European power. Also, the American approach to the global competition with the Soviet Union—which had been in the making for decades, yet found the United States more or less unprepared after World War II—has increasingly displayed inherent structural limitations that have left the Soviet Union with choices beyond her real power.

Defining Relations with the Soviet Union

Given the nature of American politics, which allows for responses rather than sustainable political strategy, the United States has generally failed to define its relations with the Soviet Union in terms that acknowledge a perennial antagonism and proclaim the need for a *modus vivendi*. The early Nixon-Kissinger policies were the major exception; characteristically, the insulation of these policies from domestic politics made it impossible for them to succeed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Some thirty years ago NSC-68 stated that the "Kremlin regards the United States as the only major threat to the achievement of its fundamental design."[38] Within a year after West Germany's entrance into NATO (engineered principally by the United States), which Adenauer very much wanted West Germany to be committed to, the West German chancellor saw reasons to doubt whether "in the United States one is fully realizing [*sic*] that Soviet activity across the board is after all directed against America, that the Russians consider the United States their only serious adversary."[39] So long as American power was overwhelming, this basic uncertainty translated into little more than occasional diplomatic frictions. In retrospect, however, it is clear that the United States never pursued either a strategic policy tailored to the task nor a diplomatic concept that combined the requirements of antagonism and cooperation in a sustainable manner. Without the foreign policy consensus of the late forties, this might have led to hard choices even earlier than in fact happened. The basic ambivalence became obvious when Eisenhower declared strategic parity a fact of international life, and Dulles followed this with the doctrine of massive retaliation.

What was only a basic ambiguity in the fifties turned into manifestly insufficient policies in the sixties, when America responded to Cuba and the subsequent Soviet buildup with unilateral restraint and the active pursuit of strategic arms control. Moreover, the Vietnam war, which absorbed the energies and the attention of the United States for years, was governed by expectations of Soviet mediation efforts, though Soviet purposes were served ideally by the way in which this war developed and continued. If during the first Nixon term a more complex American approach put the Soviet Union temporarily on the defensive, the primacy of American domestic affairs imposed itself again with the end of the Vietnam war and the climatic events of Watergate. To make matters worse, the Carter Administration painfully demonstrated that competence is the key element in all relations with the Soviet Union. By the end of the 1970s, America's foes and allies shared growing anxieties over how reduced American power might combine with an almost total loss of steering power in American diplomacy and a spreading parochialism within an increasingly powerful Congress.

The American Approach: *Corpus diplomaticum* and Power

Although human error and an undue primacy of domestic politics were elements in America's performance as a global power, the basic ineptness of the American approach to the Soviet Union is rooted in the American political system, whose very strength proved to be a handicap in the competition with the Soviet Union, as was clearly recognized in NSC-68. Dean Acheson went so far as to claim that no consistent American doctrine was feasible, that the lines of American policy were rather

> precedents and grew by the method of Common Law into a corpus diplomaticum to aid judgement of those who make the decisions. Its central aim and purpose was to safeguard the highest interest of our nation, which was to maintain as spacious an environment as possible in which free states might exist and flourish. . . . Like our own Constitution, the corpus in its order of priorities rated ahead of promotion of the general welfare the insurance of domestic tranquillity and provision for the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> common defense. It placed the strategic approach to practicable objectives, concretely and realistically conceived, ahead of generalizations. It developed institutions and means to aid in achieving these more limited and, it was hoped, transitory ends.[40]

This combination of pragmatism, institution-building, primacy of defense, and the confinement of strategy to limited ends has governed the American competition with the Soviet Union for the last three decades. With dominant American power there was even high tolerance for error. But, again, as stated in NSC-68, "a democracy can compensate for its natural vulnerability only if it maintains clearly superior overall power in its most inclusive sense."[41] This condition of superiority was neither avoidable nor durable; yet combined with the limited ends of the American global approach, it produced policies largely indifferent to the requirements of political change, all the while building into American negotiating policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union a primacy for arms control in narrowly conceived functional terms.

For the Soviet Union to deny American superiority and to enter into arms control negotiations was not merely a matter of military options and margins of tolerance; it changed the rules of the competition in ways that progressively reduced the range of American political choices. Most important, it constrained the American capacity for protective military relations with Western Europe.

Given its tradition of selectivity in foreign involvements and the need to adjust to an "immense growth of the armed forces,"[42] an open-ended competition with the Soviet Union—although unavoidable because Soviet antagonism derived from inner necessities of the Soviet system—was alien to American political culture. As Tocqueville had observed, it was not well endowed "for the prolonged endurance of the great storms which beset the political existence of nations."[43] American "overall superiority" notwithstanding, Soviet antagonism put the United States on the defensive and called for military power of a kind that the American political system was even less prepared to handle. Moreover, even with military superiority, the United States faced Soviet determination with a "much more modest arsenal of means and possibilities."[44]

The Tentative Character of Deterrence

American realization of Soviet obstinacy coincided with the advent of nuclear strategic forces on both sides. Nuclear weapons seemed to provide the United States with enduring power, a fleet-in-being, without turning America into a garrison state. Moreover, superiority of means that could be used in a punitive manner met a basic requirement for American foreign policy, even though it was bound to be short-lived. A nuclear posture that did not raise issues of entanglement also lent itself uniquely to a "dominance of security" that could "compete effectively with domestic goals of fiscal politics."[45]

If today even to raise the question of whether "nuclear deterrence [can] last out the century," as Fred Iklé put it, seems outlandish, nuclear deterrence testified to the American "power of improvisation"[46] when it became the American military posture in the 1950s. Even "the most ardent advocates of deterrence

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seldom presented it as more than an interim strategy, a policy with which to buy time until a more permanent and reliable solution to the problems of security could be worked out."[47]

Given the nature of nuclear weapons, nuclear superiority was bound to exacerbate the incompatibility of prevailing American values and the means for their protection. It imposed constraints that precluded an operational integration of nuclear weapons into the overall military posture, and not only in terms of general nuclear war planning. American leaders faced the dilemma that, without nuclear weapons, defense was not sustainable, yet, with nuclear weapons, the scope of defense was confined to retaliation. As Huntington observed, this posture "lacks not staying power but acting power."[48] Since the Kennedy Administration, the United States has attempted to escape from the dynamics of nuclear competition. Yet the unfolding Vietnam war dramatically reduced the acceptability of overall military power; and, although American defense-mindedness has increased again since the mid-1970s, the compatibility of values and military power—in particular, military superiority—continues to be ambiguous and troubled.

Soviet strategy has not only avoided the sort of political constraints that govern American nuclear strategy; while the Soviet Union is gradually acquiring important selective preemptive strike options, its strategic purpose in most conceivable contingencies is rather to deter American intervention, thereby protecting favorable political changes. In other words, the United States is more dependent on the employment of nuclear weapons than is the Soviet Union, but is also more constrained about doing so. Moreover, Western strategic interests would require a capacity to intervene with limited means in a discriminating manner. The Soviet Union has superior forces that would be in place first in contingencies where it would have to shoot second.

The strategic implications for nuclear deterrence, based on the assumption that military force will be used once deterrence has failed, have never been faced in Western capitals. The limitations of American nuclear power were inherent from the outset; they have always imposed themselves most in extended deterrence postures, particularly with regard to weapons deployed for European contingencies. If credibility of nuclear deterrence has been an issue, it has existed characteristically between the United States and her NATO allies. Introducing American nuclear weapons into NATO presented NATO's military planners with problems that the American governmental system alone was manifestly incapable of handling. There was simply no way for the inherent dilemmas of American nuclear forces to be resolved within a multilateral alliance framework. Nor was it feasible to reconcile the American commitment to stability of mutual deterrence with its commitment to extended deterrence, which presumes limited initial employment options. In fact, the United States has never, since the early 1960s, undertaken a systematic effort to generate nuclear forces that would render the inherent contradictions between the American military posture and the alliance with Western Europe somewhat less pressing.

Although the United States had neither an adequate strategic rationale for the large-scale introduction of theater nuclear forces (TNF) in the early 1960s, nor for their modernization in the late 1970s—though in both cases specific programs would have made a difference—American arms control policies have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

allowed Soviet influence on European nuclear matters to increase steadily, through the Non-Proliferation Treaty, SALT and its codification of parity, MBFR (by imposing the inclusion of "nuclear weapons" on the alliance), and the handling of NATO's TNF modernization since 1977. Inviting the Soviet Union to solve the inherent dilemmas of the American alliance structure shifted painful responsibility to West Europeans, who had to choose between the uncertainties of American nuclear deterrence and possible tradeoffs that might exacerbate NATO's nuclear dilemmas further, yet might contribute also to a political *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union.

Nuclear Balance: Channelled Competition?

When, in the late 1940s, Soviet policy forced the United States into the antagonism of global competition, the challenge was political rather than military. Given the disparity in political systems, the United States was inherently incapable of meeting the Soviet threat on its own terms. Economic reconstruction excluded Soviet influence and helped construct a viable political order. The American plan to protect this order through military superiority, implementing this superiority by building nuclear forces as the dominant element of its military posture, may have been the only plausible scheme. Yet America ignored the nature of the Soviet threat, while at the same time it tended to delegitimize its own responses; it made the competition bilateral in such a way that the Soviet Union could hope eventually to win; it emphasized the military element of the competition while depriving the United States increasingly of the capacity to respond with discrimination; it imposed political constraints on military cooperation with America's allies and, eventually, on the American capacity to make commitments; and it increasingly provided the Soviet Union with opportunities to become accepted as a partner in the one area the United States had chosen for meeting the Soviet challenge.

The limitations of American nuclear power, and also of the American alliance with Western Europe, were rooted in the American political culture. It was only under conditions of strategic denial, as a consequence of Soviet military efforts, and of agreed parity resulting from negotiations with the Soviet Union, that these limitations exposed themselves fully, reminding the West of the "tentative character of deterrence,"[49] and reopening the issue of what the political rationale of the Atlantic Alliance ought to be if military protection was jeopardized. In this perspective, the synergism of Soviet arms efforts and negotiating policies had profound political implications from the outset that were never reflected in how the United States tried to manage the unavoidable competition and resultant military rivalry.

Whatever evils nuclear deterrence may have prevented in the past, it has channelled the competition with the Soviet Union in ways that have increasingly deprived the United States of chances to bring her nonmilitary strength into play. The new American preoccupation with military superiority—alien to American political traditions—has been a major factor in the decline of American values and institutions over the last two decades, a process that has served the purposes of Soviet power diplomacy well.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Being Allied to the United States

A similar logic applies to American alliance relations. NSC-68 stated explicitly that "the very virtues of our system handicap us in certain respects in our relations with our allies. . . . It is a general source of strength to us that our relations with our allies are conducted on a basis of persuasion and consent, [but] it is also evident that the dissent among us can become a vulnerability."[50] Yet once nuclear deterrence acquired the central role in the alliance's effort to meet the Soviet challenge, this set close limits to military cooperation among the allies and imposed constraints that reinforced the American preponderance within the alliance, threatening time and again the "basis of persuasion and consent." In fact, once the logic of nuclear deterrence had come to govern NATO planning, it not only tended to exclude Western Europe from decisions that might crucially affect its destinies, but led the United States to constrain the possible emergence of commensurate and genuine military power in Western Europe without allowing for the possible tradeoffs of self-restraint. Thus the dominance of nuclear deterrence also channelled the structuring of alliance relations with Western Europe in ways that tended to preclude a genuine American partnership with a reemerging Western Europe, a Europe that would never have regained its vitality without the American reconstruction effort that preceeded NATO.

There may never have been a viable sharing alternative, but exclusive American control both provided the Soviet Union with a chance to match eventually an isolated American capability on which Western Europe's destinies were so precariously dependent and put an impossible premium on the very basis of the political fabric of the alliance—the dependability of the American governmental system. Western Europe committed its security to the assumption that the American governmental system would risk taking suicidal decisions. The strength from shared values thus was turned into the weakness of shared deadly risks.

During the formation of the alliance, American's believed that "as we ourselves demonstrate power, confidence and a sense of moral and political direction, so those same qualities will be evoked in Western Europe."[51] However, the exclusion of Western Europe from military power and the increasingly suicidal nature of the American retaliatory posture on which Western Europe depended so strained alliance relations as to produce the loosely knit and stratified alliance structure that exists today. Moreover, the declining confidence in American institutions tended to merge with the declining credibility of the nuclear deterrent, which happened *pari passu* with the neutralization of viable American strategic options.[52]

There may well have been interactions between this decline and the American preoccupation with military security. For Western Europe, however, the issue posed itself more dramatically. If the confidence of the American electorate in its political institutions had diminished so greatly even on minor matters, how could Western Europe maintain its confidence in the American system's capacity to make decisions that might protect Western Europe in a deterrence context, but that might be suicidal for the United States itself? Moreover, if confidence was so low, how could Western Europe expect prudence to prevail

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in American crisis decisions? De Gaulle answered these questions early on. If anything led to their surfacing in West Germany some twenty years later, it was President Carter's handling of the neutron weapon.

There is nothing pernicious in the West European concern over the reliability of the American political system in crisis situations. After all, Europe's confidence in it is still substantially higher than is the American electorate's confidence in its government's peacetime performance. Given the West European predicament at the outset of the 1980s, however, reassessment of when things began to go wrong in the past and reconsideration of the rationale of the alliance itself are inevitable. Only in this perspective is a future for the alliance at all conceivable.

Controlling Political Change by Controlling the Military Factor

Whether the Soviet Union had anticipated the U.S. decision to consider military power as the major resource in the upcoming competition, or had deliberately induced the United States to consider arms competition as the major area of the Soviet-American antagonism,[53] is of no consequence. Once the United States began to face the Soviet challenge, the Soviets were bound to focus on the military element. This was the one factor in the competition that the Soviet Union could hope eventually to control, by deploying sufficient forces under decreasing constraints while at the same time creating a political environment that would progressively constrain American military efforts.

For the Soviet Union, this could only be a long-term process, both in terms of resources and risks. This was in line with the political requirements for a protracted development in Europe that stemmed from the Soviet need for legitimacy in Eastern Europe and the absence of more intrusive means in Western Europe. This emphasis on the military element, however, not only induced an unfolding negotiating process that created an image of Soviet "normalcy," while synergistically muting the impact of the Soviet military buildup and reinforcing constraints on Western military efforts; it led also to the "fundamental paradox that it is precisely the possession of overwhelming Soviet military strength that has permitted the nonmilitary aspects of the global competition to be enhanced in importance."[54] It is by controlling the military relationship that the Soviet Union hopes to "exploit with impunity worldwide ideological, political, economic, social and scientific-technological trends"[55] that it could not have expected to turn to advantage in a world based on "persuasion and consent" or on superior American interventionist power.

The West European Predicament: Ways to Go

For more than three decades, then, Western Europe has been locked between Soviet determination and American uncertainty. The Soviet Union embarked on a waiting game, with no intention to settle for a European solution that Western Europe could consider as stabilizing its political order. The Soviet Union perhaps even lacked a clear notion of how to exercise control over Western Europe if the occasion were to arise, but it did have a systemic view of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political order on the European continent. The United States, by contrast, pursued an interim strategy to achieve "limited and transitory ends," to buy time for achieving unspecified objectives and military stability, never creating the conditions of political change. Failures to stabilize military force relations were reinforced by unfavorable political change.

Western Europe In-Between: "Third Force" versus "Third Way"

With Eastern Europe sealed off and the Atlantic Alliance confined to limited military cooperation, Western Europe still had economic "access to [the American] world imperial system."[56] But without changing Soviet-American relations in Europe, on which any viable European order was crucially dependent, there was no way for Western Europe to develop into a full-fledged political entity. Moreover, most conceivable changes in Soviet-American relations—a more assertive United States or a more cooperative Soviet Union—would have worsened the condition of Western Europe. Even an American approach less oriented toward arms control and that allowed for fuller Atlantic cooperation—including forms of nuclear sharing—would have failed to remove the limitations inherent in American alliance policies, though the alliance might have been spared numerous avoidable frictions that have occurred since the announcement of Eisenhower's "New Look." At the same time, such policies would have further exacerbated East-West relations in Europe, with fragmenting repercussions in Western Europe—particularly in France, but also in the social democratic parties in more Atlantic-oriented states like West Germany.

On the other hand, a broader and more sustainable Soviet-American cooperation, as envisaged after the Moscow summit in May 1972, might have stabilized European East-West relations; it might also have so changed the European political context as to weaken the American connection and increase Soviet influence in Europe in ways that would have run counter to West European policies toward developing a common entity without removing the barriers between Eastern and Western Europe.

Neither a West European political union—including a common defense posture (the "Third Force") embedded in the Atlantic Alliance—nor a more civilian Western Europe—one with dominant social democracy generating political forces of attraction in Eastern Europe without posing significant military threats (the "Third Way")—was achievable under the circumstances. If anything, American nonproliferation policy—backed by Soviet diplomacy—precluded the one option just as Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia—hardly opposed by the United States—ruled out the other. Moreover, neither a European Third Force, which would have been a second and even less promising way of channeling the competition in military terms, nor a European Third Way, which would have gotten leeway only through taking Soviet sensitivities into consideration, would have induced East-West interactions of a kind that would have brought the strengths of West European societies into play. Although the Third Force would have reinforced military competition, the Third Way would have led to intensified Soviet efforts to screen off Eastern Europe. The West European pursuit of human rights policies thus reflects Soviet and Western inherent limitations in Europe.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From the Nation, Writ Large, to Arms Control

Although Western Europe has time and again had to accommodate to changes in Soviet-American relations, it could have asserted itself between the superpowers only by trading elements of the American connection for Soviet acceptance of an all-European settlement that left Western Europe outside the Soviet orbit but that improved its access to Eastern Europe. This was essentially the Gaullist vision. It required, however, both an American determination to stay in Europe if such a settlement was not achieved and an American-West European consensus on how to achieve such an agreement jointly. Yet, on the American side, the unilateralism that has always pervaded American alliance policies tended toward reducing the American role in Europe. At the same time, West European efforts toward increased autonomy—above all, in de Gaulle's approach—became associated with an anti-American stance that led to the familiar cleavages, particularly between Bonn and Paris, over how to maintain the American connection.[57]

Western Europe got the worst of both worlds. The weakening of the American engagement in Europe originated in the United States, without leaving Western Europe opportunities to translate this into favorable changes in the European political structure. This occurred while the West European dependence on the United States was in fact increasing—particularly after the Yom Kippur War—when Western Europe was moving on to the slippery road of arms control as a result of America's propensities both to negotiate and to reduce forces unilaterally. The West Europeans hoped to mute this process by engaging in negotiations with the Soviet Union, notably in MBFR. Most of Western Europe is now deeply committed to the continuation of negotiations that not only do not constrain the increase of Soviet military leverage over Western Europe, but tend to minimize whatever counterproductive political impacts the Soviet buildup might have in the West. Yet these negotiations themselves no longer offer chances for the West to pursue political structure objectives;[58] they leave Western Europe with almost no bargaining power even in narrowly conceived arms-control terms. That Afghanistan reinforced the West European commitments to negotiating with the Soviet Union provides ample evidence that West European stakes in such negotiations derive no longer from euphoria but from a desperate conviction that the alternatives would be even more discomforting, and from a lack of policies reflective of vital West European interests.

Only persistent American policies could reverse these trends; regrettably, what used to be American oscillation between single-minded arms control and obstinate defense-first policies has become hopelessly muddled since 1977. NATO's decision on December 12, 1979, on long-range theater nuclear forces was so precarious for West European governments precisely because there were such profound concerns over what the next switch in American defense policy might be once governments in Bonn and elsewhere pulled their political support together. Yet the deployment decision was eventually pushed on the ground that the alliance's capacity to take any major decision was at stake; it was combined with a negotiating offer that not only left no escape from previous negotiating policies, but that by its very nature symbolized that the alliance lacked the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

political capacity that was said to be at stake.[59] While the outcome could have been worse, the decision showed the stage the alliance had come to. Moreover, events following these decisions provided ample evidence that NATO has lost its political centrality in West European affairs. If NATO was thought to be at stake prior to the LRTNF decision, and if in fact there was growing concern over Soviet military capabilities, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan instantly changed the political context in Europe.

Western Europe's Systematic Ambivalence

Like Suez in 1956, Cuba in 1962, and Prague in 1968, Afghanistan was a major turning point in European East-West relations. Before the Soviet intervention there, Western Europe, while withstanding Soviet pressure on the LRTNF issue, was trying to agree on a formula that would decouple subsequent developments from future switches in American policy. Western Europe slowly faced up to a maturing Soviet threat while making the scope of defense efforts depend on negotiating outcomes; it turned the LRTNF decision into a political campaign for strengthening NATO cohesion, thereby vaguely echoing efforts of more than twenty years earlier to couple political reforms of NATO with the introduction of LRTNFs. It even tried to induce the U.S. Senate to ratify the SALT II agreement, although SALT II affected Western Europe more acutely than it did the United States. New arms control proposals were to be developed in order to turn the 1980s into a "decade of arms control" (West German Foreign Minister Genscher). Very cautiously, it extended its role outside Europe by developing the EEC's relations with crucial partners like Yugoslavia, and by taking initiatives calculated to introduce some flexibility in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had a profound impact on Western Europe. The painful confirmation of often anticipated more assertive uses of Soviet military power was placed in a context that included imminent changes in Yugoslavia after Tito's death, the attempted seizure of the Grand Mosque, fears of what the Soviet Union could do if the United States took military measures to rescue the hostages in Teheran, and a widening range of other disturbing contingencies, all of which might profoundly affect Western Europe's viability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. There was, for the first time in decades, a growing feeling in Western Europe that the Soviet Union might eventually go to war, a feeling that transcended party affiliations.

With the decision on LRTNFs taken, with SALT II virtually on the shelf, and with the brutal demonstration of Soviet military power in the Middle East, this could have been a turning point for the alliance, rather like what Korea had been some thirty years earlier. However, after three years of American mismanagement, the alliance was in no condition to rally easily behind revivalist rhetoric. In any case, American responses to the Afghan crisis did not inspire new confidence in Western Europe.

It was widely believed that the United States had contributed to the breakdown of Soviet-American cooperation while failing to influence political outcomes in the Middle East. In effect, the United States invited what actually

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

happened in Afghanistan, though few went so far as to associate the more recent events with the American abdication in Afghanistan twenty years earlier. There were virtually no American efforts to generate allied responses, though Western Europe's vital interests were more vulnerable than those of the United States to changes in relations with the Soviet Union or with the oil-producing Gulf states. Its allies would have to bear the consequences of whatever punitive actions the United States might decide to take. There was a growing recognition that the United States would not be in a position to protect Western interests in the Middle East if things were to deteriorate; nor did American responses include substantive measures calculated to improve U.S. power projection capabilities. There was a growing apprehension that the punitive measures taken by the United States were essentially short-lived, for domestic consumption principally, requiring more from Western Europe than from the United States. There was a growing sense that punishment without stated conditions was not the way the United States and the Soviet Union ought to deal with each other.

As a result, Western Europe responded to American unilateralism more than to the Soviet intervention itself. Instead of trying to broaden and stabilize American policy to make it more worthy of alliance support, West European countries by and large appeared stubbornly reluctant to embrace American policies. At the same time, they displayed what one observer has called a "systematic ambivalence, willing to wound but afraid to strike, tempted by the glamour of status and gestures, but shy of the responsibilities and burdens of real power."[60] In fact, there was a growing inclination in Western Europe to see symmetry in the threat. Both the Soviet Union and the United States were thought to be permitting the crisis to get out of control. By trying to maneuver between an assertive Soviet Union and a zigzagging United States, Western Europe had gotten itself into an unprecedented situation, the consequences of which are still unfolding. "It was Afghanistan that accelerated a process now under way in Europe which might be called 'consideration of alternatives.' "[61] However, it may well turn out to be the kind of acceleration that Jacob Burckhardt recognized as the mark of historical crisis.

Accelerating Processes in Europe

Under the circumstances, Western Europe, which had seemingly reestablished an alliance priority on the occasion of the LRTNF issue, saw itself driven to choose again: either to fall in line with American policies—which it could neither agree to, because it "instinctively mistrust[s] action fueled by emotion,"[62] nor hope to control, once embarked on them—or design a West European response of its own. American as well as West European responses were governed by opportunism. In the United States, this originated in domestic needs to allow certain elements in the American approach appear responsive to the challenge. West Europeans, expecting penalties from both the oil-producing Arab countries and the Soviet Union, were profoundly influenced in their responses by these expectations. Since the Administration in Washington did not even try to generate a coherent Western policy to meet the crises, Western Europe was compelled to leave its trenches; in doing so, however, it revealed the non-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

centrality of NATO in crucial crises. In effect, Western Europe turned to a policy of reassuring the Soviet Union to mute the impact of the erratic American behavior rather than mapping out a Western approach with a chance to get the United States committed with a degree of steadiness.

This tactic would have profited from a measure of Soviet cooperativeness—some "light at the end of the tunnel," as one West European foreign minister put it. But having defused the nuclear issue as it emerged in the West through its assertive use of power in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union tried to move Western Europe even more into the role of *demandeur*. They did this by not responding to Western negotiating offers, which were intended to maintain some routine relations with Moscow, and then proceeding to intimidate Western Europe in order to discourage further major initiatives.[63] The Soviets then went on to accept things as they had developed in the West, principally to maneuver France and West Germany, in particular, into a mediating role—thereby having the United States appear as the source of disturbance—and raising prospects of long-term normalization again, by suggestions of framework agreements for European East-West trade or negotiated regimes for free access of all European states to the Gulf. Seeking to isolate the United States, the Soviets did so without even making conciliatory gestures in Afghanistan.

The United States showed its hand by demonstrating to foes and allies alike that, the new NATO consensus notwithstanding, American crisis diplomacy would be governed by unilateralism, with Western Europe expected to accept certain policies while it was left in the dark with regard to others. West European guessing over what American policies might follow the cannonade of sanctions was abruptly ended by the unprecedented American deadlines for Western Europe for joint actions, never the subject of joint policy formulation—which just happened to coincide with the increased Soviet pressure on Western Europe. When Soviet diplomacy turned eventually to its Continental mode, it became clear, as West European governments had anticipated all along, that American diplomacy had run out of options once its policy of sanctions had run its course.

Amidst these accelerating processes, which left Western Europe for the first time since its alliance with North America without an obvious way to find its place between the United States and the Soviet Union, Western Europe tried to achieve three things: to insulate Europe from the Middle Eastern crises; to maintain a degree of continuity—calculability, as Helmut Schmidt chose to call it—in relations with the Soviet Union; and to develop political answers to unfolding crises. In a sense it succeeded on all three counts: Europe came to be regarded as a model of stability rather than the area most crucially affected; dealings with the Soviet Union returned almost to business as usual; and Western Europe took a number of political initiatives—developing relations between the EEC, Yugoslavia, and the ASEAN group; stepping up its aid to Turkey; strengthening policies of nonalignment as a way to avoid Soviet involvements; providing vulnerable regimes in the Gulf with an intermediate option for closer ties with the West; introducing some flexibility into the Arab-Israeli conflict to prevent further radicalization of the PLO as a result of Israeli intransigence and American domestic constraints; and, indeed, accepting sanctions against Iran.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Although—with the exception of the policy on nonalignment—these were prudent responses, West European policies have evolved in ways that will tend to preclude coherent policies on a wide range of vital issues.

On Squaring Circles: The West European Allotment

Western Europe has in fact been kept out of the Middle Eastern crises, and, except for sharper West European sanctions and harrassing Soviet responses, this was the most likely outcome. But in its efforts to have Western Europe perceived as a zone of stability, West European political elites lost sight again of the massive Soviet military buildup in Europe that increasingly precludes European stability. They failed to recognize what had become more evident during the crises—that the Soviet Union sees Western Europe and the Middle East within one strategic context, and that it is in fact pursuing a flanking strategy in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Third World that directly affects West European vital interests, the outcomes of which the Soviet Union expects to protect in terms of a "no-more-Chiles" posture.

Moreover, Western Europe has not faced the possible combination of its delicate dependence on Middle Eastern oil supplies and the prospects of increasing Soviet political control over the area, in terms of Soviet coercive options during a war of coercion as a substitute for war. Major West European countries like West Germany are preparing to substitute one dependence for another; by expanding Soviet gas imports in the aftermath of Afghanistan, with the explicit objective of improving supply security,[64] they tend to ignore military inter-theater relations between Europe and the Gulf, except in terms of switching or overstraining American resources.

In fact, while the centrality of NATO is seen to have further diminished, most West European governments, including the West German, claim that military cooperation with the United States ought to be confined to NATO, which is understood to exclude non-European contingencies such as those that now threaten in the Gulf. To the extent that they recognize a threat in the Gulf, they pretend to choose between meeting the military challenge and maintaining the political cohesion of the alliance. Yet there are widespread doubts whether any military solutions are feasible in the Gulf, even with massive increases in American power-projection capabilities that have not yet been programmed. The reason, quite simply, is that the Soviet Union could be in place first, but would only have to shoot second. The political rationale of NATO tends to be further undermined if NATO defense can no longer be conceived primarily in terms of NATO cases, leading in turn to a growing realization of the diminishing reality of American protection. With American retaliatory forces seen as neutralized in European contingencies, and with oil supplies almost unprotected, it is no longer a question of relying on the uncertainties of nuclear escalation as a sufficient deterrent.

These changes must hamstring any future efforts within the alliance to reorient existing defense policies. At the same time, they tend to reduce the prospects for a more purposeful multilateral negotiating policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and to open up new avenues for the Soviet indirect approach to Western Europe. What is at stake is the American engagement in Europe.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Up for Negotiations?

There is no way for Western negotiating policies on European security to be redirected to envisage stabilizing outcomes, unless the Western nations change their military posture to meet the Soviet challenge in nonsuicidal ways. However, the West European anxiety to maintain a dialogue with the Soviet Union and to prevent the Soviet Union from turning away from negotiations, which by and large serve Soviet interests more than any other, has led to a paradoxical outcome of the Afghan crisis: West European governments are now committed to the continuation of negotiations—as distinct from agreements—at almost any price.

At the same time, this West European commitment tends to reinforce a growing impression that the United States is incapable of pursuing a steady and sustainable negotiating policy, and that West Europeans who have been driven into the negotiating process by the United States in the first place must now themselves inject sufficient dependability into the process. While this reduces further the chances for an overdue revision of Western negotiating policies, the Soviet Union is quick to stigmatize the United States as a negotiating partner lacking both credibility and dependability. West European concerns over an American failure to ratify SALT II strengthen this Soviet campaign. Indeed, the Soviet Union goes so far as to claim that Western Europe must now choose between continued negotiations with the Soviet Union and military relations with the United States. At the same time, the Soviets lean on Western Europe, and West Germany in particular, to exert pressure on the United States to fall into line.

This approach prevents West European governments from reviewing negotiating policies in terms of how they might render the growing military disparity in Europe more manageable; or whether confidence-building measures need to be regarded as a priority matter, despite the reckless and deceptive Soviet behavior in Afghanistan; or whether Soviet disregard for principles of security as the West defines them does not require that principles and framework agreements be moved into the center of subsequent negotiations.

The Soviet Union has picked up earlier West European positions to commit the West in ways that would tend to constrain the alliance even further. By making agreements on LRTNF dependent on the ratification of SALT II, which West European governments considered so vital to future negotiations, for example, or by incorporating a West German suggestion that no MBFR partner be allowed to maintain more than 50 percent of the forces on its side of the reduction area at the very moment that Western Europe needs to consider possible substitutions for American forces in Middle Eastern contingencies, the Soviets achieve their purpose.

Given the West European notion that Soviet-American frictions after Afghanistan require a West European mediating effort, some important changes in the negotiating process have already occurred. Arms control had traditionally been pursued by the West through a combination of American unilateralism and Western multilateralism. In fact, even after Afghanistan, Western Europe and the Carter Administration remained committed to the pursuance of existing negotiating policies; it was thought that only the politics of arms control were out of phase on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet, between a Soviet diplomat-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ic waiting game and an American policy of delay, the one West European country that had always been most circumspect in protecting multilateralism in European arms control, avoiding all impressions of bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union—West Germany—began to play a role that, while conceived as that of mediator whose purpose was ostensibly to reopen channels for multilateral and Soviet-American negotiations, reflected also what could only be perceived as vital West German interests.

Amidst the turmoils of the Afghan crisis the two Germanys reassured each other of their firm intention to insulate their relations from the East-West crisis. While this is in fact a vital German interest, it tends also to constrain West Germany further in all future efforts to give political priority to alliance matters; it also happens to serve the Soviets in their design for Europe. While this was always a latent dilemma of West Germany's European security policy, it has now surfaced in ways that allow multilateral issues of security to be conspicuous on the intra-German agenda.

During a difficult time when the United States was seeking support for its policies of sanctions, West Germany appeared to waver on the one issue that virtually stood for Western multilateralism—NATO's LRTNF decision—in ways that were meant to signal flexibility to Moscow. Yet, although West Germany saw fit to return again to the NATO position that it had tried so hard to engineer in the first place, and although the Soviet Union appeared not very much seduced by these West German suggestions, the visit by Chancellor Schmidt in Moscow—a visit the West German government found necessary to save the negotiating part of the NATO TNF decision, given Soviet opposition to LRTNF negotiations and American refusals to ratify SALT—produced new Soviet offers on how to open LRTNF negotiations. These were instantly made welcome in Bonn as evidence of its successful mediating role. The Carter Administration, already on its way back to arms control, found the outcome worth studying; the Soviet Union regarded it rather as something to turn against the United States. It was unprecedented in European security diplomacy that the Soviet Union should lean on the United States to accept what in Soviet perception had already been agreed to by Moscow and Bonn. It seemed a mere happenstance that the Soviet proposal on LRTNF, which West Germany considered as a positive outcome of its mediating role, concerned exclusively American forward-based systems in Europe.[65]

This may turn out to be a passing episode; still, it sets a precedent for what may also become a new structure in European East-West negotiations. The more that West Germany is maneuvered into a special mediating role that circumstances may show to be in its interest, the more this by itself will reduce the chances for continued Western multilateralism—if only because it reduces American incentives for such negotiations and drives the United States back to bilateralism. Moreover, it tends to turn America's organic relation with Western Europe into something considerably more alien. As one observer anticipated, it may be "the United States, rather than the Soviet Union, which is placed in the position of using the continent as a stage from which to pursue its conflict with the rival superpower."[66]

While such changes may well invite American overreactions one way or the other, West Germany is not likely to take great risks in the foreseeable future. It has little to trade but its Western commitment. It is, however, "unlikely to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

avoid being at the center of any great changes in the future."[67] Yet as in 1980, American ineptitude may again inadvertently drive West Germany farther down the road toward its "eastern alternative," as Hans Morgenthau described it.[68] This would undoubtedly change the whole fabric of Western relations, inside Western Europe as well as between Western Europe and the United States, though West Germany itself may not be in a position to capitalize on it.

Persuasion and Consent

If the combination of the growing Soviet military threat in Europe and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan proved one thing, it is that Western unity has to be built around a broader set of shared vital interests than simply meeting the Soviet challenge. There is a possibility that deteriorating military force relations and the continued momentum of ongoing negotiations on security may channel European processes to a point where it becomes politically unfeasible to redirect Western policies to make them more reflective of Western interests and values; this would not only increase Soviet leverage, but could have fateful repercussions on the cohesion of all the bodies politic of Western Europe. Given the European situation of the early 1980s, however, efforts to match the Soviet military threat or to discontinue negotiations would tend to have similarly disintegrating effects.

Although basic changes in Western defense and negotiating policies will be imperative in the 1980s, the viability of American and West European societies will depend not only on how the West will manage to withstand Soviet pressure. Even with sufficient military strength, the West may lose if American and West European policies increasingly fail to draw on resources that are inherent in Western political cultures. Just as the Soviet Union can hope to make major advances only as the result of Western weaknesses and maladjustments, the West must rediscover its internal strength to discourage Soviet hopes ever to extend political control to Western Europe except by brute force. In this perspective, to employ Jacob Burckhardt's insight again, future European relations "must not just be changed power relations, but they must correspond to a great revival of national life." The "great basic decision can come only from the 'inner' of mankind."[69] Forceful suppression is the least acceptable condition that West European societies are likely to seek.

Yet, while national policies in the West ought genuinely to encompass these basic desires of West European societies—which would have crucial implications for current deterrence policies but might also release existing constraints on West European readiness to meet the Soviet threat—American as well as West European policies ought to be reflective also of the genuine interests of the respective allies and what policies the governmental structures of these nations can bear without risking breakdown. Current mutual recriminations on both sides of the Atlantic tend to lose sight of the fact that the viability of American society, with Western Europe alienated or lost, or, worse, of West European societies without the "spacious environment" that only the United States can provide, would be in grave jeopardy.

West Europeans must recognize that American policies will continue to be governed by domestic interests. However, unpredictability cannot be tolerated as a political virtue. Likewise the United States must accept the fact that West-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ern Europe is a diversified political entity and that as a clustered entity it may serve American interests in many ways that it could not within a tight alliance. If there is any future for the alliance, it is through building on persuasion and consent in ways that reflect the real interests of electorates. A relationship "between autonomous allies is healthier and more productive than one based on fading hegemony."[70]

For the United States, this means, above all, accepting the established political cooperation between EEC members as a dominant West European policy-making process. If there is to be any coherence among West European policies, it will come primarily through this channel. There is no way for the political centrality of NATO to be reestablished. The political initiatives taken by Western Europe after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the context of the deteriorating Arab-Israeli situation may all turn out to be in the American interest. They will certainly do so if American policy seeks to encompass all of them in a more coherent Western approach that means, in the words of a close American observer of West European affairs, "calling the Europeans' bluff: pushing them to do what they are talking about because this is in the American interest."[71]

This would require wholly new arrangements for joint policy-making between a complex government in Washington and the complex multilateral West European structure. It requires that the American body politic accept the fact that the European Community and the West European system for political cooperation (EPC) are going to be more influential than any other device in creating West European cohesion, precisely because they are responsive to real needs and preferences. It likewise suggests that the pursuit of a common West European foreign policy no longer be divorced from power, which calls for intimate military association with the United States as well as a more closely organized and common West European defense posture. Such a division of labor envisages long-term advantages that the West Europeans might be able to develop without losing sight of the short-term requirements for checking Soviet military power. The United States and Western Europe need to find parallel answers to the two interrelated issues that are most likely to be disruptive of the cohesion of the Western alliance—the Middle East, which could well lead to a breakup of the alliance, and the energy issue, still strongly governed by parochialisms in ways that directly threaten the viability of Western societies as well as the solidarity between North America and Western Europe.

Although all these policies are aimed at releasing political strengths inherent in Western societies, there is no way for the Soviet challenge to be insulated from Western internal developments. The central task for the West is to find a common answer to the problem of how to deal with the Soviet Union. Clearly, given the nature of the Soviet challenge, it is imperative that more coherent policies be generated to prepare for future contingencies in the Caribbean, in Northeast and Southeast Asia, in Southern Asia and the Middle East, in Southern Africa, in Southern Europe, and in the Northern Atlantic. And, although military responses to such contingencies will become increasingly demanding, so also will the requirements to tailor all responses to the imperatives of political change. The United States and Western Europe must develop a more global common outlook, which neither was prepared to do in the past.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yet some return to the great issues of the European agenda in the mid-fifties is likely. Rather than add military strength without improving the chances for West European survival, or reduce strength without improving the stability of political relations inside Europe, current processes need to be redirected to create structural conditions in Europe that produce a continental *modus vivendi* that is capable of containing Soviet power without foreclosing increasing interactions with the Soviet Union. Current processes of détente will eventually deprive the West of its capacity to withstand Soviet pressures in Europe. Yet it is only through negotiations with the Soviet Union that a more stable *modus vivendi* on the Continent can evolve. And it is only in this perspective that sustained support for Western efforts to meet the Soviet challenge can be generated. Similarly, current defense policies tend eventually to become divorced from public support. It is only through more purposeful and increased defense efforts that stable relations in Europe can be preserved; again, without orienting such efforts toward building a more stable military relation rather than simply matching Soviet efforts, it is unlikely that public support will be sustained in the West. Moreover, it is only in terms of a more stable European security structure as a basis for a continental *modus vivendi* that possible synergisms of Western defense and negotiating policies can eventually be translated into political advantage. A redefinition of American security purposes in Europe and a new American firmness with regard to common security policies in the West is the absolutely essential prerequisite. It is only in this perspective that Western Europe can hope to regain some control of its future destiny. If Western Europe fails, its final choice between American "protection" and Soviet "cooperation" is likely to hurt the United States as fatefully as it does itself. There *are* vital common interests between the United States and Western Europe; these must be searched for again.

REFERENCES

[1]Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The European Crossroads," in *Atlantis Lost: U.S.-European Relations after the Cold War,* James Chace and Earl C. Ravenal (eds.) (New York: 1976), p. 85.

[2]Raymond Aron, *In Defense of Decadent Europe* (South Bend, Ind.: 1977), p. 77.

[3]Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. 1 (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1954), p. 452. Among the countless predictions, see also the gloomy statement by Baron Melchior in 1790: "Two empires will share all the advantages of civilization, of the power of genius, of letters, of arts, of arms and industry; Russia on the Eastern side and America on the Western side, and we other peoples of the nucleus will be too degraded, too debased, to know otherwise than by a vague and stupid tradition what we have been" (quoted from Paul Dukes, *The Emergence of the Superpowers* [New York: 1970], p. 9).

[4]"NSC-68. A Report to the National Security Council," April 14, 1950, *Naval War College Review*, May-June 1975, p. 71.

[5]Wadim W. Sagladin, Interview with the French Broadcasting System RTL, July 5, 1980.

[6]Sergey Akhromeyev, "Military Détente: The Soviet View," *Novosti Daily Review*, October 22, 1979 (reprinted in *USSR Report*, November 8, 1979, p. 5).

[7]Sagladin, Interview.

[8]The circumstances of President Carter's "deadline" for West European sanctions against Iran and the Soviet Union were erratic experiences, worrisome evidence that American governments no longer possess concepts and instruments on which to base common action, a condition that is likely to last very long. Needless to say, there are some West European observers who join America in its impatience. See, for example, Peter Jay, "Europe's Ostrich and America's Eagle," *The Economist*, March 8, 1980, pp. 19-29.

[9]James O. Goldsborough, "Europe Cashes In on Carter's Cold War," *The New York Times Magazine*, April 27, 1980, p. 47.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[10]Glasunov, *Novosti*, July 10, 1980.

[11]Jacob Burckhardt, *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen* (Stuttgart: 1955), p. 171.

[12]EDC—European Defense Community; CDE—Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

[13]See Uwe Nerlich, "Western Europe's Relations with the United States," *Daedalus*, Winter 1979, pp. 103-9.

[14]See Uwe Nerlich, "Theatre Nuclear Forces in Europe: Is NATO Running out of Options?" *The Washington Quarterly*, 3(1) (Winter 1980): 103-17.

[15]Santiago Carillo, *"Eurocomunismo" y Estado* (Barcelona: 1977), p. 138. Although "Eurocommunism" posed a major challenge to Soviet centralism, it was also conducive to political change in Western Europe that would have further estranged the United States, if only because Kissinger's predictions about America's unwillingness to support a more leftist Western Europe might have come true. Afghanistan put West European Communist parties into an impossible situation, precluding whatever prospects for Eurocommunist cohesion still existed. It forced various Communist parties—most clearly the French, but also the Spanish—to return to a pro-Soviet hardline, thereby precluding political participation. In turn, this reduced the incentives of governments like the French to play the Soviet card to check the Communist party at home.

[16]In today's circumstances, the politics of generating political support for drastically increased defense expenditures in the United States would have feedbacks in Western Europe that would be seen as jeopardizing the prospects for working toward a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union on the Continent. Typically, an influential West German editorial considered Ronald Reagan's platform on greater defense efforts as one that ought to work in Carter's favor (Theo Sommer, *Die Zeit*, July 18, 1980, p. 1).

[17]Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 1257.

[18]In this sense, the NATO Long-Term Defense Program that the Carter Administration launched in 1977 was the right kind of initiative, but the Administration itself fell short of meeting the requirements. It used the NATO force goals to camouflage its insufficient overall defense effort. President Carter's mishandling of the ERW issue and the overriding priority he assigned to SALT II diffused whatever readiness to go along that still existed in West European capitals.

[19]See John Van Oudenaren, "The Soviet Conception of Europe and Arms Control" in *Military Force and Negotiation*, Uwe Nerlich (ed.) (forthcoming).

[20]Eberhard Schulz, *"Charakteristika sowjetischer Westpolitik und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Entspannung,"* in *Entspannung am Ende?* Josef Füllenbach und Eberhard Schulz (eds.) (München/Wien: 1980), p. 221.

[21]Helmut Sonnenfeldt, *"Die Afghanistan-Krise und die amerikanisch-sowjetischen Beziehungen,"* *Europa Archiv*, March 25, 1980, p. 177.

[22]*Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context for U.S. Diplomacy.* Committee on Foreign Affairs, Special Studies Series on Foreign Affairs Issues, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), p. xxxv.

[23]As Leslie Gelb suggested after a trip to Moscow, "They [the Soviets] understand, perhaps better than we, that these [West European] governments will not stray far from ours" (*The New York Times*, July 10, 1980).

[24]See the remarkably detached study by Gerhard Basler, *Gemeinsamkeiten und Widersprüche im Verhältnis BRD-USA, IPW-Forschungshefte 1/1979* (East Berlin: 1979), p. 130.

[25]William R. Smyser, "German-American Relations," *The Washington Papers*, 74 (Beverly Hills/London: 1980), p. 23. For an almost deterministic assessment, see A. W. Porte, *Europe and the Superpower Balance*, Headline Series 247, December 1979: "The factors of stability will not be lightly swept away. The state system which up to now has so well reflected the true balance of power in the Europe that has emerged from the crises of the 20th century has a strong lease on the future" (p. 76).

[26]Thomas Mann, *Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen*, (Frankfurt: 1956), p. 41.

[27]Alfred Grosser, "Western Europe," in *The United States in the 1980s*, Peter Duignan and Alvin Rabushka (eds.) (Stanford: 1980), p. 713.

[28]See Uwe Nerlich, "Washington and Bonn: Evolutionary Patterns in the Relations between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany," in *America and Western Europe. Problems and Prospects*, Karl Kaiser and Hans-Peter Schwarz (eds.) (Lexington, Mass./Toronto: 1977), pp. 386-8.

[29]See the published account of the minutes of Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow in late June 1980: *Die Welt*, July 7, 1980, p. 1. The Soviet Union paid a price for getting this process started by accepting the American role in Berlin in the Four-Power Agreement, by chosing MBFR rather than waiting for unilateral American reductions (May 1971 episode), and by accepting a permament role for the United States in the CSCE process, without which, of course, the process would never have gotten started. The most precarious concession from a Soviet point of view was on Berlin. On the other hand, it provided the Soviet Union with additional leverage vis-à-vis Bonn, evidenced in repeated West German anticipations of Soviet blackmail over Berlin in ways conducive to West German good behavior.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[30]This approach became fully visible through Brezhnev's visit to Bonn in May 1978 and the resulting "Bonn Declaration" of May 6; it was reestablished during the Schmidt visit June 30-July 1, 1980.

[31]This took on particular importance in the spring of 1980 when, amidst all the post-Afghanistan turmoils, the two Germanys reassured each other of their continued interest in maintaining cooperative relations. From a Soviet perspective, the GDR is increasingly becoming its most effective proxy in the Third World—along with Cuba—and dragging West Germany into a special relationship with the GDR at the expense of Western ties clearly favors Soviet interests. But increasing West German influence on the GDR—not least importantly through TV—also creates major uncertainties with potentially wide-ranging repercussions on Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. For an expression of Soviet uneasiness, see Vladimir Lomejko and Oleg Prudkov, "Rožđenie Nouogo Čeloveka" (The Birth of the New Man), *Literaturnaja Gazeta*, no. 30, July 23, 1980, p. 14f.

[32]Robert Strausz-Hupé, *NATO: Task of Adaptation*, University of Southern Carolina, Institute of International Studies, Occasional Paper no. 2, 1978, pp. 7-9.

[33]Developments in West European reformism are closely watched in Moscow and other East European capitals. See, for example, the East German account by Hermann von Berg, "Eine Betrachtung zum Verhältnis EG-Sozieldemokratie," *Horizont*, December 1979, no. 32, p. 8f.

[34]Social democratic parties genuinely prefer negotiations on collective security structures and disarmament, unlike Americans, who prefer more limited discussions.

[35]Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen 1955-1959* (Stuttgart: 1967), p. 159. These apprehensions induced Adenauer very early to consider possible fallback positions. The Paris Agreements appear to be based on prior agreement with the United States to the effect that West Germany would never make any claims on territories east of the Oder-Neisse Line (December 1951), which both reinforced his apprehensions and paved the way for a possible Eastern alternative. In 1955 he was the first Western leader since World War II to go to Moscow, again in order to set the stage for a "Second Way," after misgivings over how the United States had approached the Geneva Summit. These apprehensions, which Adenauer during his first two terms tried to conceal in order not to jeopardize his Western priority, took on new political importance after Adenauer's and de Gaulles' meeting of minds on September 14, 1958, at Colombey-les-deux-Eglises, when both came to consider a strong West European community as the most viable way out, a solution that American diplomacy was successful in arresting.

[36]Charles de Gaulle, *Memoires d'Espoir. Le Renouveau 1958-1962*, (Paris: 1970), p. 213.

[37]Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, p. 149.

[38]"NSC-68. Report to the National Security Council," p. 54.

[39]Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, p. 158.

[40]Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (London: 1970), p. 727.

[41]"NSC-68. Report to the National Security Council," p. 70.

[42]See Denis W. Brogan's apt observation in his introduction to the Vintage Edition of *The American Character* (New York: Random House, vol. 1 1961), p. xv.

[43]Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, vol. 1 (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1954), p. 237.

[44]See Alfred Weber's farsighted analysis of the Soviet-American global competition in *Kulturgeschichte als Kultursoziologie*, 2d ed. (Munich: 1950), p. 444.

[45]Samuel Huntington, *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York/London: 1961), p. 443.

[46]Brogan, *The American Character*, p. xxxi. For Fred Iklé's seminal analysis, see "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?" *Foreign Affairs*, 51(2) (January 1973).

[47]Huntington, *The Common Defense*, p. 437f.

[48]Ibid., p. 446.

[49]Ibid., p. 438.

[50]"NSC-68. Report to the National Security Council," p. 70.

[51]Ibid., p. 71.

[52]For a survey of the erosion of political confidence in the United States over the last twenty-five years, see Alex Inkeles, "The American National Character," in *The Third Century: America as a Post-Industrial Society*, Seymour Martin Lipset (ed.) (Stanford: 1979), p. 413f.

[53]Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union had massive forces in Eastern Europe after World War II. Although in retrospect these forces were manifestly unready to attack Western Europe, they were strong enough to impose themselves on the West, leading to the buildup of American military power in Europe in the early 1950s. Conversely, the United States had created strategic nuclear forces; in 1947, however, there was not a single operational American nuclear weapon. Although American strategic weapons programs were confined to bombers, nuclear destruction was perceived in Moscow as the major threat posed by the United States. This led the Soviet Union to embark on its own long-range missile programs, even after the United States had cancelled theirs.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American programs were not resumed until 1953-54. Although the Soviet Union, despite its continued military efforts, "was a destroyed, exhausted country, which was absolutely incapable to engage in a new war—except to fight another invasion" (Milovan Djilas, Interview in *Rheinischer Merkur*, November 9, 1979), the United States did not maintain its military efforts after the war because of the political climate that prevailed, even at a time when the United States was never more resourceful.

[54]Stephen P. Gibert, *Soviet Images of America* (New York: 1977), p. 125.

[55]Ibid. As Abraham S. Becker has pointed out, the Soviet military leadership today can claim not only political advances as a direct result of growing Soviet military strength (in Angola or Ethiopia), but also that "the change in the correlation of forces brought capitalist representatives to Moscow eager to deal on favorable terms" ("On the Politics and Economics of the Burden of Soviet Defense," unpublished manuscript, May 1980, p. 51).

[56]David Calleo, "Germany and the Balance of Power," in *West German Foreign Policy: 1949-1979*, Wolfram F. Hanrieder (ed.) (Boulder, Colo.: 1980), p. 11.

[57]Although in 1957-58, both Adenauer and de Gaulle recognized that, as a result of the emerging Soviet missile threat against Western Europe, NATO had lost much of its original purpose, there were also some profound divergences between them. Adenauer complained that the United States would lose interest in NATO, that the Soviet threat might induce defeatism in Western Europe, that NATO could maintain its purpose only if thoroughly reorganized, and that West Germany's Western commitment should never come up for bargains (even though he was anxious to provide for relations with the Soviet Union as a fallback position). De Gaulle argued that, with the reality of American protection diminishing, Western Europe ought not to be dependent on the United States, that there was no way for Moscow to rule Western Europe, that NATO should be replaced by West European efforts, and that structural elements of the Western alliance should be traded against Soviet acceptance of a European settlement. Both Adenauer and de Gaulle considered arms control with apprehension in the context of political instrumentalism.

[58]Some West European governments today pin some vague hopes on the French proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe; they see it as a possible occasion for reintroducing notions of political order into East-West negotiations.

[59]It is often argued that, without the negotiating offer that had been initiated in Washington and Bonn, there would not have been a deployment decision. Had there been a firmer and earlier American commitment to LRTNF deployments (prior to late spring 1979), a straightforward deployment decision would have been likely.

[60]Peter Jay, "Europe's Ostrich and America's Eagle," p. 25.

[61]Goldsborough, "Europe Cashes In on Carter's Cold War," p. 42.

[62]Henry Brandon, "Uneasy Allies are finally getting the unity message," *The Washington Star*, April 20, 1980, p. H-1.

[63]Along with West Germany, France and certain Scandinavian countries were chosen as prime targets. In late January Chaban-Delmas was rudely used to transmit warnings not to involve China in the Afghan crisis. Then Paris was chosen as the place to announce that the Soviet Union would "not permit another Chile," and that any country in any region "has the full right to choose its friends and allies, and, if it becomes necessary, to repel with them the threat of counterrevolution or a foreign intervention" (Flora Lewis on Soviet Ambassador Chervonenko's speech in mid-April, *The New York Times*, April 22, 1980, p. A-14). Helsinki then became a platform for Soviet warnings to Norway and Denmark, in particular, when General Anatoliy Konstantinov stated in the wake of Afghanistan that the Soviet Union cannot "remain indifferent to Norway's decisions. We are trying to use political means to head off a military danger that directly threatens us" (*Foreign Report*, April 4, 1980, p. 3). And, along with these campaigns, the Soviet Union tried to blame the crisis on West Germany's role in the LRTNF decision and the alleged revival of West German "militarism" as a way to isolate West Germany within Western Europe, to impress the Benelux countries and other smaller states, and to raise the price for continued cooperation with Bonn in view of Chancellor Schmidt's intention to go to Moscow. See, in particular, the ominous article in *Novosti*, April 29, 1980, at a time when West Germany was trying hard to find a middle road. Moscow went so far as to threaten vaguely the disruption of gas supplies, although negotiations and a huge expansion of supplies were pending, and the Soviet Union was scheduled to receive pipelines on a large scale (Soviet spokesman Juri Krassnow in Hanover in mid-April 1980. See *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, April 19, 1980, p. 34).

[64]The Soviet Union already makes up for 8 percent of the total energy consumption in West Germany, with a 55 percent share of enriched uranium, a 16 percent share of gas, and a 6 percent share of oil and petrochemical products (*Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, April 19, 1980, p. 34). Increased gas imports are expected to result in a 20 percent share.

[65]"The USSR is now exclusively focussing on including American systems already stationed in Europe which can reach Soviet territory. British and French weapons systems now don't interest it" (account of the German minutes of the Schmidt-Brezhnev talks in late June 1980, *Die Welt*).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For a striking precedent for this Soviet approach to West Germany, see Khrushchev's account of his Moscow talks with Adenauer: " 'If a third world war is unleashed,' (Adenauer said), 'West Germany will be the first country to perish.' I was pleased to hear this, and Adenauer was absolutely right in what he said. For him to be making public statements like that was a great achievement on our part. Not only were we keeping our number one enemy in line, but Adenauer was helping us to keep our other enemies in line, too.

"I have always been against war, but at the same time I've always realized full well that the fear of nuclear war in a country's leader can paralyze that country's defenses. And if a country's defenses are paralyzed, then war really is inevitable: the enemy is sure to sense your fright and try to take advantage of it" (*Khrushchev Remembers*, Strobe Talbott (ed.) [London: 1971], pp. 517-8).

[66]John Van Oudenaren, *The "Leninist Peace Policy" and Western Europe*, Center for International Studies, MIT (Cambridge, Mass.: January 1980), p. 13.

[67]Calleo, "Germany and the Balance of Power," in *West German Foreign Policy*, p. 12.

[68]Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Prospects of German Foreign Policy," in *West German Foreign Policy*, p. 245. See also William G. Hyland's assessment that "the West may be poised on the brink of a new period of building strength—in NATO and in the EEC—much as it was thirty years ago. But there remain strong undercurrents for negotiated arrangements pointing toward Moscow. The direction is thus still to be determined" (in *West German Foreign Policy*, p. 126). In a related assessment, this directional choice is related to outcomes on the American side: "Bonn will question the value of ultimate reliance on an alliance leader whose domestic political system virtually assures unpredictability and ambivalence" (Catherine McArdle Kelleher, in *West German Foreign Policy*, p. 58).

[69]Burckhardt, *Westgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, pp. 237, 205.

[70]Goldsborough, "Europe Cashes In on Carter's Cold War," p. 114.

[71]Ibid.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WILLIAM H. KINCADE

Over the Technological Horizon

THE HORIZON OF THE STRATEGIC PLANNER EXTENDS, with diminishing clarity, from five years in the future to ten or fifteen years beyond that. The nearer term, up to five years from now, can usually be anticipated with considerable confidence, given the time required to produce and deploy a major new weapon; hence this period is of less interest. Today the long-range planner's concern is roughly the period from late 1985 through the end of the century.

There are few variables affecting this period that can be predicted with even minimum confidence, which reinforces the innate caution of the military planner. Technology is among the factors about which one must, of necessity, hazard some predictions, though even here the range of uncertainty is daunting. However, because technology is a central element, and one in which some forecasting is necessary or possible, technological anticipation is the dominant influence on long-range military planning. What one superpower's engineers and scientists discover as technologically feasible is projected into the future inventories of the other as well. The need to develop defenses or countermeasures against expected innovations becomes immediately evident. This process of threat projection is a common one; it affects any competition where the art of strategy is practiced, such as chess, football, or retailing. Yet, rarely is long-range projection so vital to an enterprise as in the case of military technology.

The aim of this essay is to examine briefly some possible technological developments, highlighting primarily those affecting strategic nuclear weapons, and to sketch their influence on the strategic setting of the late 1980s and the 1990s.[1] More specifically, the interrelated implications of cumulative technological innovation for American force planning and budgeting will be addressed.

The terms of reference for this excursion to the farther horizon are:

1. No allowance is made for the possible effect on future developments of negotiated security arrangements, nor is any significant effort made to assess the potential for such regimes. (This is the province of two other essays in this volume.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

2. The effects of incremental technological advance will not be discussed in terms of a hypothetical military balance or its stability—concepts of multiple, subjective connotations that, though useful shorthand terms, do not provide an agreed-upon criterion for judging the impact of technology. Instead, the conceptual scheme will be that of the "strategic environment," construed to include: weapons and related systems in inventory or advanced development; weapons in prospect because their principles violate no laws of nature, even if they have not passed the test of engineering feasibility; and estimates or perceptions of existing and prospective weapons that weigh heavily in the calculations of planners and on the minds of politicians and citizens.

3. The possibility of "technological surprise"—in the sense of a strategically decisive breakthrough by one party, not anticipated and not immediately redressable by the other—is not provided for. Not only is forecasting the unexpected contradictory, it is also difficult to detect a true case of technological surprise in the postwar era because the pursuit of new technology in that period has created expectations that discount unforeseen developments in advance.[2]

Writing in these pages five years ago, Harvey Brooks summarized the principal differences between past and future technological advance:

> It is fair to ask whether we can expect the development of a qualitative arms race to be as rapid today as it was from 1955 to 1965. The revolutionary technological situation that existed then may have been unique. . . . The revolutionary fifties and sixties were made possible by the confluence of several basic technological advances which came to maturity at more or less the same time—solid-fuel rocket propulsion, high yield-to-weight thermonuclear warheads, inertial guidance, compact solid-state electronics and computers, MIRV and re-entry technology. . . . [Yet] . . . the cumulative effect of many small evolutionary improvements in the parameters of component technologies can often be as revolutionary as such dramatic basic developments as the transistor or the hydrogen bomb.[3]

It is questionable whether there is now as much utility as formerly in distinguishing between the qualitative and the quantitative aspects of strategic arsenals, or whether the velocity of technological change is as significant as the breadth and depth of its reach. Improvements in weapons interact in decisive ways with increases in their numbers.[4] The evolutionary improvement of the inertial guidance systems that determine missile accuracy is one of the most noteworthy examples of quiet, but steady and significant, progress in the quality of modern weapons. Even with ideal accuracy, however, the use of intercontinental nuclear weapons now contemplated against command posts, troop or armor concentrations, individual factories, and missile silos would be seriously restricted if there were not large quantities of them.

The diverse applications of incrementally improving technologies also seem today of greater significance than the rate of change itself. Orbiting satellites, for example, are deployed for attack warning, attack assessment, damage evaluation, missile guidance, civil and military navigation, intelligence collection, target location and identification, arms limitation verification, and long-distance communications. Yet Brooks's characterization of the direction of technology

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

remains sound, and his expectation of dramatic consequences arising from evolutionary innovation is being fulfilled.

To review in detail progress in the many technologies that bear on military preparedness is well beyond the scope of this essay. The most that can be done is to examine the major trends and their implications for the strategic environment. Yet one or two related fields are worth touching on briefly because they exemplify so well the effects of cumulative innovation, in particular the interactive or interdependent character of those effects.

The increasing accuracy and responsiveness of both conventional and nuclear weapons has led to the coinage of the terms "smart bombs" and, more recently, "precision-guided munitions." Many of the improvements in guidance systems are traceable to the great strides that have been made in inertial components and in information-processing equipment, or computers, including systems for storing or transmitting the data to be processed. Paralleling these developments, and interacting with them, are steady advances in the miniaturization or microminiaturization of system components and in the capabilities of imaging and other sensors that collect the data for processing. Technological innovation has not only made possible "on-board computers" for individual weapons; it has also created the possibility of a much greater variety of nuclear or conventional warheads, tailored more to specific targets or to the specific effects desired. Indeed, there continue to be more designs for warheads on drawing boards than there are militarily useful applications—though this is a subject of intense debate, as demonstrated by the enhanced radiation warhead controversy of 1977-78.

The effects of these trends, most growing steadily out of a technology base created in the 1950s and 1960s, are by no means limited to improving the accuracy and destructive effects of offensive weapons. High-volume, high-speed communications systems in small packages make possible the development of airborne command posts for strategic and tactical battle management. Progress in command and control technologies is matched by improvements in materials and delivery vehicles. High-energy aircraft and rocket fuels, improved nonnuclear explosives, new heat-resistant and distortion-resistant materials for missile nose cones, and advanced alloys for less detectable submarine hulls are additional examples, albeit of varying degrees of military significance.

All of the weapons and associated systems discussed below are in some stage of the research and development process. In some cases, the research problems are just being defined, while in others, deployment is at hand. Because the solution of engineering problems often proves in practice more difficult than theory would suggest (owing partly to the demanding operational requirements of most systems and the propensity to include in each new system every advance in the "state of the art"), predicting which weapons will come to fruition as deployed forces at what time is a highly speculative enterprise. Suffice it to say that the developmental programs for most of the hardware discussed herein envision an operational weapon or related system in the late 1980s or the 1990s.

A further hazard in an overall assessment is the fact that technology does not recognize an offense or a defense, a conventional or nuclear distinction, or the difference between tactical, theater, or strategic weapons. Though a given technology may have a differential impact on these classifications, it can also cut

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

across the standard nomenclature of weaponry, and this is increasingly the case. Creating some distinctions for the purpose of analysis is a necessary but frustrating task; no claim is made for the felicitousness of the classifications below.

Finally, as suggested earlier, it should be borne in mind that increases in the number of deliverable weapons (here, meaning primarily explosive warheads and delivery vehicles) influence the strategic environment and national responses to it almost as much as technological improvements. In depicting some of the possibilities in an emerging strategic setting, it is assumed that there will be no effective agreed-upon constraints on the quantities of offensive weapons available. Whether budgetary limitations or political factors act to create such constraints is a matter for separate inquiry.

Offensive Technologies

Precision Guidance

The evolution of technologies associated directly or indirectly with guidance systems for projectile weapons (missiles of all types, bombs, artillery shells, torpedoes, etc.) has lead some to portray the decade just begun as the "era of absolute accuracy." If this is an overstatement, the difference between perfect accuracy and near-perfect accuracy is unlikely to be very meaningful in military terms.

Substantial accuracy increases are now in train for every element of U.S. strategic forces: the MX follow-on to the Minuteman III, the possible Trident II successor to Trident I, and the advanced cruise missile already being developed as a future replacement for the soon to be deployed air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). Another of the growing family of cruise missiles—the advanced strategic air-launched cruise missile (ASALM)—is being designed for supersonic speed and high accuracy to perform in a variety of roles, including suppression of defenses against bombers and cruise missile carriers. The sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) is under development for possible antiship and strategic ground-attack missions; a variant may be deployed in Europe before mid-decade as the high-accuracy ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM), along with another improved-warhead intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), the Pershing II, which will be more accurate than the Soviet SS-20 IRBMs. Soviet ICBM and IRBM accuracies are, however, also improving steadily.

Significant as the increase in projectile accuracy is, in terms of increasing confidence in target destruction and expanding the list of feasible targets, it has tended to obscure another feature of modern weapons produced by many of the same technologies—penetrativity, or the ability to get through defenses. This is accomplished primarily through overwhelming, foiling, or fooling the vital target acquisition, tracking, and destruction systems that comprise the defense. Thus, both numbers and advanced electronics packages contribute to increased penetrativity.

The MK12A warhead now being deployed on part of the Minuteman III ICBM force has an accuracy-yield combination that permits the presumption that it can destroy land-based missiles in heavily hardened silos—historically thought to be one of the most difficult targets to eliminate—if used in sufficient quanti-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ties.[5] It is widely believed that the Soviets will be able to deploy a warhead of equal destructiveness within this decade. Warheads of this type are, of course, capable of destroying or rendering unusable a variety of other targets of similarly small size and great hardening, such as command, control, and communications centers, bunkers for civil authorities and citizens, military-industrial facilities, or underground storage sites.

Thus, while the focus has been on the threat such weapons pose for ICBM silos, their advent opens up a range of new target possibilities and, hence, the perception of new vulnerabilities. Hitherto neglected, important civil and military command facilities, which the whole structure of military operations and civilian control rests on, are becoming the more worrisome Achilles' heel.

The MK12A warhead or the advanced ballistic reentry vehicle are the leading candidates today for use with the new MX missile, which will have the capacity to carry more than the ten reentry vehicles that would have been permitted under SALT II. However, even more lethal reentry vehicles (RVs) are being designed that could be deployed on the MX, the Navy Trident II intercontinental missile, or their successors. These are the advanced maneuvering reentry vehicle (AMaRV) and the precision-guided reentry vehicle (PGRV). While there are as yet no plans for proceeding to the engineering development stage with either, their design characteristics could include even greater accuracy than the reentry vehicles currently proposed for the MX; terminal guidance systems that would improve their ability to evade the missile interceptors of an ABM system; and lower yield warheads that could, if desired, reduce collateral destruction without sacrificing the ability to damage hardened targets.

Thus, in a decade or less, increasingly dependable means will be in hand to threaten the highly selective destruction of almost any conceivable stationary Soviet target, and possibly many that are mobile, even if selective ballistic missile defenses are deployed in the interim.[6] Should mobile offensive missiles also be deployed by both superpowers, as now seems likely, the threat to these forces may be somewhat diminished by their mobility. Yet even this is uncertain if both sides acquire very large numbers of evasive, maneuverable reentry vehicles. The simple ruse of creating more shelters or silos than there are offensive missiles (as recommended for MX) may not greatly increase confidence in the survivability of these mobile missiles; there are ways of calculating the success of repeated attacks on such missile fields to reduce the requirement for attacking RVs to levels now possessed by both the United States and the Soviet Union.[7]

The foregoing would be possible, of course, only if missile mobility is restricted to a limited area (or areas) with special-purpose roadways and conveyors. There is some speculation, however, that the theoretical vulnerability of entire fields of stationary or semimobile ICBMs may drive the superpowers—especially the Soviet Union, which has more of its strategic assets in ICBMs—to deploy road-mobile missiles with virtually unconstrained deployment areas or to institute a policy of launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack (if such has not been done already), or both.

Serious analysis of the demanding operational requirements of the so-called disarming attack on ICBM fields reveals virtually insoluble problems in obtaining the confidence levels required to make such an attack an attractive option.[8] Yet

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the prospect of a disarming strike on land-based ICBMs is widely accepted in the West says much about the way in which technology—or perceptions of it—influence the strategic environment. Improvements in missile accuracy have led to pencil-and-paper calculations showing the feasibility, under favorable, or "laboratory" conditions, of successfully destroying a single hardened missile silo with another missile. A generalized attack can be extrapolated from this "single-shot *kill* probability" by minimizing the difficulties of operationalizing these calculations for an entire force of attacking ICBMs, while avoiding disclosure of such preparations to the adversary. The wholesale vulnerability of fixed ICBMs has thus become the driving assumption of Western strategic planning.

To reduce the uncertainties occasioned by this line of analysis and, of at least equal importance, to exploit emerging technological possibilities, new weapon systems are designed to counter the presumed threat to ICBMs. New targeting, launching, or other operational policies may also be adopted to take advantage of the capabilities of these new weapons. Innovations in hardware and doctrine, however, do not necessarily decrease uncertainty. They may, as in the case of possible road-mobile ICBMs or launch-on-warning policies, substitute new and perhaps greater uncertainties, while not, in all cases, completely resolving the initial doubts.

Perhaps the more interesting and realistic vulnerability that is growing as a result of the increased numbers and effectiveness of reentry vehicles is that of military command, control and communications (C^3) facilities, such as the North American Air Defense Command at Cheyenne Mountain, the Joint Chiefs of Staff relocation site in the Appalachians—known as "The Rock"—and Soviet equivalents. Early destructions of these centers or merely their vital communications links could almost render moot the question of how many offensive missiles survive; without these centers, battle management of surviving forces would be highly problematic. There are certain possibly severe penalties for the attacker for destroying or damaging its adversary's command and control system, including misguided missiles, uncontrolled salvos, and the difficulties of terminating hostilities. Yet these disincentives are not enough to reassure planners. Concern for command and control vulnerability is driving both superpowers to harden and disperse some of these facilities and to increase redundancy, partly by developing improved airborne command posts, though these also have their particular vulnerabilities and limitations. Providing highly dependable command and control facilities has proved difficult, however, owing to problems inherent in defending a limited number of fixed sites against a determined nuclear attack and the limitations of mobile command posts.

While some of the implications of precision guidance can be foreseen in a general way, more exact estimates remain elusive because the operational effectiveness of innovative weapons remains to be seen and because there are so many crosscutting variables at work in the offense-defense competition. Given the normal process of technological maturation, however, it is reasonably safe to speculate that the strategic environment of the future will be one of heightened vulnerability, uncertainty, and incalculability, as new families of highly accurate and penetrating weapons give the presumptive attacker a much wider range of targets and battle plans. The limitations that confined earlier attack planners to the consideration of only a few sequences or targets will diminish. U.S.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

targeting plans are continually being modified to include target sets, such as concentrations of conventional forces, that not long ago would have been considered unfeasible.

Further consequences of these developments are increased pressures on defenses of all types (which, of course, are not limited to antiaircraft or antimissile systems) and greater incentives to adopt a policy of launch-on-warning or, more likely, launch-under-attack to respond before one's forces and command facilities are lost. The technology to support such an option is, as we shall see, also improving, as are other technologies that tend to reinforce the effects of precision guidance by creating greater vulnerability and uncertainty.

Mobility

The greater mobility of advanced offensive weapons has already been foreshadowed. Mobile IRBMs are already deployed, and mobile ICBMs will likely be in superpower inventories by the latter half of the decade. The accuracy and penetrativity of modern cruise missiles has somewhat obscured their even greater mobility; if desired, they can be mounted on almost any launch platform, from a flatbed truck to a patrol boat to a fighter-bomber. The development of the MX and sea-launched cruise missiles has shown that a ballistic or cruise missile can be encapsulated to free it from most of the ancillary and maintenance systems formerly associated with large weapons. Moreover, the technology is being developed for in-putting target data to missile guidance systems remotely, as from radio guidance equipment aboard airborne command posts.

The development of conventional weapons of great firepower, accuracy, and mobility—including antitank and antiaircraft missiles that could be carried and operated by one or two men—occurred during the 1960s. The effects of these developments have already been partly gauged in conflict, chiefly the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, and they are being taken into account in conventional war planning.

The implications of parallel mobility in theater and strategic nuclear weapons may be less appreciated. At a minimum, however, such mobility will complicate surveillance of adversary forces, assessment of the threat they pose, and the planning of defenses against highly mobile offensive weapons. The increased mobility of strategic and theater nuclear forces means both greater undetectability and greater mission interchangeability. American planners are already concerned about the Soviet potential for moving its China-oriented mobile SS-20 IRBMs into positions where they can fire on West European targets. The mobility of American GLCMs, when deployed in Europe, will give rise to Soviet uncertainties regarding their ability to target these potentially reloadable cruise missile systems.

Such mobility will also inevitably raise questions as to whether one party or another is covertly producing large numbers of such systems for surprise deployment, perhaps in a crisis. While this may seem to some an extreme, even a hysterical hypothesis, it is by no means technologically unfeasible, and lies no farther from the realm of plausible conjecture than many of the fearful scenarios that have marked the American strategic debate over the last five years or so. These fears also influence the strategic environment.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mission Flexibility

The aircraft is among the most versatile of weapons; emblematic of mission flexibility in the 1970s are the American FB-111 and Soviet TU-22M (Backfire) bombers, which could perform in naval, theater, and strategic environments, carrying conventional or nuclear ordnance. The U.S. B-52 and Soviet heavy bombers, as well as lighter attack bombers and fighter-bombers, could also carry out a variety of missions equipped with either conventional or nuclear weapons. The advent of improved missiles, first the short-range attack missile (SRAM) and later the cruise missile, have extended the utility and flexibility of the bomber still further.

Other types of cruise missile, for sea-launching or ground-launching, and, possibly, remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) are the foundations for new families of versatile weapons that can perform in a variety of roles—naval, tactical, theater, or strategic, with conventional or nuclear warheads. The sea-launched ground-attack cruise missile is being developed with conventional and nuclear warheads to operate in several modes. Depending on where they are positioned, mobile IRBMs, such as the Pershing or SS-20, can be seen as theater or strategic in their implications.

The effects of this trend toward "gray-area systems"—those with great mission interchangeability—are similar to the effects of increased mobility. They are already being felt to a considerable extent. The multiple capabilities of these weapons cause some confusion in the enumeration of "orders of battle," the primary index of adversary forces, with the possibility of some double counting to err on the safe side. Versatile systems have already complicated Soviet and American estimates of the other's strength, as has been shown in the continuing internal and bilateral controversies over the Soviet Backfire bomber and American forward-based systems (FBS)—dual-capable aircraft deployed around the periphery of the Soviet Union.

Though it may prove possible in time to develop techniques for distinguishing, without adversary cooperation but with high confidence, nuclear-tipped cruise missiles from those with conventional warheads, or long-range from short-range missiles, it is likely to prove easier to obscure these distinctions if desired. Moreover, the effectiveness of such techniques first requires that these small, portable weapons be located, a potentially far more difficult problem, especially for the United States. To facilitate negotiated limits, the United States may even design cruise missiles with observable features that indicate their characteristics. There is little to warrant the assumption, in the present climate at least, that the Soviet Union would do likewise.[9] Furthermore, if large production runs of cruise missiles drive down costs below their already comparatively low price, each side will be able to have so many, that knowing their individual characteristics, and even their location, will be of relatively little practical value. Meanwhile, counting multiple-mission dual-ordnance aircraft will continue to be a speculative venture.

Another general effect of more versatile weapons, in particular, more versatile delivery systems, is to blur the distinctions—between battlefield, theater, and strategic arenas, and between nuclear and conventional ordnance—on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which so much of Western escalation strategy has been premised. Judging as best one can from Soviet writings on theater warfare, their operational doctrine has already discounted the possibility of maintaining firebreaks or rungs between areas and levels of conflict; thus their skepticism about keeping limited nuclear wars limited.[10]

Although multipurpose systems remain attractive to military commanders and defense budget analysts, the likely implication of increased versatility is, once again, increased indeterminacy in the strategic environment.

Nuclear Technologies

The principles and engineering feasibility of various types of nuclear weapons—those emphasizing blast effects over radiation or vice versa, for example—have been known for many years. Indeed, an enhanced radiation weapon (ERW) was developed nearly two decades before the controversy of 1977-78. Suppressed radiation weapons are equally feasible. In the 1960s methods for creating favorable yield-to-weight ratios—a form of miniaturization—contributed to the development of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, each of which can carry one of these small nuclear weapons and still fit in a so-called bus atop a ballistic missile of an earlier generation. The proliferation of nuclear weapons on a single missile ("fractionation") results from this cumulative shrinking of the nuclear explosive device. Today it is possible to talk about "mininukes" (very low yield weapons) for small targets and about multiple-warhead cruise missiles.

The technology of nuclear explosives has thus reached a mature state, and only marginal advances are likely in the future. Instead, research in this area has emphasized handling safety, resistance to accidents, and conformance with other operational requirements such as small size, improved penetration vehicles, and, in the case of a new gravity bomb being developed by the air force, minimum risk to the crew and the aircraft dropping it.

However, not all of the nuclear weapons that have been designed or tested have been deployed. The chief influence of nuclear weapons technology on the strategic environment, then, lies in the anticipation or implementation of decisions to deploy weapons now within the state of the art. Enhanced radiation ordnance and mininukes are among the leading candidates for operational use. Concern about adversary deployment of these weapons and the intentions they may reflect, about possible countermeasures, about what many believe are their inhumane characteristics, and about their possible effect in reducing inhibitions against nuclear conflict will continue to contribute to the growing general climate of fear and doubt.

Supporting Technologies

Battle Management Systems[11]

The successful use of the weapons described earlier depends, of course, on the quality, comprehensiveness, and timeliness of information available to the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

decisionmaker (whether a battlefield commander or a head of state) and on the cogent analysis of that information by humans or machines. The same technological innovations that are revolutionizing weaponry apply to battle management systems, which consist generally of hardware and software that collect, process, and display data on the status of one's own and enemy forces, and send commands to one's forces.

The United States is currently engaged in an effort to upgrade its battle management systems across the board. The ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS) and the sound surveillance system (SOSUS) for detecting submarines are being upgraded, while a new SLBM radar warning system for both East and West coasts is nearing completion. The potential of advanced (over-the-horizon backscatter) radars is being evaluated for augmenting current systems for early warning of ICBM and bomber attacks. Also, under the strategic warning and attack assessment (SW/AA) program, a new and more survivable system for evaluating the effectiveness of nuclear detonations is being developed; this will permit decisionmakers to monitor damage inflicted both on, and by, the Soviet Union. Another project in this program is aimed at improving the U.S. attack assessment capability with space-based and earth-based sensors.

Improvements are also being made to the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft, which can assess enemy actions and direct friendly forces in tactical, theater, or strategic environments, and to the national airborne command post, assigned to control U.S. strategic nuclear weapons if similar facilities on the ground are imperiled or not functioning. The navy is similarly protecting and improving its strategic battle management capacity under the GRYPHON program. Two major elements of this program are: the development of a more secure, reliable, and survivable system for communicating with (and presumably providing rapid retargeting data to) ballistic missile submarines; and, separately, the nuclear hardening and improvement of a fleet of modified C-130 cargo aircraft for relaying communications between national decisionmakers and ballistic missile submarines. As a separate project, the navy is continuing the development of an extremely low frequency system for normal communications with these same submarines; this system, with facilities planned for Michigan and Wisconsin, is not expected to survive in a nuclear war, however. Meanwhile, the worldwide military command and control system (WWMCCS), related to the aforementioned systems, is constantly being upgraded as advances in electronics permit.

The overall aim of these several projects is the "controlled and responsive use of strategic forces."[12] Individually and cumulatively they will provide for more effective management of rapidly unfolding nuclear conflicts, that is, improved war-fighting capacity, as similar battle management systems of more restricted scope have exploited a variety of advances in electronics to improve the capacity for direction of naval surface warfare, tactical or theater air combat, and even ground operations. The Soviet testing of high-energy over-the-horizon radars and command aircraft similar to the U.S. AWACS aircraft suggests that they, too, are improving their strategic battle management systems.

Such programs have both defensive and offensive implications. Both sides will presumably stress the defensive or deterrent character of their efforts. Yet,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

when these battle management programs are set alongside steadily improving offensive weapons, it will be difficult for a prudent planner in either Moscow or Washington to avoid the conclusion that something less benign than defense or punitive retaliation is intended. Given the historical wariness of the two powers, the likely effect of more responsive war-fighting or battle management systems will be an increase in the fear that the other side is contemplating a nuclear attack or, at a minimum, an increase in uncertainty on this point.

There are other implications of more effective warning and control facilities. They make more feasible, and thus increase confidence in, a launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack policy. And they improve generally the detection and tracking capacity required for antiballistic missile systems. Finally, and less discernibly, they may make nuclear war decisions less considered, more automatic. "Responsiveness," after all, is something of a euphemism for quick reaction. Given the premium on rapid decision-making created by the speed of many modern nuclear weapons, the availability of preprogrammed response options, and early, but perhaps ambiguous or fragmentary, strategic warning, the pressures for, and probability of, an ill-informed or ill-judged launch command would seem naturally to increase. This could mean a poor use of forces, or worse.

Technological advances, again largely in electronics, are also changing the scope of modern warfare, making it possible to contemplate the application of battlefield concepts to regional or theater and strategic conflicts. Proposals have been made, for example, to exploit long-range precision-guided nuclear or conventional munitions and advances in warfare management technology to create, at least for Europe, a truly electronic theater battlefield. In such a system a commander, remote from the conflict and using a grid system, calls in the appropriate ordnance on the basis of nearly instantaneous information of enemy movements derived from a variety of sensors. This would essentially elevate to the theater level the more rudimentary type of system long used to direct tactical artillery.

The potential battlefield for nuclear conflict spans continents and oceans. As the ability improves, at least in principle, to collect and process information rapidly over these long distances, and to direct or retarget one's forces in a timely manner, it is correspondingly more appropriate to think of strategic warfare as involving an almost global electronic battlefield. The comparatively rapid time-to-target of many strategic weapons and the penalties of being slow to detect, assess, and respond to a nuclear salvo encourage this approach.

Yet, although battle management capacity will continue to improve in comparison to the recent past, there remain profound obstacles to achieving the high degree of control and responsiveness, and the high level of confidence in these systems, desired by military commanders. The classic "fog of battle" problem will persist. Moreover, the complex systems that effective intercontinental battle management depends on will continue to be vulnerable, and may become increasingly so, to human miscalculation (owing to poor judgment, sparse or conflicting information, or information of the wrong kind), to enemy action (including electronic deception and countermeasures), or, as in the two nuclear alert false alarms of 1980, to equipment malfunction.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Surveillance Technology

The technologies used for gathering intelligence on adversary forces, existing and developmental, are similar to those for attack warning and assessment, at least in terms of the primary data-gathering systems such as satellites, radars, and other collectors of electronics and communications information. Surveillance technology, however, differs sufficiently in processing and supplemental systems to merit separate consideration.

The science of surveillance benefits not only from advances of the kind discussed earlier, but also from the expanded exploitation of the radio frequency spectrum, which permits collection of a variety of electromagnetic waves emitted by different objects. Accoustical and electromagnetic waves, especially those associated with mechanical and electronic equipment, are distinctive enough to be called "signatures." Various imaging sensors—deployed on a variety of platforms (aircraft, ships, remote ground stations, submarines, satellites, etc.) and using multispectral, infrared, or other specific bandwidths—can penetrate natural barriers, such as clouds or darkness, and even standard camouflage techniques, to read these signatures, and can provide, in many cases, quite precise information on military hardware and other targets of interest.

This information—supplemented by data from communications, electronic, industrial and economic, and scientific and technical intelligence collection sources—can in principle be rapidly correlated and analyzed by high-speed computers to provide not only a very accurate picture of specific or general adversary capabilities, but even to project the future direction and performance levels of weapons being tested.

The technologies involved will continue to improve in the 1980s and 1990s. Various image-enhancement techniques, for instance, will improve the quality of the data as well as help to pierce some methods of concealment. The growing intelligence data base—often ignored in the consideration of surveillance—will increase the accuracy of projections regarding developments in enemy weaponry.

These advances, however, will be offset by two factors: the growing mobility, interchangeability, and indeterminacy of new weapons; and improvements in techniques of intentional concealment and deception. The United States, for example, is constantly trying to reduce the electromagnetic profile or signature of its weapons. This telltale could also be obscured. An excellent example is the U.S. "Stealth" bomber design, combining aerodynamic and electromagnetic features to escape radar detection. Many of the weapon developments anticipated in the next decade or so will not be covered by any agreement prohibiting interference with national technical means of verification. Therefore, the capacity to locate, identify, count, and assess the operational characteristics of adversary weapons *with the degree of confidence desired for intelligence purposes*, while relying primarily on technical (rather than clandestine or penetrating) intelligence, will diminish overall. The very direction of weapons technology is thus away from, not toward, greater certainty in surveillance. While the existence of a family of cruise missiles may be known, the range, accuracy, warhead type and yield, probable target, and other vital characteristics of a particular deployed representative of that family may be ascertainable with much less certainty than is the case for large ballistic missiles.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Defense Technologies

Space Warfare

Partly owing to the provisions of the outer space treaty of 1967, the current drive to exploit the military uses of inner and outer space tends to have a defensive character, though there are offensive implications in the technologies being developed for this comparatively new arena of competition. Defensive systems, however, do not seem to violate the provisions of the treaty, especially its ban on the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction in outer space.

Currently, American space warfare programs are pursuing three ends: development of a variety of systems for destroying objects in space, including the standard and "killer" satellites of an adversary; providing detection, tracking, attack warning and assessment, and targeting assistance for the weapons that may be developed; and development of active and passive measures for defending U.S. space vehicles, including satellites. Current candidates for the antisatellite mission are projectiles launched from fighter aircraft with high climb capacity, co-orbiting killer satellites, and direct ascent projectiles. In the more distant future, various "speed of light" energy beams, such as high-energy lasers, may be mounted on the target satellite or on a separate vehicle.

Although the Soviet Union appears to be the first nation to test an antisatellite weapon (ASAT) as such, the United States is expected to overtake this seeming lead, essentially by "leapfrogging" the crude Soviet ASAT technology.[13] In any military competition in space, it is believed that the United States "could compete on favorable terms."[14] In this environment, in particular, the American lead in electronics and miniaturization should yield a pronounced advantage.

Though most space warfare programs have long leadtimes, it is clear that U.S. technology planning anticipates inner space, and perhaps outer space, as the next medium for threats to Western security. A space defense operations center is already in existence, and a ground-based electro-optical deep-space surveillance system (GEODSS) is to become operational before the end of the decade.

The critical role of satellites in all aspects of modern warfare (navigation, targeting, surveillance, attack warning and assessment, and battle management) makes these developments of special importance. Although the United States may maintain a consistent lead in antisatellite technology, and satellite redundancy may preclude any realistic threat of the loss of this vital array of spaceborne sensors, it is clear that space vehicles have lost the virtual inviolability they once possessed. Recent history suggests that any potential threat will create considerable apprehension. Efforts are already being made to offset threats to satellites through improved ground facilities, but they cannot fully duplicate satellite capabilities. Thus uncertainties will grow even in an area of substantial U.S. advantage.

Ballistic Missile Defense

Advances in space warfare technology also have implications for the defense of ground-based weapons, especially ground-based ICBMs. However, as with

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

almost all forms of space warfare technology, it is difficult to distinguish between the offensive and defensive implications.

Several American programs are in train to examine various technologies for the detection and destruction of ballistic missiles in the outer space (exoatmospheric) portion of their flight trajectory, assuming that these missiles would be aimed at U.S. missile silos. Nuclear and nonnuclear projectiles are being considered for the role of ballistic missile killers, along with high-energy lasers.

Meanwhile, the use of inner and outer space for the protection of U.S. ICBMs is being studied from another perspective. Two concepts now under consideration are indicative of the often bizarre consequences of the interaction of perceived threats and technological innovation. In one, a large unmanned airframe—a sort of giant cruise missile—would carry U.S. ICBMs aloft for long periods during a crisis; these combination cruise-ballistic missiles would "loiter" over U.S. territory until ordered to land or launch an attack. The second concept involves placing U.S. ICBMs in a "parking" orbit around the earth, to be launched if the United States is attacked. This latter system is not seen as violating the outer space treaty, since the ICBMs would not be launched into orbit until the United States is actually in a nuclear confrontation, when, it is presumed, the terms of this or other arms control agreements would become moot.

Although it is unlikely that these particular approaches will be adopted, at least in the foreseeable future, their very consideration reflects the level of concern for feasible, if improbable, scenarios, as well as the kinds of apparent solutions technology can provide for such concerns. Though viewed as primarily, even intrinsically, defensive in nature, moreover, such approaches could well be seen as increasing an offensive threat if deployed by an adversary. This is true of many defensive systems because of the inherent ambiguity of nuclear deterrence. Most weapons that help to assure the survival of a significant retaliatory force *from* an opponent's first strike are also, arguably, suitable for preserving a significant reserve of weapons or other military resources from retaliation after *initiating* a first strike. Indeed, generally speaking, defensive measures will be more effective for the side that makes the first move offensively. Hence, the concern, especially in the less defensively oriented West, that strategic defense implies offensive intentions.

The radar technology and the tactics for active defense of small or "point" targets against ballistic warheads that have reentered the atmosphere have advanced since the signing of the ABM treaty in 1972. This has increased the feasibility of "preferential" defense of ICBM silos or shelters, and perhaps protection for other critical military targets such as satellite communications facilities or command and control centers.[15] The Army's low-altitude defense (LOAD) program envisions the rapid deployment, if necessary, of a system for protecting such targets. This system, which seeks to identify and acquire RV targets at about 30,000 feet and intercept them at 4,000 feet, is considered to pose few technological risks and to be unambiguous, that is, "it could not be mistaken for an area defense system."[16] (The wary adversary may be less certain that the system cannot intercept at higher altitudes, and thus provide a presumptive area defense.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In addition, the army is pursuing a number of related R&D programs aimed at detecting targets, discriminating warheads from penetration aids, and intercepting the RVs outside the atmosphere, before the maneuvering reentry vehicles expected to be available in coming years begin their evasive maneuvers. Although there is considerable controversy in the technical community over the likely success of these exploratory programs, especially against anticipated advances in RV penetrativity, even slow improvement in exoatmospheric defense technology will encourage continued dedication of resources to these programs—a classic example of U.S. advanced technology programs competing with one another at least as much as, if not more than, with parallel Soviet programs.

In the absence of effective limitations on offensive weapons, pressures to deploy the selective ABM systems are already growing. The notion is that the ABM treaty could be renegotiated to permit only preferential or point defense. The arguments made against such a move are that point defense of a number of high-value targets, especially adjacent ones or those near urban areas, might prove indistinguishable from a defense of wide areas such as cities; that extra ABM systems could be built clandestinely for sudden deployment; and that mobile ABM systems—expected to be feasible in the near future—would create further ambiguities. An exoatmospheric ballistic missile defense, if it proves feasible, would be an even more tempting technology to pursue, and would have clearer implications for protection of large-scale urban targets—still regarded as the ultimate, if no longer the only, hostages of nuclear deterrence.

On the other hand, it is speculated that even far more efficient preferential or wide-area ABM systems could be overwhelmed, although at greater cost to reserve forces and with less assurance of success against critical targets, by flocks of the maneuvering reentry vehicles that could be deployed in the next decade. These are being designed specifically to penetrate ABM defenses. A case can be made, though, that, in principle, a preferential ABM system would serve to decrease confidence in first-strike effectiveness and therefore also decrease fears of first-strike vulnerability, without necessarily eroding confidence in retaliatory capability.

Historically, however, even first-generation ABM systems and technologically constrained civil or "passive" defenses have led to claims that retaliatory effectiveness will be significantly reduced, unless offsetting measures are taken. The periodic stirs in the West caused by the largely outmoded Soviet civil defense program attest to the reality that the strategic environment is more than simply the objective enumeration and assessment of military forces.[17] The likelihood is that deployment of a preferential ABM by an adversary will produce the judgment (perhaps self-serving) that retaliatory capacity is seriously affected. Uncertainties about the expansion or improvement of a selective ABM, once deployed, would certainly reinforce this concern.

Antisubmarine Warfare

Advances in the technologies related to detecting, tracking, and destroying submarines have been slow in coming. The obstacles to the decimation of an at-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sea missile submarine force will remain insuperable. And there exist submarine technologies for reducing the effectiveness of antisubmarine measures (e.g., quiet-running electric submarines powered by a fuel cell or other advanced energy system). Uncertainties in future technological developments are such, however, that the survivability of individual missile submarines beyond 1995 cannot be guaranteed with confidence levels as high as those of today. Hence, the increasing probability of being able to destroy a few submarines in a force is being generalized to vulnerability for an entire fleet.

The strategic antisubmarine warfare (ASW) threat has a differential impact on the two superpowers. Because its access to the open ocean is through relatively narrow straits that can be monitored and blocked, the Soviet Union tends to suffer more from advances in ASW technology, most of which are now American advances. Indeed, the Soviet Union virtually appears to have given up operating SLBM submarines in the deep ocean basins, and to have confined their operations to adjacent waters, such as the Greenland and Barents seas, whence they could launch SLBMs with ranges of 5,000 to 6,000 miles. Making these operating areas into Soviet "lakes," however, involves considerable difficulties for the Soviets, who will not likely be able to prevent fully the intrusion of *Los Angeles*-class hunter-killer submarines into these waters. And this could decrease their confidence in the survival of an adequate sea-based missile force.

Despite this differential, speculation about innovation in ASW has begun to raise American fears over the long-term viability of its own SLBM fleet, in a process analogous to that of the growing concern for the survivability of U.S. ICBMs. In this, there is perhaps a classic example of how linear technological projection—"whatever we can conceive, they will deploy"—affects the overall strategic environment. No matter how great or persistent the U.S. lead in ASW may prove, the net effect of advancing ASW technology is to increase the overall level of doubt and uncertainty on both sides regarding the future.

Other Defensive Technologies

A number of programs are under way to improve the resistance of American strategic weapons and command and control systems to nuclear effects. One such program, for example, will increase still further the "hardness" of the B-52 bomber. The increasing indistinguishability of the defense from the offense is reflected in the fact that, although the purpose of these endeavors is to help U.S. forces "ride out" a first strike, they also support the interpretation that the United States is increasing its ability to initiate a nuclear exchange.

Exotic Technologies

To decide which technologies are exotic in the face of so much prospective change is a rather arbitrary matter. One class of possible weapons, however, the so-called directed energy weapons (DEW), seems to deserve this characterization. The scientific feasibility of using speed-of-light energy beams to destroy or disrupt various enemy weapons or installations is not greatly contested. What is at issue in the scientific and technical community is whether directed energy weapons—such as high-energy lasers or charged-particle beams—will pass the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

test of engineering feasibility; whether they have important military applications; and, if so, whether their advantage outweighs their own liabilities or the advantages of alternative technologies. Interest in positive answers to these questions runs very high because of the obvious benefits of speed-of-light energy weapons, especially for the defense, and because of the generally favorable conditions for laser beam propagation in outer space, where the attention of military technologists and planners is increasingly turning.

What can be said confidently is that both the United States and the Soviet Union will be vigorously pursuing research and development in the area of beam weapons far into the future, as they have in the past. Whether the result is failure—as with the efforts to develop the elusive nuclear aircraft—or success—as with the space travel program—this effort is sure to add to the other uncertainties that will mark the strategic environment over the next two decades. This effect has already been demonstrated by the concern that the Soviet Union is on the verge of deploying a charged-particle beam weapon—a concern strong enough to prompt the reopening of U.S. research in this field. In the judgment of many scientists, though, the charged particle beam is an unpromising candidate for a weapon system.[18] The possibility that one side or the other will achieve the necessary engineering breakthrough in high-energy lasers or some other speed-of-light technology provides perhaps the ultimate question mark for the strategic setting from here to the end of the century.

Significance of Strategic Innovation

Understanding the implications of future technology requires comparisons with technology past and current. Early generations of strategic weapons were characterized by large, cumbersome delivery vehicles and warheads with limited capacity for discriminating employment and, hence, restricted missions or roles. Ancillary systems for attack warning and assessment, and the control and evaluation of responses were mainly slow, inflexible, and differentiated as to mission. The original Distant Early Warning (DEW) radar line and the air force's Strategic Air Ground Environment (SAGE) system had limited capacities to provide early alert of intercontinental attack, assess its size and purpose, and aid in the management of the defense. The navy's underwater surveillance system (SOSUS) was even more restricted in its use. Retargeting ICBMs took at least twenty-four hours, and SLBMs could scarcely be retargeted at all while on station.[19]

To some degree, the U.S. force of bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs grew up in response to the limitations of each individual type of weapon and related systems, since each had somewhat different deficiencies that were compensated by the others. The overall and individual limitations of these weapons and supporting systems strongly influenced the development of concepts for their use. Although most nuclear weapons were allocated to military and industrial targets, and cities were not targeted directly as a matter of priority, many military and industrial targets were in or near urban areas. Massive exchanges against these urban areas were anticipated, although not necessarily desired, as a consequence of technologies that did not permit the effective implementation of the more discriminating and limited targeting goals contained in U.S. operational

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plans.[20] With alternative uses of weapons constrained by the limitations of the hardware itself, the strategic environment of the time was relatively more "plannable" as well as resistant to concepts other than reciprocal deterrence.

As technological progress relaxed the earlier constraints of fuel payload requirements, bulky internal guidance mechanisms, and other components, the engineer was able to design much smaller and more versatile delivery vehicles (though often the military services resisted these innovations). Simultaneously, the related nonweapon systems were improved so that the monitoring of adversary forces, attack warning and assessment, damage evaluation, and management of forces became, in many respects, comparatively easier. Yet technological advances often offset one another. The development of smaller, more concealable, maintenance-free weapons, for example, will tax technology to produce sensors capable of locating them, especially if simple measures are taken to fool or obstruct data collection sensors or communications links. The global electronic battlefield is a mixed blessing, even for the leader in the field.

Future Planning and Perceptions of American Security

Although the technology of strategic and conventional warfare has been changing slowly, but decisively, the images or paradigms of modern conflict held by the public, by politicians, and even by some analysts have not kept pace. The very undramatic nature of these cumulative, interactive innovations tends to reduce for the public the salience of their effects, which are likely to be far more consequential than is at present imagined. Indeed, by concentrating on the "older" and more visibile technology of conflict, many in the West have come to doubt its ability to keep pace with the East. Paradoxically, rather crude improvements in current Soviet technologies (tanks and large ICBMs are examples) have almost entirely captured the public imagination. There is little appreciation that qualitative change is creating virtually new classes of weapons that could dominate the scene five or ten years hence and make existing weaponry obsolescent, if still useful for certain military missions and certain strategic objectives.

Based on the evidence of current deployment and development programs in the United States and the Soviet Union, therefore—of which this review provides only the highlights—the strategic environment is undergoing a sea change. Little noticed by even attentive audiences, cumulative technological innovation is ushering out the era dominated by large limited-mission strategic systems (if not the weapons themselves) and crude systems for controlling them. Alongside improved models of these behemoths will be smaller, more flexible, more interchangeable, and faster weapons with greater firepower and more supple control mechanisms. Even as the gaze of mass and elite publics has focused, even fixated, on the disparities between Soviet and American versions of the existing technologies of strategic nuclear conflict, a new chapter in the strategic competition has been unfolding, principally as a result of American innovation.

When the emerging technology of warfare is viewed comprehensively, the United States continues to maintain a significant edge, in part because the "core" technologies, such as miniaturized electronic components and systems,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have proved troublesome for the Soviet Union to acquire and integrate in operational weapons. Even before SALT II was withdrawn from consideration, the United States announced plans for a five-year $15 billion *increase* in military R&D, specifically to ensure that long-range technical options are kept open. Without SALT II in place, this amount will undoubtedly grow. Yet, as Table 1 shows, the record of competition does not leave much room for optimism about the possibility of using technological leverage to force the Soviet Union to the wall. This recurring notion—common at the time of the U.S. development of the A-bomb and of MIRV, and resurgent today—overlooks the possibilities for the Soviet Union to acquire the new technology in relatively short time, or to offset it by sheer size, numbers, or other stratagems that may lack technological sophistication but that are nevertheless militarily effective and likely to further complicate U.S. defense.

Despite the U.S. lead in these new dimensions of warfare, then, their effects on military security, and especially on the apprehension of security, will be profoundly unsettling. Although the *political* probability of a premeditated first strike, surprise attack, or "bolt from the blue" will remain low, the fact remains that technological change is improving the means for such an attack, and thus the incentives for it, if one side decides the other may be contemplating such a move.[22] This will increase pressures on diplomats and decisionmakers in crises, whether they arise from direct confrontation or "third party" conflicts.

At the same time, many of the technological advances in weapons cannot be denied to other countries. While lightweight warheads and very sophisticated guidance systems may not be readily achieved by less technologically sophisticated nations, the aerodynamic design and turbofan engines of cruise missiles can be copied. As new nations attain the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons, new and comparatively simple delivery technologies are becoming available, primarily in the form of deep-penetration strike bombers. The next nuclear power may completely bypass the "dinosaur" stages of American, Soviet, French, or Chinese bomber and missile development. At the same time, all existing nuclear weapon states must modernize their forces or find them vulnerable to others.

If somehow the combined proliferation of advanced delivery technologies and nuclear weapons is avoided, the United States will still face a formidable threat from its principal antagonist. Assuming that the Soviet Union in time deploys or offsets in some way most of the innovations now on U.S. drawing boards, the strategic setting of the future will be far less predictable than anything we have known to date. Unrecognized in the American strategic debate is the fact that the weapons we can expect in the next ten to twenty years will allow us and our adversary to plan attacks and responses free from many of the limitations on the weapons that gave the strategic setting of the past its essential calculability.[23] The same weapon can be fired in a variety of modes, from a variety of azimuths, and with a variety of warheads. The loss of this calculability, combined with the likely increase in the difficulties of surveillance or intelligence collection, will create a situation in which planners cannot confidently assign priorities to threats, and to budget accordingly. Any plausible attack scenario, and there will be many more of them, must be prepared for. The budgeting difficulties already now being experienced in terms of meeting

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 1. Comparative Technological Innovation in Offensive Strategic Weapons

Nature of Innovation	United States	Soviet Union
Atomic (nuclear explosion)	1945	1949
Intercontinental bomber operational	1948	1955
Hydrogen (thermonuclear) explosion	1951	1953
Deliverable thermonuclear weapon	1954	1955
Nuclear-powered submarine	1954	1958
First test of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)[21]	1958	1957
Operational ICBM	1960	1959
Operational submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)	1960	1957
Solid propellant ICBM operational	1962	1968
Test of multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) (U.S. deployment: 1964)	1962	1968
Test of multiple independently targettable reentry vehicle (MIRV)	1968	1973
ICBM with MIRVs operational	1970	1974/75
Test of modern long-range cruise missiles (ALCM, SLCM)	1976	1979 (?)
High operational ICBM accuracy (CEP* approximately .15 nautical mile)	1980	mid-1980s
Antisatellite weapons	mid-1980s	mid-1980s

*Circle of Equal Probability

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

threats of different types (expanding conventional naval forces versus protecting the new MX missile, for example) will become aggravated. Only a large, general, and sustained expansion of the defense budget can preclude a return to the interservice rivalries of the 1950s. Such an expansion is exceedingly rare in postwar American history. Public support for continuing high levels of defense spending declined rapidly even during the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. Yet each small increment of additional military capability will prove far more costly than the original building blocks of our defense in the 1950s and 1960s. Meanwhile, the "ultimate technological fix" will continue to elude our grasp.

A central paradox of nuclear deterrence is that it requires forces that are ambiguous in terms of the classic distinction between offense and defense. Technological innovation is reinforcing or heightening this basic ambiguity. Yet military prudence and service interests dictate that it be resolved in favor of worst-case assumptions about the intentions behind the adversary's weapons and their capacity to exploit emerging technologies rapidly.

As the hardware changes, so, in time, will our conceptions of nuclear forces, conflict, and strategy. As stated, the so-called gray-area systems are beginning to blur distinctions on which Western strategy has rested. The Triad concept will become increasingly irrelevant as a way of describing our forces, except at the most superficial level of combining land, sea, and air systems. The condition of reciprocal deterrence through threats effectively limited to each other's cities has been eroded by improved targeting options made possible through technological progress. Deterrence through superior war-fighting concepts and forces is more and more replacing deterrence through punitive retaliation.

The change in paradigm already beginning to manifest itself is likely to prove increasingly painful for Americans, once accustomed to, and still beguiled by, virtual nuclear supremacy. No such margin of advantage can be expected even from persistent technological leads now that the Soviet Union has developed a broad nuclear weapons base. Owing largely to technological innovation and the durability of the Soviet-American competition, the contingent and indeterminate quality of U.S. security foreseen at the time of Hiroshima and *Sputnik* is now being fully realized. Nearly all of the technological developments now on the horizon will increase the level of uncertainty and the sense of insecurity. And the quality of routine and crisis decision-making may decline under conditions of higher indeterminancy brought on by volatile technological change.

In a very real sense, Americans will have to accustom themselves to the kind of insecurity their West European allies have long lived with, their survival dependent on decisions made in distant capitals, and possessing no immunity from nuclear weapons effects. Increasing accuracy, shorter times to target, reduced decision or response time, larger numbers of more versatile weapons, and lengthening lists of feasible targets are creating circumstances for Americans similar to those Europeans have experienced for twenty-five years: life at the epicenter of a potential nuclear battlefield where the likelihood of intentional or accidental war is remote, but never quite remote enough.

The sense of confidence or concern that arises from these changing technological circumstances will not be the simple product of political calculations of profit and loss, of mathematical computations of conflict probability, or of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

objective evaluation of nuclear weapons and forces, as the debates over the missile gap and ICBM vulnerability have already revealed. Instead, reactions to the strategic environment of the future will be compounded of individual psychological or political predispositions and imaginative and apprehensive speculation about the meaning of each military innovation. And separate and cumulative technological developments will provide much to stir the national psyche and stimulate disputes in the 1980s and 1990s.

Moreover, because perceptions of security are influenced by complex individual, cultural, and other nonrational factors, U.S. ability to manipulate the perceptions of allies and adversaries through the deployment of advanced technologies—often argued as a major reason for producing new systems—will remain small. Indeed, such efforts to influence perceptions may even prove to be counterproductive.

If the strategic setting is as much in our minds as in objective factors—and not necessarily in the most analytical quarters of the cerebrum—the likely effect of the technological developments foreseeable in the next decade or two will be, not a rising sense of security, but growing fear and doubt.

REFERENCES

The author is greatly indebted to Harvey Brooks, Duncan L. Clarke, Sidney Drell, Richard L. Garwin, Colin S. Gray, Roger Molander, George W. Rathjens, Jack Ruina, Herbert Scoville, Jr., Kosta Tsipis, Herbert F. York, and Peter D. Zimmerman for their helpful comments on a draft of this paper. Responsibility for errors of fact or interpretation, however, rests solely with the author.

[1]I am particularly indebted to Richard Tarplin of Skidmore College for his ideas and research assistance in preparing this essay. Two documents that proved of great value were "Trends in the Technological Development of Nuclear Weapon Systems," an unpublished draft chapter prepared by Richard Garwin for the UN Group of Experts on a Comprehensive Study of Nuclear Weapons; and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's *Fiscal Year 1981 Arms Control Impact Statements*, Joint Committee Print of the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees, 96th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1980), hereinafter cited as *FY81 ACIS*.

[2]The earlier-than-expected detonation of a nuclear device or the launching of *Sputnik* might be regarded as "surprises." Yet they were more a product of barriers to intelligence collection and poor estimating. The surprise lay in the timing, not the development itself.

[3]Harvey Brooks, "The Military Innovation System and the Qualitative Arms Race," *Daedalus*, Summer 1975, p. 78. For a further elaboration of these themes, see the three-part series by Deborah Shapley, "Technology Creep and the Arms Race," *Science*, 201 (September 22, September 29, and October 20, 1978); and George W. Rathjens, "Nuclear War between the Super-powers," in *The Dangers of Nuclear War*, Franklyn Griffiths and John C. Polanyi (eds.) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979).

[4]This is not to suggest that the interaction is always beneficial, or beneficial in a linear way. For some nuclear war scenarios, there are diminishing returns from increased quantities of certain types of weapons, such as "hard-target killers," which may provoke preemption or reduce capacity to destroy area targets, and enhanced radiation warheads, which may invite escalation and restrict tactical maneuverability.

[5]The ability to destroy, with high confidence of success, most of an opponent's fixed ICBMs will likely remain beyond the reach of new technology, however, though the prospect continues to alarm some planners.

[6]To many, myself included, the political and military utility or desirability for either side of attacking many of these targets in a first strike is highly problematic, not to say implausible. Such is the nature of strategic planning and the state of mutual fear, however, that whatever scenario can be conceived as a possibility, even a remote one, is usually perceived as a threat. When "threat" is used here, therefore, it connotes the perception of a threat. Generally speaking, there are few satisfactory, objective criteria for determining what is a real threat and what is not, just as there are few agreed objective criteria for evaluating parity or what is stabilizing or destabilizing. This is made clear by repeated Soviet and American assertions that one or another weapon cannot legiti-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mately be viewed by the other as threatening, though almost invariably the item in question is so perceived.

[7]Garwin, "Trends in Technological Development," p. 24.

[8]See John D. Steinbruner and Thomas M. Garwin, "Strategic Vulnerability: The Balance Between Prudence and Paranoia," *International Security*, 1(1) (Summer 1976); and Robert R. Soule, *Counterforce Issues for the U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces*, Congressional Budget Office Background Paper (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 1978).

[9]I am grateful to Ambassador Thomas O. Enders for suggesting this possibility to me.

[10]See Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., *The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive*, U.S. Air Force Studies in Communist Affairs, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976); Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *International Security*, 3(1) (Summer 1978); and Robert L. Arnett, *Soviet Attitudes towards Nuclear Survival, 1962-1977*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1979.

[11]The term "battle management systems" is used in preference to the customary phrase "command, control, and communications systems" because it better connotes their ultimate purpose (although they are also used for routine noncombat functions), and because advancing technology makes it increasingly relevant to conceive of theater or strategic warfare in terms once associated with the battlefield. Many of the new systems, moreover, are capable of operating in a tactical, theater, or strategic mode.

[12]*FY81 ACIS*, p. 177.

[13]The United States launched a Nike-Zeus missile against a satellite well before the Soviet test of a co-orbiting killer satellite.

[14]*FY81 ACIS*, p. 208.

[15]Preferential, because the system would seek to defend only some of the shelters; which ones would theoretically not be known by the attacker.

[16]*FY81 ACIS*, p. 224.

[17]For an elaboration on passive defense technology, see William H. Kincade, "Repeating History: The Civil Defense Debate Renewed," *International Security*, 2(3) (Winter 1978).

[18]See Richard L. Garwin, "Charged-particle Beam Weapons?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 34(8) (October 1978); and John Parmentola and Kosta Tsipis, "Particle-beam Weapons," *Scientific American*, 240(4) (April 1979).

[19]For an overview of the state of technology in the late 1950s, see *Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age* (the "Gaither Report" of 1957), reissued by the Joint Committee on Defense Production, 94th Congress, 2d session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976).

[20]The view that an adversary's military capacity must be destroyed in addition to, or in lieu of, its cities is, of course, the core of classical strategy and, as such, has remained influential, if not decisive, in the development of American nuclear conflict planning. See David Alan Rosenberg, "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision," *The Journal of American History*, 66 (1) (June 1979); and Ronald L. Tammen, *MIRV and the Arms Race: An Interpretation of Defense Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1973), chapter 6, especially pp. 114-5. A school of revisionist critics espousing classical approaches to nuclear strategy now holds that the American preference for emphasizing the deterrent aspect of nuclear weapons was prompted by mistaken conceptions of the strategic competition, rather than by the limitations of the technologies of the 1950s and 1960s. The public record, albeit scanty, reveals that, on the contrary, the adherence to "hostage cities" deterrence was in large measure declaratory. Military forces were consistently targeted in the past, as prudence dictates they must be even in a countercity plan; only technology constrained the effectiveness of such counterforce targeting, to which a significant portion of the U.S. strategic inventory was allocated.

[21]The clumsy Soviet ICBM—which for lift-off had twenty rocket engines the size of the German V-2 rocket operating in tandem—provided essentially an emergency operational capability, and only a few dozen were deployed at most. The American Atlas ICBM tested in 1958 was a regular operational system, and over one hundred were deployed. In general, this summary overlooks such important qualitative differences.

[22]Conceptually, qualitative and quantitative advances could improve the capability of a nuclear force to survive a first strike and could thus, in principle, enhance what is called crisis stability. If current apprehensions about first-strike scenarios are a reliable guide, it seems more likely that such advances will be seen as increasing the adversary threat rather than assuring one's own counterpunch.

[23]It is fair to say that the progress made in strategic arms limitation in the 1970s was largely the product of a "political window" (détente) and a "technological window" (large, distinguishable strategic weapons). Should the political window reopen at some time in the future, it is unlikely that the technological window will also, given the comparative unverifiability of emerging small, concealable, and interchangeable weapons.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HARVEY BROOKS

Notes on Some Issues on Technology and National Defense

TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT is an increasingly influential parameter driving the military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Moreover, as the weapons technology developed by the major powers diffuses ever more rapidly to the rest of the world, it becomes a more significant element in local and regional military balances, and even in the relationship between governors and governed within single nations. Yet technology alone is seldom a determining factor. The American experience in Vietnam showed that technological dominance cannot guarantee military victory irrespective of political circumstances. The Iranian revolution showed similarly that a government's command of sophisticated instruments of military and communications technology cannot guarantee its survival over the mobilized opposition of groups among its own subjects.[1] New technological instruments appear to have augmented the power of determined minorities to paralyze governance and bring well-ordered societies to a standstill.[2]

Two papers in this double issue of *Daedalus* deal explicitly with technology as a parameter in the military balance; both are concerned mainly with the influence of technology on the strategic competition between the superpowers. William Kincade's paper in this volume provides a comprehensive review of the effect of selected technological developments such as "smart weapons" or antisatellite techniques on the military balance; Sidney Drell's paper in the Fall issue raises the question whether the technological means available to the superpowers constitute tools that simply are not matched to any political ends that might justify their use. The availability of such means, even when unused, in the background of every conflict changes the context of any attempt at the measured use of military force for limited political objectives. But the same disparity between available technological means and political ends appears to apply at many different levels of conflict.

In these notes I would like to make some observations on five selected issues that seem to me to underly much discussion about military technology and that do not seem to be treated by the other authors in these volumes. In general, my discussion will raise more questions than it answers, but I think these questions are worth bearing in mind as one reviews the various perspectives on U.S. defense posture.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Superior Innovative Capacity of the United States

The three decades following World War II were years of unique American dominance in both civilian and military science and technology. Although its dominance in manufacturing technology goes back to the 1870s, U.S. preeminence in science and in military technology is largely a postwar phenomenon. Nevertheless, it has come to be taken for granted, though we are now in a period of agonizing reappraisal, particularly with respect to technology and both our domestic economy and our competitiveness in international trade. The causes of our economic and trade lag are complex and much debated, and there is by no means a consensus that the difficulties center primarily in science and technology or in a failure to innovate per se. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that as a nation we face unprecedented challenges in our capacity to use science and technology for economic and social purposes, and that our uniqueness as a source of innovation is disappearing—an inevitable development, given the essential indivisibility of scientific and technological knowledge and skills.

In the military sphere, there is equal concern with the U.S. lag in the weapons competition with the Soviet Union, but so far this concern has centered more on quantitative than on qualitative factors. Little doubt has been expressed since the days of *Sputnik* about our capacity to "out-invent" the Soviets in weaponry if we wish to. Our rapid recovery from the technological surprise of *Sputnik* reinforced self-confidence in our underlying innovative capacity. Our defense policy is predicated on the assumption that the United States leads the world in technology and that a vigorous military R&D program is our best insurance against technological surprise and, indeed, against the need to maintain numerical superiority. Even when the superiority of U.S. technology is not asserted as a fact, it seems to be implicit in much military planning and in popular discussion of the military balance. Indeed, it might be argued that the doctrine of U.S. superior innovative capacity has become a psychological equivalent to the Maginot Line in prewar France. It appears to remain an article of faith in NATO. This doctrine has two aspects: the belief in Yankee ingenuity and the capacity for innovation, and faith in technology itself as a substitute, or surrogate, for all-around military capability. We believe there is a technological "fix" for every military problem—a fix that can become a substitute for manpower, logistics, training, tactics, political determination, or diplomatic skill.

Clearly, one problem with our confidence in technology and in our technological prowess is that it often overlooks the asymmetries between ourselves and our opponents. Because of the openness of our system, innovations are rapidly adopted by our opponents (as is well illustrated by Table 1 in Kincade's paper), and in proposing innovations, we often fail to envision the military situation that will exist when both sides have acquired similar capabilities. MIRV, adopted posthaste to counter an apparently mythical Soviet ABM, has left us with a situation in which the MIRVing of heavy Russian missiles casts doubt on the survivability of our land-based ICBM forces. Would the Russians also have moved more slowly on MIRV if we had been more restrained in its testing and deployment? Would moderate progress have slowed the Russian buildup and permitted a less pressured SALT II negotiation? More generally, one can question whether the most recent round of strategic technological initiatives in the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

United States will have more than a highly temporary effect on the strategic balance. Will American advances in ASW technology ultimately cast doubt not only on the survivability of the Russian SLBM force, but also on our own second-strike capacity?

At a more fundamental—and disturbing—level, we must ask how long we can count even on superior U.S. innovative capacity. Will the erosion of U.S. inventiveness that some believe has set in, in the civilian sphere begin to affect the military as well? It is obvious that the Soviets are very conscious of their technological lag, and that a great deal of soul-searching is going on regarding the causes of their inability to get a new technology into production. Clearly, they view U.S. innovative capacity as one of our greatest military assets, and they will strive as hard to overcome their lag in this area as they do in other specific technologies. But is this lag so inherent in the structure of their social system, that overcoming it requires compromises in basic features of their system that the leadership will be unwilling to make? This is the comforting belief of many American observers, but it rests mostly on observations of those parts of the Soviet R&D industrial establishments that are open to Western visitors.[3] There is little knowledge of the military R&D system, and experience suggests that the Soviet system can overcome lags in specific areas, given sufficient priority and resources.[4] Both in numerical terms and in the quality of individual performers, the Russian technical establishment is impressive. Even in the civilian sphere, Western commentators are puzzled by its poor performance, considering its potential and the resources and support that go into it. Contrary to what many people believe, there is a striking parallel between the U.S. R&D establishment at the beginning of the twentieth century and the present Soviet establishment. Both manpower and support already exceeded that in Europe, yet the performance of the American system lagged behind that of Europe in almost every dimension except mechanical inventiveness. It is at least conceivable that the Russian technical establishment may be on the threshold of a take-off similar to that which occurred in the United States during and after World War II. The potential is certainly there, and we cannot be completely confident that the inherent characteristics of the communist system will prevent its full exploitation.

Should we find ourselves suddenly in a situation where innovative military technologies appeared in the Soviet Union before the United States, the political shock would probably be much greater than that which resulted from the unexpectedly rapid Russian success in catching up to U.S. achievements. Indeed, *Sputnik* appeared to be such an achievement, although we now know that it rested on a very narrow technological base that was quickly overtaken by U.S. efforts. But the political consequences of even that success were extraordinary, and the tide was only turned by a rapid and determined U.S. reaction of unprecedented proportions, culminating in the success of Apollo in 1969.

I do not pretend to know the answers to these questions. There are many who believe that the United States paid dearly for its military-space buildup of the 1960s, and that many of our economic difficulties today stem from the distortion of the economy and of the national R&D focus that began during that period.[5] These commentators believe that, rather than being complementary, military-space R&D and economically oriented R&D are in competition, and that

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

we can achieve a precarious military "superiority" only at the price of a general deterioration of the U.S. economic position and consequent political influence in the world. Others believe that superior innovative capacity in the military sphere must remain primary, and that it is the *sine qua non* of political clout. They also tend to believe that military and civilian R&D are complementary and mutually reinforcing, as exemplified in U.S. economic performance in civil aircraft, space communications, computers, and (until recently) nuclear power.

Quality versus Quantity

Closely related to our faith in the power of military technology is our propensity for ever more expensive and complex weapons systems—so expensive that they cannot be procured in sufficient numbers for military effectiveness. This applies principally to nonnuclear weapons. Indeed, our inability to deploy conventional weapons in militarily effective numbers may have caused us to rely too much on tactical nuclear weapons and thus on a defensive conventional strategy with a low threshold for the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons. The situation is aggravated by large positive feedback in the weapons procurement loop. Expensive weapons mean small production runs stretched over many budget years, with consequent failure to realize many potential economies of scale. Efforts to mitigate this problem by standardization in NATO and by foreign military sales have not been successful, and, indeed, have been the source of political problems in the alliance.

Gold-plating of weapons is not a new problem; it has been debated within the defense establishment since the mid-fifties. Yet almost every effort to develop a "simple" weapons system has ended in a creeping escalation of technical requirements that in turn has eventuated in an end-product almost unrecognizable in comparison with the original concept. It is pointed out in justification that a weapon even marginally inferior to the opponent's can be of no value at all, and it is therefore necessary to design weapons to meet the most sophisticated opposition that can be brought against them, even though they may be overdesigned for many situations.

There has been some toying with the concept of a "high-low mix"—a combination of a few very sophisticated weapons with much larger numbers of simple, cheap weapons that could be used in "brush-fire wars." Apparently this has not worked out in practice. A reasonable stopping point in qualitative improvements in performance has rarely been found, despite valiant efforts and cost-effectiveness tradeoff studies introduced by top management at the Department of Defense. This problem is a thread running through hundreds of weapons systems—battle tanks, aircraft carriers, fighter-bomber aircraft, air defense weapons, even strategic missile submarines. In fact, the new Trident submarine, with its special basing mode, is a prime example of how the problem arises.[6] Furthermore, as the weapons systems become more valuable, they also become more valuable as targets, and hence warrant more and more sophisticated defenses. This often results in very little residual offensive capability, as appears to be the case for the modern nuclear aircraft carrier. The defensive armament and protective ancillary weapons systems (e.g., nuclear escorts for nuclear carriers) in turn add to the overall systems cost. In addition, when such valuable weapons systems are risked in marginal situations, difficult political

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tradeoffs may be involved. One can ask, of course, whether this is good or bad. That the United States may be willing to expose an extremely valuable carrier provides both a temptation and a deterrent—a temptation, because the loss of such a carrier could be a tremendous blow to U.S. policy and political purpose in a given situation; a deterrent, because the loss of such a valuable target could lead to an escalation of unknown dimensions and consequences, thus encouraging restraint on the part of the enemy.

The unsuccessful effort to rescue the Iranian hostages provides an interesting illustration of the set of problems created by the elaboration of weapons technology. It is probably fortunate that the operation terminated as and when it did, for the contingency plans (at least as reported in *The New York Times*) would have probably escalated the operation into a major battle, possibly resulting in Soviet intervention. This escalation (strafing of the approaches to the Embassy, pinpoint bombing of military installations around Teheran) was in the plans largely because it was technically possible, forced into consideration without full assessment of political consequences. Such contingency plans tend to be the inevitable accompaniment of sophisticated technological operations.

It is interesting to speculate whether the trend described above may be coming to an end. Technology now makes possible the substitution of automatically guided vehicles (RPVs) for manned tactical aircraft in the battlefield. Remote-controlled land vehicles are not far behind. At a higher strategic level we expect to see increased use of long-range standoff "smart" weapons from aircraft, ships, and submarines. Both RPVs and standoff weapons can be cheaper and more expendable because there is no highly trained pilot to be defended and returned to fight another day. The sophisticated launch vehicle can be withdrawn to a less exposed situation. However, it is not clear how this will ultimately come out. In principle, vehicles with long-range standoff weapons can always be countered by long-range counterweapons, whether these are aircraft, ships, or land-based vehicles. It seems that the question cannot be answered in terms of general principles. Rather, it is necessary to look at concrete weapons systems on a case-by-case basis, and the situation may evolve very rapidly over time in a technological duel between force and counterforce, with ever more sophisticated decoying and jamming techniques. Also, although the individual weapons may be simplified in this evolution, the weapons system as a whole may be more elaborate and expensive, and may require ever more elaborate command and control. Nevertheless, the amount of effective firepower that could be embodied in a given system may increase, thus providing more "bang for the buck" even with conventional warheads. It remains to be seen.

Offense and Defense

The preceding section suggests how the duel between offensive and defensive capabilities has tended to result in ever more sophisticated and expensive weapons systems, with smaller numbers, at least in the U.S. arsenal. Can we now say anything meaningful about the likely outcome of this duel as technology advances?

Clearly, in the field of strategic weapons, especially ballistic missiles, the outcome has been acknowledged to favor the offense. The signing of the ABM treaty in SALT I is ratification of this fact. Whether this resolution is temporary

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or permanent, however, is more difficult to say. The ABM treaty was possible not because ballistic missile defense was believed to be impossible, but because the incremental tradeoff between offensive and defensive capacity made increased offense cheaper than the defense needed to neutralize it. This tradeoff could change, especially for hard-point ABM defenses of missile silos. Indeed, several authors in these volumes have raised the issue whether the introduction of hard-point defense may be necessary to preserve the survivability of land-based ICBMs and, hence, the stability of the strategic standoff.[7] I will not address this question here.

In the domain of conventional warfare, the offense-defense balance is much more complex. The advent of precision-guided battlefield weapons (PGMs) has led some to assert that the advantage has shifted in favor of the defense in the NATO battle, an argument used to rationalize the large Warsaw Pact superiority in battle tanks. A similar advantage for the defense may be in the making for SAMs against manned aircraft. In each case, a relatively cheap, but highly sophisticated and accurate, weapon can be used to counter an expensive manned vehicle. There is much room for debate whether this is a temporary situation, such that the race between measure and countermeasure will ultimately shift back in favor of the offense. This might happen, for example, through the introduction of remote-controlled unmanned vehicles, for which much greater attrition could be tolerated than for manned vehicles. In addition, PGMs can often be defeated by relatively simple improvised countermeasures, including various kinds of decoys. There do not appear to be any generalized answers to these kinds of questions. A situation that seems well defined today may be subject to quite rapid change.

In the long run, the criterion for the offense-defense balance is the comparison of the incremental costs of measures and countermeasures. If the countermeasures to a given incremental offensive capability are consistently cheaper, the defense will tend to dominate, and vice versa. This puts a large premium on ingenuity and inventiveness, since these might greatly reduce the incremental cost of countermeasures. That is why the question of U.S. innovative capacity may be so important.

There is also the question of the significance of defensive weapons in more localized situations. Are developments in air defense missiles—for example, highly mobile SAMs—likely to defeat the "police" powers of carrier and battlefield aircraft, perhaps even down to the guerrilla level? This discussion is complicated by the ability of aircraft to defeat, with relatively inexpensive countermeasures, all but the most sophisticated SAM systems.

A related problem may be the future role of the CVA (attack aircraft carrier) in the light of technological developments in sea-based standoff weapons. There are, for example, submarine-to-surface and air-to-surface cruise missiles that might be fired outside the range of ASW and antiaircraft screens. This raises the question whether the aircraft carrier will gradually be replaced by large submersibles equipped with remote-controlled vehicles or cruise missiles to replace the functions of manned carrier aircraft. Here the question of command and control may be a crucial determining factor. Does the target acquisition and identification capability of manned aircraft outweigh the vulnerabilities associated with the CVA-manned aircraft combination? Can a dispatcher aboard a submarine have a sufficiently clear picture of the situation ashore entirely

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

through remote sensing and communications methods, so that he can intervene there effectively with remote-controlled vehicles or weapons?

Command and Control

There is a widespread sense that our weapons systems have become so complex, that we can no longer effectively control them. The failure of the Iranian hostage rescue mission adumbrated the difficulty of controlling even a relatively modest operation involving a great deal of technology, and there are many other examples in recent years of the breakdown of command and control or failures of communications. Furthermore, technological innovation with respect to weapons used in the battlefield has gone through so many generations, that military planning has become increasingly remote from practical command experience. The realities of the battlefield become more and more difficult to simulate either in maneuvers or in models. We do not really know whether theater or local commanders can retain control of all the many weapons theoretically at their disposal, or whether they will have a clear enough picture of what is happening in the battlefield to use the weapons effectively. This situation was bad enough even under the immensely simpler conditions of World War II. There is a belief that vastly more capable communications and sensors and information-processing capabilities will overcome these limitations, but the increasing limitations on simulating realistic conditions make this uncertain. The situation is bad enough with conventional weapons. It will be much, much worse in the presence of battlefield nuclear weapons; simulation of battle conditions here becomes orders of magnitude more remote from reality.

The command and control problem extends from the level of police activities in primitive areas to the level of management of our strategic deterrent. Furthermore, as fear mounts regarding the vulnerability of various levels of deterrent—from theater to strategic forces—the temptation is to try to increase the rate of response of the command and control system, and this leads to greater automation. While automation may decrease the likelihood of small errors, or cumulations of human errors, we know little about how automated command and control systems might degrade with respect to various malfunctions. This may be known to people on the inside, but that it is not subject to public scrutiny (in contrast, for example, to nuclear reactor safety) may ultimately result in a sudden, severe erosion of public confidence in the systems that ensure against catastrophic malfunction.

In short, the uncertainties surrounding the nature of real conflicts are tremendous and increasing. The war of the future, even the nonnuclear war, has become increasingly remote from experience and precedent. Humanity has no experience with the magnitude of technological change that now takes place between successive conflicts. The Vietnams and the wars in the Middle East are too remote from, say, the NATO battlefield to provide useful lessons.

Logistic Requirements of Modern Battle

The striking feature of the last Egyptian-Israeli war was the extraordinary rate of expenditure of quite expensive and sophisticated military equipment.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The outcome was to a large extent determined by the ability or willingness of the superpowers to resupply their clients and to accept the risks of escalation associated with their attempts to do so. There is great concern over U.S. ability to resupply a battle of any duration in the NATO area. The whole question of the technology of resupply is extraordinarily complex and has received little public discussion. Precision weapons of high-kill probability may reduce logistic requirements, but this has never been tested or proved in practice. This issue has been brought to the fore recently because of impressive demonstrations of Soviet capability for long-range resupply in distant areas. Is the United States being squeezed out of areas vital for its survival because of the changing balance between their resupply capability and that of the Soviet Union?

In these notes I have tried to raise a series of questions broadly related to the impact of technology on military operations at all levels of conflict. I have not been able to provide definite answers to these questions. My purpose, rather, has been to provide a sort of typology of issues related to technology and war that deserve a lot more discussion than I have seen or than seems to be represented in most of the discussion in these volumes.

References

[1]M. Tehranian, "Iran: Communication, Alienation, Revolution," *Communication Policy*, 7 (March 1979): 6-12.

[2]David Apter, "Notes on the Underground: Left Violence and the National State," *Daedalus*, Fall 1979.

[3]Thane Gustafson, "Why Doesn't Soviet Science Do Better than It Does?" in *The Social Context of Soviet Science*, L. L. Lubrano and S. G. Solomon (eds.) (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980).

[4]D. Holloway, "The Soviet Style of Military R.&D.," in *The Genesis of New Weapons: Decision-Making for Military R.&D.*, F. A. Long and J. Reppy (eds.) (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp. 137-60.

[5]J. H. Hollomon and A. E. Harger, "America's Technological Dilemma," *Technology Review*, July/August 1971.

[6]G. W. Rathjens and J. P. Ruina, "Trident," in *The Future of the Sea-Based Deterrent* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973), pp. 53-76.

[7]For example, see the article by Jan Lodal in the Fall 1980 issue of *Daedalus*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JOSEPH J. KRUZEL

Arms Control and American Defense Policy: New Alternatives and Old Realities

By 1980 THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE toward superpower arms control had come full circle, back to the early postwar disappointment and skepticism over efforts to ban nuclear weapons first put forward in the Baruch Plan of 1946. From that early effort through the unproductive wranglings of the 1950s over general and complete disarmament, the United States and Soviet Union moved cautiously to the successful conclusion in 1963 of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Less than a decade later came the crowning achievement of superpower arms control, the signing and ratification of the SALT I accords in 1972.

SALT I and the flurry of American arms control activity that followed it were based on the belief that the United States and the Soviet Union had finally come to appreciate their mutual interest in negotiating restraint on military armaments. But by the end of the 1970s superpower arms control had produced little in the way of meaningful results. President Carter's commitments in 1977 to restrain superpower armaments, nuclear proliferation, and conventional arms trade had all collapsed by 1979. In this new decade the United States has once again begun to doubt that it and the Soviet Union share a common purpose, and is skeptical about the role arms control can play in stabilizing or improving its relationship with that country.

SALT II was shelved in early 1980 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but disenchantment with arms control had been mounting for some time. Critics argued that arms control had come to be seen as an end in itself, pursued energetically but without much sense of purpose or direction. Many early proponents of arms control had become disillusioned and had come to see the process as fraudulent, as nothing more than the legitimation of the arms race in the guise of restraint. For some, superpower arms control had revealed itself to be a meaningless diversion with no real impact on the military forces or policies of either side. Many would agree with Walter Mondale who, as a Senator in 1975, said SALT appeared to be nothing more than the stapling together of the defense programs of the two sides. By 1980 even the most ardent supporters of arms control were forced to concede that the process had produced depressingly meager results for so great an input of time and energy. Particularly in SALT, the gap between initial expectations and ultimate results was enormous.

What went wrong? Was the entire enterprise of superpower arms control doomed from the start, preordained to failure by irreconcilable differences in perception and motivation? Were incompetent negotiators at fault? Or was it

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

intransigent bureaucrats in Washington and Moscow who were blocking opportunities for more meaningful progress? Or do such questions suggest too bleak a view of the arms control record? There may be more to arms control than has generally been acknowledged of late, when the process has fallen into disrepute, if not disgrace. The failure of arms control to produce results that matched initial expectations may have blinded observers to the modest, but nonetheless useful, contributions the process has made to international security.

With twenty years of serious superpower arms control negotiations behind us, including more than a decade of SALT, it should be possible to develop some perspective on arms control, to think of it as a process rather than as a series of unrelated episodes. It should also be possible to make some tentative evaluation of costs and benefits and to determine what role, if any, arms control should play in future relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Was superpower arms control a noble and important experiment, worth attempting but ultimately unproductive, even counterproductive? Or is it a process that, despite obvious limitations, should remain an important element of the politico-military strategy of the two superpowers in the 1980s?

A Decade of SALT

SALT was the centerpiece of superpower arms control, the major achievement of the process, the only negotiation to deal directly with central strategic weapons. It is therefore appropriate that SALT should bear the heaviest burden of judgment about U.S.-Soviet efforts to control arms.

The doctrinal impetus for SALT came from the growing conviction of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and other senior government officials in the mid-1960s that a nuclear strategy based on a combination of offensive counterforce capabilities and a thick nationwide ballistic missile defense was a sure prescription for a destabilizing and expensive arms race. McNamara repudiated his earlier "no cities" strategy and declared that a doctrine of mutual vulnerability was the only route to strategic stability in the nuclear age.

McNamara's conversion was reflected more in declaratory policy than in military capability. Although the United States abandoned its plans to deploy an ABM system and drastically scaled down its civil defense efforts, strategic planners throughout the 1960s and 1970s continued to improve U.S. counterforce capability and to expand coverage of Soviet military targets. But, while the American counterforce capability continued to grow, so did the belief in the doctrine of assured destruction and in the overriding importance of stability in the strategic relationship of the United States and Soviet Union. These two concepts, assured destruction and stability, became the doctrinal leitmotiv of U.S. nuclear policy and the basis for the entire SALT experience.

Whatever attracted the Soviets to SALT, it was almost certainly not the benefits of mutual assured destruction and the paramount importance of stability. Soviet military literature before SALT consistently emphasized a war-fighting counterforce doctrine. In the pre-SALT era the Soviets saw nothing wrong with threatening the military forces of the other side, and positive virtue in striving to protect their own population, shown by their early enthusiasm for ABM.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Many American defense officials and analysts in the late 1960s conceded this difference in perspective, but hoped SALT would educate the Soviets about the folly of the arms race and the merits of mutual vulnerability. To some extent this hope paid off. The Soviets did sign the ABM treaty and generally abided by its provisions. Moreover, some of their doctrinal pronouncements during the SALT decade showed a keener appreciation of the horrific consequence of nuclear war.[1] But, in the main, the Soviets continued to stress war-fighting capability in their literature and in their force deployments.

They built a strategic offensive missile force capable of destroying most of the American Minuteman force in a preemptive attack, and did not apologize for posing such a threat. They continued vigorous support for civil defense and antisatellite capabilities, and they sustained a major investment in ABM research and development. The Soviets may have been forced to recognize the fact of strategic vulnerability, but they seemed neither to grow fond of it nor to accept its inevitability.

It is not surprising that the SALT decade produced no convergence on nuclear doctrine between the United States and Soviet Union. Perhaps it was naive, or even arrogant, to expect that SALT would stimulate a great bilateral debate over nuclear strategy. What is surprising, however, is the lack of debate within the United States about the relationship of SALT to American nuclear strategy.

Arguments about SALT in the United States tended to deal with immediate issues at hand—proposals under negotiation at the time or agreements pending ratification—and debate revolved around two criteria of judgment: balance and verifiability. These two measures became the ultimate tests of acceptability for an agreement. When supporters praised an agreement, they stressed the fact that its provisions were equitable and adequately verifiable. Opponents tended to criticize an accord for its deficiencies in satisfying these two conditions. An agreement was unacceptable either because it conferred unfair advantage on an opponent or because it offered tempting opportunities to cheat.

Few people involved in the mainstream of SALT debate paid much attention to the broader questions and underlying assumptions about defense strategy that made SALT worth pursuing in the first place. The SALT II debate was an exception, but not a particularly constructive one. The debate over SALT II did not focus, as it might have, on technical arguments about balance and compliance—in fact, it never really had a focus—but came eventually to rest on questions far beyond the scope of the accord: the proper increase in the defense budget to accompany the agreement, the sincerity of the Carter Administration's commitment to such a spending increase, the significance of the Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba.

Even the ABM treaty of 1972, which reduced ballistic missile defense to trivial levels and which passed the Senate by the resounding margin of eighty-eight to two, did not occasion any serious debate about the merits of mutual vulnerability. The debate focused instead on technical details of the balance and prospects for detecting cheating. It did not deal with the morality of hostage theory or raise the quesiton of whether assured destruction was a temporary arrangement, forced on us by our technical limitations in constructing a workable ballistic missile defense or a status we desired to perpetuate.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Throughout the SALT decade a few strategic analysts firmly and fervently opposed the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, but they were never able to make their concerns the focus of discussion. "Responsible" argument about SALT dealt with questions of equity, verifiability, and impact on U.S. strategic weapons programs. The absence of a serious debate about MAD is all the more surprising, since even the staunchest advocates of the doctrine concede that it is far from the ideal solution to the nuclear dilemma.

The importance of nuclear parity, or rough equivalence as it was sometimes called, also escaped serious challenge during the decade of SALT debate. Once again, responsible opinion assumed away questions about the merits of strategic parity. The condition was presented as, self-evidently, the only alternative to a destabilizing, expensive, and ultimately counterproductive arms race. While the prospect of Soviet strategic superiority was especially condemned, the idea of American superiority was also thought to be dangerous.[2] The question of whether there might be some virtue in American nuclear superiority was a theme pursued enthusiastically in the more hawkish journals of defense strategy, but it never became a serious issue for discussion in the mainstream of the SALT debate. No Senator ever said he opposed a SALT agreement because he objected to the idea of strategic parity. No one demurred from the notion that the most we could hope to derive from nuclear weapons was deterrence of nuclear attacks by other states.

By the beginning of 1980 the two concepts of mutual vulnerability and parity had come under increasing criticism, along with the SALT process itself. It is worth noting, however, that it was not so much SALT that drove the United States to accept mutual vulnerability and strategic parity; rather, it was the acceptance of these concepts that made SALT possible. The real impact of SALT was not to *impose* the ideas of MAD and stability, but to give them a legitimacy and immunity to challenge they did not deserve. SALT enshrined mutual assured destruction and strategic parity; it made challenges to these *idées fixes* illegitimate, irresponsible, and beyond the pale of reasonable debate.

Arms Control and Bureaucratic Politics

SALT also had two important bureaucratic consequences. First, the pursuit of SALT agreements occupied the time and attention of policymakers who might otherwise have thought more deeply about nuclear strategy and doctrine. SALT was a major objective of each American administration of the 1970s—Nixon's, Ford's, and Carter's—with new agreements avidly pursued by each incumbent and his national security apparatus. In bureaucratic terms, this meant an interminable progression of meetings, studies, and decision memoranda.[3] This was full-time work for harried bureaucrats and senior national security officials. The short-term and immediate pursuit of SALT accords made it difficult for the government to focus on long-term and less time-urgent direction for strategic nuclear policy.

Second, the pursuit of strategic arms agreements served to highlight the arms control aspects and implications of defense planning. Since there is no natural constituency within the government for arms control, some increased sensitivity to arms control perspectives was undoubtedly beneficial. If nothing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

else, it forced the government to take more explicit account of the consequences of weapons and policy decisions that might otherwise have been set aside. It was also useful to try to inject such considerations into the decision-making process before weapons choices acquired a momentum of their own that would be difficult to deflect. Nonetheless, it is possible to pay too much attention to arms control. Since consistency with SALT proposals on the table is easier to achieve than consistency with the long-term objectives of defense strategy, there is the risk that decisions about weapons programs will be shaped more by immediate concerns about arms control than by more distant objectives of defense strategy. The "racetrack" basing mode chosen for the MX missile in the fall of 1979 was a good example of a weapon decision dominated by arms control considerations.

The government's experience with arms control impact statements has struck very few people as a useful means of bringing arms control considerations to bear on national security decisions. PD-50, a White House directive signed by Brzezinski in the fall of 1979, was a clear acknowledgment that arms control was shaping defense policy rather than vice versa, and that priorities needed to be set right.

The New Nuclear Debate

SALT II was not shelved because of uneasiness over the doctrinal basis of SALT, although the debate reflected a general malaise about the strategic future, with or without SALT II. With SALT on the shelf, however, there was an increased willingness to challenge the fundamental doctrinal assumptions of the SALT decade.

Any serious discussion about the evolution of American nuclear strategy must address two central questions. The first concerns the purpose of the U.S. strategic nuclear offensive arsenal. How does this force work to reduce, as much as possible, any temptation on the part of a potential adversary to use nuclear weapons against the United States?

The *1981 Department of Defense Annual Report* offers an answer that goes beyond traditional incantations about maintaining an assured destruction capability and essential equivalence. The United States will deter nuclear war, the report says, by denying a potential aggressor any plausible outcome that would represent success. This "countervailing strategy" would inflict higher costs on an opponent "than the value he might expect to gain from partial or full-scale attacks on the United States and its allies."[4]

One must ask, as the Defense Report does not, whether this objective can be realized with a strategic nuclear force essentially equivalent to that of the Soviet Union. Does acceptance of nuclear parity mean that in practical terms the United States has foresworn the option of taking the strategic initiative or the possibility of dominating a process of nuclear escalation?[5] Or is it possible that more flexible and responsive forces could give the United States a nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union even if the forces of the two sides were numerically equal?

If the United States is intent on denying an opponent any gain from attacks on allies, it is not obvious that such a mission can be accomplished with a strategic force approximately equal in size and capability to that of its principal adver-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sary. Can the United States have parity and offer a nuclear guarantee of minimal credibility?[6] And would strategic superiority—were it achievable—make extended deterrence any more credible?

This line of inquiry deserves more serious attention than it has received by American administrations over the past decade. Essential equivalence may well be in the national interest, but that determination involves a more candid assessment of costs and benefits than it has so far officially received.

A second question for debate involves the future of U.S. strategic defensive forces. Is the American commitment to the doctrine of mutual vulnerability permanent and absolute or temporary and conditional? Is mutual assured destruction our last best hope for survival in the nuclear age or a perversity that is tolerable only because technology has not yet offered the option of a workable ballistic missile defense at an acceptable cost? What kind of ABM system, at what cost and with what effectiveness, would tempt us to undertake such a program?

The SALT-prescribed answer is clear. The United States has signed and ratified an ABM treaty of indefinite duration. The treaty is reviewed every five years by the two signatories, but there is no reason to expect that it will not remain in force. Despite this commitment, the United States and the Soviet Union spend a great deal on ABM research and development, and new "exotic" systems on the technical horizon may dramatically alter the prospects for a cost-effective BMD. The American attraction to mutual assured destruction would be sorely tempted by the availability of a ballistic missile defense system that could be built at an "acceptable" cost. The Soviets undoubtedly will gladly sacrifice the presumed benefits of mutual assured destruction for a working BMD system when their technology permits such a choice to be made.

Debate over these two questions will go a long way toward clarifying future U.S. interest in strategic arms control. If parity is determined to be our preferred national goal, agreements on strategic offensive forces, perhaps even involving substantial numerical reductions, ought to be avidly pursued. On the other hand, if parity is deemed inconsistent with American defense and foreign policy objectives, we should either revise our objectives or reassess our commitment to strategic arms control. If the U.S. commitment to the ABM treaty is less than absolute, we should consider whether the treaty serves a useful purpose by remaining in force until the United States is prepared to build a BMD.

The Future of Strategic Arms Control

Without anticipating the outcome of a domestic debate over the future of U.S. strategic nuclear policy, it may be useful to sketch out a number of alternative futures for SALT, to explore where the process can go from here.

The first alternative would be to continue SALT more or less as before, attempting to negotiate reasonably comprehensive agreements on the major strategic weapon systems of the two sides. Such a course could not, however, be a simple continuation of SALT as it was conducted between 1969 and 1979.

The SALT II agreement concluded in June 1979 will almost certainly have to be modified before it would be acceptable to the two negotiating parties. The original SALT II protocol was scheduled to expire at the end of 1981; the treaty

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

itself terminated in 1985. These were modest durations even in 1979, and if the agreement is to have any appeal in the 1980s, something will have to be done to extend its life span.

During the SALT debate many senators proposed combining SALT II and SALT III, and resuming negotiations without ever putting the SALT II package up for ratification. This move was vigorously opposed by the Carter Administration at the time, but it may be the only option open to those who would like to continue the SALT process in anything like its original format. The United States and the Soviet Union could simply move on to SALT III negotiations without ratifying SALT II.

There are elements of SALT II that both sides are probably interested in retaining. The aggregate limitations on numbers of strategic offensive forces put upper limits on the force deployments of each party and thereby rule out greater-than-expected threats. Despite this common interest, the two parties will find a reconvened SALT a much more difficult negotiation than either SALT I or II for a number of reasons. For one, the United States has developed a new toughness toward the Soviet Union and a greater skepticism about the benefits of arms control. This attitude is clearly reflected in the increasing conservatism of the Senate, which will be more demanding of a new SALT agreement than it was of SALT II. But a reconvened SALT negotiation faces serious challenges before it ever gets to a vote on ratification. Any new SALT negotiation will involve a more ambitious set of objectives, a broader range of weapon systems, and a wider array of national interests.

Even if the political conditions for SALT could be restored, there is still the question of what strategic arms control will be able to do in an increasingly complex and more demanding technical environment. Our European allies will insist that Soviet Euro-strategic systems like the Backfire bomber and SS-20 missile be somehow taken into account in SALT III. If SALT II took nearly seven years to negotiate, how many years would it take to conclude SALT III, particularly if the talks are expected to produce a "better" agreement?

There will be no return to business as usual in SALT, no simple resumption of the bipolar dialogue of the 1970s. Even the most optimistic vision of the future of SALT is for negotiations far more difficult than those of the previous decade.

Small Is Beautiful

A second alternative would be to scale down the entire SALT process. The negotiation could become a less ambitious enterprise directed toward securing more limited and more frequently concluded agreements of shorter duration.[7] This option holds particular appeal to supporters of arms control who recognize that the SALT experience to date has not produced dazzling results.

For many people, the lesson of SALT II was that comprehensive agreements take too long to negotiate. Negotiation may eventually produce an accord, but by the time it is concluded the central provisions may no longer be relevant to the strategic concerns that originally inspired the talks. Moreover, to justify the length of the negotiations, governments are forced to inflate claims for the prospective accord. The ultimate result is an agreement almost bound to be a disap-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pointment. A search for comprehensive accords is therefore self-defeating. Comprehensiveness is unattainable in arms control, and the search for it may miss opportunities for more feasible and modest progress.

A scaling down of ambitions in SALT would have the apparent virtue of making agreements more negotiable, but would also pose its own difficulties. Strategic arms agreements tend to have a rechanneling effect that shifts momentum from limited areas to nonlimited ones. More modest agreements can be more easily circumvented than more comprehensive accords.

It may also be that only through efforts to secure fairly comprehensive agreements can strategic arms control make any meaningful impact on superpower arms competition. Ambitious undertakings may be necessary to produce even modest results. With more modest goals, the process itself may collapse, and nothing would be accomplished. The "small is beautiful" approach runs the risk of making strategic arms control more peripheral and less relevant than it already is. Still, scaling down SALT might ensure its continuance, and could restore the confidence in arms control so necessary to conclude—and see through to ratification—more comprehensive accords. Additionally, this alternative has the unassailable virtue of being a novel approach at a time when arms control enthusiasts are eager to try something new.

Other SALT Futures

Rather than a search for either comprehensive or modest agreements, a third alternative would be to transform SALT from an effort aimed at negotiating formal treaties or executive agreements to one in which the two sides seek informal and conditional accords. One side might propose, for example, to refrain from some action so long as the other side observed a specified *quid pro quo*. Conversely, and more positively, one side could offer to stop some action or reduce some component of its strategic forces if the other side undertook a reciprocal obligation. Such offers could surely be negotiated with counterproposals and rebuttals in a process not unlike more formal and traditional SALT exchanges.

Such a process would permit parties to sidestep two difficult parts of the traditional SALT process: converting general agreement in principle to precise treaty language, and going through the process of ratification. For those who see merit in the SALT process but practical difficulty in concluding and ratifying treaties, this option may have particular appeal.

This notion of SALT differs substantially from the suggestion advanced during the SALT II debate that the president simply ignore constitutional process and act as though the treaty were ratified, regardless of Senate action or inaction. This proposal envisions a forum for registering "if, then" propositions that would impose no legal obligations on either of the parties. Many people have argued that SALT has produced little more than this in any case.

Concern about "breakout" potential and the need for stability in arms agreements are two important considerations that limit the scope of arms control, whether it is formal or informal. If it is reasonable to argue that no arms agreement should be accepted if it provides a great temptation to break out or cheat, then arms control is resigned to limiting actions that parties are reluctant to undertake in any case. For such agreements informal arrangements may work as well as formal ones.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A fourth alternative would be to reduce SALT to a rhetorical forum, a mechanism for exchanging ideas and information rather than proposals about military weaponry and doctrine. As noted earlier, there were hopes that SALT might develop into a meaningful strategic dialogue. Many Americans expected that SALT would teach the Soviets the American vernacular of strategic weaponry and convince them of the benefits of assured destruction and the futility of arms competition. The Soviets were quick to pick up the language, but little else. SALT not only failed to convert the Soviets; it also failed to shed much light on Soviet doctrine. Kremlinologists desiring to understand Soviet doctrine have to turn to military literature, or infer from weapons deployed, to learn what motivates the Soviets. Few clues about doctrine were revealed in SALT.

Even if SALT has been more of a parallel monologue than a serious exchange of views, such a forum may still be better than nothing at all. Strategic arms talks, even without the prospect of limitations, would keep open a channel of communication on strategic affairs. It would give each side an opportunity to voice its concerns and anxieties and to justify its own defense decisions. Each may develop a keener appreciation of the other's strategic culture. In intangible, but perhaps important, ways a SALT forum could settle disputes about weapons developments and deployments. There is no reason to sacrifice the communication potential of SALT simply because the negotiating parties cannot hammer out substantive agreements.

Fifth, SALT could become a search for confidence-building measures, a mechanism for monitoring the arms race and taking modest steps to diminish its most dangerous aspects. A great deal of thought has been given to confidence-building measures in the European context, but surprisingly little attention has been paid to the utility of such measures in the strategic nuclear field. The Hot Line Agreement of 1963 is a useful precedent in this regard, not only because it established an important channel of communications, but also because it predates and is independent of the SALT negotiations.

Strategic confidence-building measures could be discussed by the existing Standing Consultative Commission. The SCC now operates to supervise the SALT accords in force, to establish agreed procedures for the dismantling or destruction of weapons, and to deal with questions of compliance. The SCC has worked surprisingly well, far more smoothly than the SALT negotiations themselves.

The only question is whether there would be anything for the SCC to do were there no SALT agreements in force to monitor. Even without an accord on central strategic forces, it is possible to imagine agreements on procedure that might be useful and mutually acceptable. The agreement on advanced notification of missile tests that was negotiated in SALT II is not dependent on other parts of the agreement and could be handled through the SCC. Similarly, SALT II required the two sides to keep current and exchange an inventory of their strategic forces. This data base could be maintained independent of the other SALT II limitations. Finally, the provisions that safeguard national monitoring capabilities could be observed without a SALT agreement on offensive forces in force. These rules ban deliberate concealment measures and prohibit interference with satellites and other means of verification. Perhaps even the controversial agreement not to deny telemetry from missile tests could be observed independent of the other SALT limits.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is possible to imagine other procedural arrangements that can be negotiated. For example, the United States and Soviet Union might find it in their mutual interest to give each other advance notification of new weapons deployments. Even in a strategic arms competition unfettered by qualitative or quantitative limitations there may be mutually acceptable rules of behavior. This version of SALT would attempt to establish such rules.

SALT and Ballistic Missile Defense

A sixth possibility would be to use SALT not as a means of reducing strategic arms, but as the instrument of managing the transition away from the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. New advances in ballistic missile defense technology are making such systems increasingly attractive to Pentagon planners and some members of Congress. It may well be that at some point in the 1980s the United States or the Soviet Union will once again begin to deploy ABMs. Such a move, by one or both sides, would certainly be a challenge to the SALT process, but it need not be the end of negotiation. It is worth asking whether SALT can play any useful role in a transition from assured destruction to a situation of defense dominance.

No one doubts that such a transition could be an extremely dangerous process. If one nation saw its assured destruction capability being eroded by an adversary's deployment of BMD, it might be tempted to launch a preemptive attack before the adversary's system became operational. A BMD would subject the undefended nation to a threat of assured destruction against which it could pose no effective retaliation. The risk of a preemptive attack by a nation before it loses its assured destruction capability is the greatest risk in the transition. Indeed, many advocates of mutual assured destruction are more troubled by the dangerous instability in the transition process than by the expense and technical difficulty of building an ABM defense.

SALT could be the vehicle for managing the transition process and reducing the risks of instability. The ABM treaty now in effect provides a framework for ABM limitations that could be used for a gradual and ordered expansion. The two sides could match their deployment schedules so that their systems would become operational at approximately the same time.

Using SALT to manage a shift from mutual vulnerability to defense dominance should cause the Soviets no doctrinal difficulty, since they have long espoused such ideas. It would be a supreme irony if SALT served its most valuable purpose by effecting the transition away from mutual assured destruction, a defense doctrine it served to legitimize.

The six alternatives explored thus far are not mutually exclusive, and many could be pursued simultaneously. A future SALT strategy could easily combine elements of various approaches. Segmenting problems into smaller and more manageable packages could be combined with a continuing effort to negotiate a superstructure of aggregate numerical limits. Talks on confidence-building measures could accompany both. The United States and Soviet Union do not have to choose in advance which type of SALT they prefer. It is worth noting that a future SALT process could encompass a number of different forms and purposes.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The End of SALT?

One final possibility must be raised, and that is the abandonment of the SALT process altogether. Many analysts believe that superpower arms control will be inappropriate or irrelevant to the strategic environment of the 1980s. Given the uncertainties of the new decade, an effort to negotiate before we know our goals may be a risk not worth the modest benefits that may result from any of the reconfigured versions of SALT considered above.

The technical advances that we can foresee in the 1980s—changes in targeting options; improvements in communications, command, and control—do not appear to lend themselves to bilateral arms control. Even if Washington and Moscow were interested, it is difficult to see how they could agree on the proper targets of their nuclear weapons. Finally, many people would argue that, so long as SALT continues, it will tie the United States to the strategic legacy of the 1960s as well as to the host of inevitable practical problems that attend arms control. If we want to accustom ourselves to the strategic realities of the 1980s and beyond, we can best do so by dropping our illusions—and administering a short sharp shock to SALT.

Arms control is still fraught with positive connotations, and many of us find it difficult to contemplate a world without it. Even the most unrequited hawks might pause at the thought of arms out of control. Yet we need to remind ourselves that the end of SALT is not the end of the world nor even necessarily the end of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in strategic affairs. The superpower arms competition will never be without limits, even if it does go on without formal negotiations or explicit communications. Thomas Schelling has reminded us of how much communication and coordination goes on between adversaries, even when they think of themselves as resolute foes.[8] If by SALT we mean a specific and formal process of negotiation on strategic nuclear weaponry, that process can certainly be terminated, with debatable impact on the future of the strategic nuclear balance. But in the nuclear age it is inevitable that the two superpowers will transmit signals and affect each other's strategic force planning, through example and implication if not through formal negotiation. If we take SALT to mean all of the positive (that is, non-zero sum) aspects of the U.S.-Soviet strategic nuclear relationship, then it will never end, and can never end, short of all-out nuclear war.

Other Arms Control Measures

Conventional Arms Trade

The 1970s saw the tool of superpower arms control applied in many fields other than strategic nuclear weapons. The Vienna negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) that began in 1973 were partly inspired by the desire to extend the arms control success of SALT I and partly by the Nixon Administration's need to deflect congressional pressure for U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe. Other negotiations dealt with weapons of mass destruction on the seabed, the risk of accidental war, biological and bacteriological weapons, incidents at sea, and nuclear testing. In 1975 the Ford Administration

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, that prohibited nuclear tests greater than 150 kilotons and that was intended to be a way-station on the road to a comprehensive test ban.

During his 1976 campaign for the presidency, Jimmy Carter emphasized his personal commitment to arms control. In his inaugural address he expressed the hope that "nuclear weapons could be rid from the face of the earth." Early in his Administration, in a burst of arms control enthusiasm that surprised even his own cabinet, Carter launched several new initiatives and revived a number of moribund negotiations for restraining East-West arms competition. In SALT the new administration advanced the March 1977 "comprehensive proposal" that, in effect, offered a new framework for negotiation as an alternative to the Vladivostok accord. In other areas there were proposals to begin talks on limiting conventional arms transfers, on restricting U.S. and Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, on banning antisatellite systems, and a renewed effort to conclude a comprehensive test ban. With the arguable exception of human rights, no issue consumed so much of the Carter Administration's early energies as arms control. All of these negotiations were characterized by optimism and a sense that noble aspirations would prevail over the practical difficulties of securing agreement. There was an eagerness to begin negotiations, in some cases even before U.S. negotiating positions were fully established.[9]

Of all the arms control initiatives of the Carter Administration, perhaps the most instructive was the effort to negotiate restraints on conventional arms transfers. Early in his tenure Carter identified arms transfers as a major foreign policy problem. He announced a six-point unilateral program for restricting U.S. arms sales, including a pledge not to exceed the dollar value of arms sales in the last year of the Ford Administration, and claimed that henceforward arms transfers would be an "exceptional instrument" of foreign policy. Internationally, the United States began talks with the Soviet Union and expressed the hope that negotiations could be expanded later to include other major arms suppliers.

The Carter approach implied that arms transfers were much more of a problem than an opportunity, more often a danger than a useful instrument of foreign policy. A few obvious exceptions were made—NATO countries and other close allies were exempted from the limitation—but there was little apparent appreciation of the fact that an arms transfer could in some cases be an alternative to direct American military intervention or an inducement to a country to forgo the development of nuclear weapons. Carter saw arms transfers as primarily an arms control problem with some impact on foreign and defense policy, rather than as a fact of international life with some arms control implications.

Arms trade is unavoidable in a world of states that perceive threats to their national security and are unable to build for themselves the weapons they feel they need. The international transfer of weapons is an integral part of foreign policy, and any arms trade policy that does not take account of a wide range of political, economic, and security considerations is bound to be redrawn in short order.

There is no doubt that conventional arms transfers could have used some restraint, both unilateral and multilateral, in the 1970s, as it can in the 1980s.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There are numerous cases in the U.S. experience, most notably with the Shah of Iran, when long-term interests would have been better served by a more cautious approach. But the simple fact that restraint is desirable does not mean that arms control negotiations are invariably the right approach.

The most that could reasonably be expected from the U.S.-Soviet dialogue on arms transfers was agreement to consult about arms shipments to specific regions of mutual concern. It is possible that some *ad hoc* restriction—for example, a ban on the transfer of certain types of weapons to particular states—could have been agreed to by the United States and Soviet Union and accepted by other suppliers. Such an arrangement might even have been welcomed by the recipients. But it is not likely that a firmer foundation of long-term negotiated restraint could be built upon so temporary a coincidence of interests. It is a safe assumption that arms control agreements will be of little use when the policy of individual states is so poorly defined and subject to such rapid alteration.

Indian Ocean Arms Control

Another arms control initiative of the Carter Administration was the effort to restrict naval forces in the Indian Ocean. The United States had traditionally maintained a modest naval force there that could be augmented only by drawing ships from some other area. By the mid-1970s officials were concerned about the growing Soviet naval and air presence in the area and proposed talks on "stabilizing" deployment levels so they could not be radically altered.

The U.S. interest in such a restriction was based on three questionable assumptions: first, that the 1977 level of U.S. naval forces was generally adequate to protect U.S. security interests in the area; second, that no foreseeable development in the area around the Indian Ocean would justify a substantial increase in U.S. forces; third, that a stabilization or freeze on forces within the Indian Ocean would not provide the Soviets with an unacceptable advantage, given their physical proximity to the region. The events of 1978 and 1979 in the Horn of Africa, the Yemens, Iran, and Afghanistan proved how dangerous and shortsighted such a restriction might have been. The Indian Ocean talks illustrate the danger of pursuing arms control agreements in a rapidly changing strategic environment in which national interests are ambiguous and subject to alteration.

Antiproliferation Policy

The effort to restrain nuclear proliferation was another major American foreign policy objective of the late 1970s. In this case, however, the question was whether the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970 should continue to be the focus of U.S. antiproliferation efforts. The NPT played an important role in the early 1970s in forging an international consensus against the spread of nuclear weapons. But since that time there had been relatively few important accessions to the treaty, and there was growing resentment about the terms of the NPT bargain. By the late 1970s few additional nations were likely to sign and ratify the treaty, and many were likely to resist pressures to accede to an agreement that much of the world viewed as inherently discriminatory. Moreover, the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nature of the proliferation problem had changed dramatically since negotiation of the NPT. In the wake of the 1973 oil embargo and the fourfold increase in the price of oil, efforts to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons had to be reconciled with the perceived need of many nations for access to nuclear power.

The Carter Administration took the initiative in expanding the scope of a nuclear nonproliferation regime. Basically, the Carter policy was to try to postpone the advent of a plutonium economy until adequate safeguards could be devised and implemented. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 mandated stricter bilateral safeguards for American nuclear exports, and the United States urged other supplier-states to adopt a similarly restrictive policy on the transfer of sensitive technologies.

The NPT will certainly be preserved, and review conferences held every five years will ensure that its obligations are publicized and discussed. But the treaty no longer plays the central role it once did in U.S. antiproliferation policy. Instead, the United States has broadened its efforts to include an array of other measures to reduce the motivations and increase the cost of nuclear acquisition. An effective antiproliferation regime requires new institutions and new rules of trade for nuclear technology and fuel. Although restricting proliferation remains a major arms control objective of the United States, it is now recognized that dealing with the problem of proliferation requires more than reliance on the formal instrument of an arms control treaty.

Arms Control in Europe

Even President Carter could not do much to revive the MBFR negotiations. The talks had made little progress since their inception, with the two negotiating blocs unable to agree on a data base, much less a general framework for serious negotiations.

The premise underlying MBFR was that European security could be enhanced by a mutual and properly balanced reduction of military forces in Central Europe. A glance at the map of Europe would raise doubts about the validity of such a proposition, particularly if Soviet troops were withdrawn to their borders and American forces returned to the continental United States. Still, the United States and its NATO allies concentrated in the talks on the issue of troop reductions, and until 1980 tended to put little emphasis on efforts more in line with the Western concept of stability, such as confidence-building measures and other efforts to reduce the danger of surprise attack.

Just as SALT witnessed a tremendous expansion in the strategic forces of the two participants, so MBFR continued while the Warsaw Pact and, belatedly, NATO modernized their conventional forces and moved toward deploying substantially improved theater nuclear forces. These improvements on both sides were scarcely reflected in the content or pace of MBFR negotiations.

By early 1980 MBFR showed some signs of limping toward a cosmetic solution of the long stalemate. The two sides seemed to be moving toward agreement on a nominal withdrawal of troops from the "guidelines area" and a package of confidence-building measures. Such measures would include the stationing of observers at posts and areas of access to Central Europe, ground

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inspections of each alliance's military forces, and advance notification of all major military movements. A settlement along these lines would still leave the two alliances with the problem of trying to negotiate some limits on their theater nuclear forces.

The NATO decision in December 1979 to improve is long-range theater nuclear forces was coupled with a commitment to enter arms control negotiations on such forces. This offer was necessary to secure the support of some smaller members of the alliance, but did not reflect any real hope of serious negotiations, much less agreement, on such forces.[10]

By the end of the 1970s the United States and its West European allies appeared to be drifting apart in their views of arms control. While Americans were becoming more skeptical of the process and doubtful of its benefits, Europeans tended by and large to keep the faith about arms control. They did so in part for purely domestic reasons. For some West European governments, arms control was a way of keeping the center and center-left parties interested and involved in defense issues. Nations with influential peace and disarmament constituencies were obliged to champion arms control, even when it may not have been appropriate or feasible, as a means of justifying their expenditures on defense.

There is nothing novel about using arms control for domestic political purposes, but the practice may have particularly unfortunate consequences for NATO in the 1980s, as the alliance moves ahead with the modernization of its theater nuclear forces. Differences between the United States and its European allies over the nature and role of arms control may jeopardize force deployments, deepen suspicion about arms control, and give the Soviets an opportunity to play on the divisions within the Western alliance.

The uses and misuses of arms control in the 1970s raise the general question of the conditions under which arms control may be a valuable instrument of foreign policy. Which circumstances justify its use? In what circumstances might arms control be irrevelant or dangerous?

Arms Control in the 1970s

Superpower arms control produced meager results in the decade of the 1970s for reasons that will be debated for at least a decade to come. Certainly, there were opportunities lost during the various negotiations, and political pressures undoubtedly deflected the negotiations from results they might otherwise have produced. But most of the public disappointment about arms control stemmed from a fundamental and widespread misunderstanding of what the process was capable of producing. This is not a criticism of arms control but an observation about public misperception, aided and abetted by administrations eager to tout the virtues of agreements for which they were responsible.

In actual fact, arms control is a modest enterprise. It is basically cautious, conservative, and oriented to the status quo. It can help stabilize a military balance, but it cannot bring about the abolition of weapons. SALT, as many dovish critics quite rightly recognized, was an effort to *manage* the strategic arms race, not to end it.[11] President Carter was apparently untroubled by the con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tradiction between his hope for a world ultimately rid of nuclear weapons and a SALT process that helped to legitimize and perpetuate a substantial accumulation of such weapons by the two superpowers.

Early in the decade of the 1970s there was a growing perception in American public opinion that arms control was a new way to do business, the beginning of an enduring shift from confrontation to cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Both sides seemed to appreciate the benefit of greater predictability in their relationship. Both sides seemed firmly committed to reducing the risk of nuclear war. Measured against this expectation of a new era in relations between the two superpowers, the results of arms control were bound to be a disappointment.

The relative ease with which SALT I was negotiated was also a deceptive signal. In less than three years the United States and Soviet Union went from the opening round of a novel enterprise to the entry into force of an astonishing treaty virtually banning ballistic missile defenses. It is not surprising that SALT I fostered the widespread impression in the United States that superpower arms control would gain momentum and lead quickly to agreements of even greater significance.

Looking back from the 1980s it is difficult to escape the impression that SALT I resulted from an extraordinary convergence of factors that is unlikely to recur in the foreseeable future. First was the shift in American strategic doctrine. Washington had pledged allegiance to a nuclear strategy that deemed ballistic missile defense dangerous and destabilizing. In offensive forces, the U.S. government had reluctantly accepted the notion that parity was the only basis for a stable long-term nuclear relationship with Moscow.

For their part, the Soviets had encountered technical difficulties in their effort to build an ABM, and were eager in the late 1960s to nullify the American lead in such technology. From the Soviet position of quantitative and qualitative inferiority in strategic offensive weaponry, the prospect of strategic parity with the United States was quite appealing.

Verification posed relatively minor problems in SALT I. With few exceptions, the restrictions under discussion posed modest challenges to verification capabilities. Apart from forward-based systems, there was a reasonably clear and generally accepted distinction between intercontinental and theater weapons. Moreover, the weapons to be limited—ICBMs, submarines, bombers, ABM complexes—were large, took a long time to construct, and were deployed in known areas.

Politically, the United States was experiencing a general war-weariness over Vietnam and a consequent reluctance to support high levels of defense expenditure. Related to this national mood was broad support for détente with the Soviet Union. Finally, there was a Republican president whose political affiliation and reputation as an anti-Soviet hard-liner shielded him, and his treaty, from a good deal of potential criticism.

By the end of the 1970s all had changed. The U.S. commitment to assured destruction had weakened; the virtues of parity were once again open to serious challenge. New weapons systems, particularly the cruise missile, revealed the artificiality of distinctions on which the entire SALT process had been based. Cruise missiles could be intercontinental or theater weapons, strategic or tacti-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cal, nuclear or conventional. Because cruise missiles were small, easily concealed, and mobile, they also posed verification problems far more difficult than any encountered in SALT I.

In political terms, the United States had developed a new assertiveness, sparked by increasing concern over the growth of Soviet military power and skepticism over the alleged benefits of détente. Finally, Carter's position as a Democratic president offering a treaty for ratification in the year preceding an election undoubtedly contributed to the partisan passions surrounding SALT II.

Life under SALT I had also been a disappointment. The Soviets did not act in blatant violation of the accords, but they had pushed military programs to the limit of what was permissible. They had also tested the U.S. reaction to activities at the margin of legality, and in general considered themselves under no restraint in nonlimited areas. SALT I did not generate the widely anticipated result of increased goodwill and mutual restraint. The legacy was more one of suspicion and resentment.

The new decade, and the shelving of SALT II, threatened to bring an end to the process of superpower arms control. To many, the repudiation of SALT II, and of arms control in general, seemed to offer ritual absolution for the excessive optimism and casual attitude toward defense preparedness that characterized the 1970s.

To others, this seemed far too drastic a remedy. After all, it was not arms control that generated the adverse strategic trends of the 1970s; rather, it was the acceptance of such trends that made arms control feasible. It was too easy to make arms control the scapegoat for the relative decline of U.S. military strength in the 1970s, and too facile to assume that without SALT the United States would have avoided what in 1980 were perceived to have been the mistakes of the previous decade.

If the instrument of arms control is to have a future after the disappointing experience of the 1970s, it must be used with more skill and discrimination than in the past. It is unrealistic to demand more meaningful results from arms control; that would only inflate expectations once again. But it is not too much to ask that policymakers show more sensitivity to the conditions of probable success, and greater awareness of the risks assumed, in entering an arms control negotiation.

Conditions of Success

One necessary condition of arms control success is that the negotiating states must have already reached some form of political accommodation. Historically, arms control has been a poor diplomatic icebreaker. Arms control has virtually no chance of success in an environment of acute political suspicion. There must be some common perception of mutual interest. On the other hand, if two nations find themselves with so cordial a relationship that the threat of conflict is seen by both to be utterly remote, then obviously there is no need for arms control.

Negotiated restraint is therefore only useful when nations are sufficiently wary of each other to see the need for an agreement, but not so suspicious that talks will either fail, or produce an accord likely to collapse at the first hint of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

crisis. This is the paradox of arms control: the easier it is for nations to conclude an agreement, the less need they will have for it.

Arms control can thus make its most useful contribution in relationships characterized by a fairly even mix of cooperative and conflictual impulses. Too much cooperation renders arms control irrelevant; too much conflict makes it impossible. For the large set of mixed-motive international relationships, however, arms control can serve a valuable political function. It cannot bring about détente, but it can reinforce and legitimize the positive elements that already exist in a relationship. Arms control cannot be the engine of détente, but it can serve to keep a stable relationship on track.

A second condition of probable success concerns the technology of the weapon systems under negotiation. Arms control is more likely to succeed in restricting "mature" weapon technologies than in limiting new or emerging technologies. Mature technologies are those whose theoretical potential has been fully explored and for which major breakthroughs can be ruled out. Emerging technologies are those whose potential is still being developed. Fixed-site ICBMs and ballistic-missile-carrying submarines are mature technologies; ABMs and antisatellite weapons are examples of emerging technologies.

It is obvious that not all new technologies are beneficial, but it is not so obvious a priori which are good and which are bad. Particularly in an era of rapid technological change, arms control may do more harm than good in an effort to impede dangerous or destabilizing systems. It may be possible to negotiate agreements on emerging technologies, but such accords will be inherently fragile and pose sore temptations for cheating or preparations for breakout. The outer space and ABM treaties both attempt to limit unexplored and undeveloped technologies. Their durability over the next decade will pose an interesting test of this proposition.

Finally, arms control is unlikely to be a useful exercise unless a nation has a clear sense of strategic purpose. A government must be confident of its strategic objectives and reasonably clear in its vision of the strategic future before it enters arms talks. Without such confidence and vision, a nation might unwittingly sacrifice valuable future options. A nation should have a clear sense of defense strategy, but it should also have a clear sense of negotiating strategy: what it wants, how it plans to get it, what it is willing to sacrifice to achieve the desired results. Obviously, no negotiation can be planned in detail from the start, and some flexibility is necessary to keep negotiations moving forward. Too often in the 1970s the United States began negotiations without any real sense of what it hoped to accomplish. Flexibility in such circumstances may become unconscious accommodation. Exploratory talks should be an opportunity to explore the other side's interest in negotiations, not an opportunity to conduct bureaucratic debate about one's own policy with the full participation of the other side.

The Risks of Arms Control

The American approach to arms control could also be improved by paying more attention to the costs and risks of entering negotiations. Too often in the past arms control initiatives were undertaken without any evident appreciation of the implicit costs involved in merely taking a seat at the negotiating table. At least three potential costs must be assessed before agreeing to talks.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

First, to what extent will the talks themselves create problems for defense strategy and anxiety among allies? Any serious arms control negotiation simplifies and compartmentalizes military reality. Any negotiation narrower than a world disarmament conference covering all the military forces of all the nations in the world has to set some limits on participants and agenda. Some nations will participate, some will be excluded; some weapons, modes of employment, or geographical regions will be discussed, others will not. Such simplifying conditions are necessary to reduce the problem of arms control to manageable proportions. But they are also a distortion of military reality, which is far more a seamless web of interactions than a neat matrix of weapons and nations.

This is a particularly troublesome fact of life for the United States, which relies heavily on the "seamlessness" of its military doctrine—the indivisibility of NATO, the risk of escalation to nuclear weapons—for the success of its defense strategy. Any negotiation that isolates one type of weapon (strategic nuclear weapons, as in SALT) or a geographical region (as in the Indian Ocean talks), imposes strains on doctrines and alliances. These strains are real and may be serious. They cannot be entirely overcome with reassurances and consultations. Some distortions of military reality may be acceptable in the higher interest of securing a useful agreement, but they should not be ignored.

Arms control negotiations also complicate a nation's internal defense decision-making. Bargaining chips are an indispensable commodity for any negotiator, but in arms talks, bargaining chips have a particularly insidious consequence. They provide a convenient rationale for new weapons systems, even those with no discernible military merit. In fact, such systems make ideal bargaining chips because they will not be missed if they are sacrified in negotiations.

Arms talks also make bargaining chips out of existing deployments and sometimes freeze the status quo for fear of adverse impact on a nation's bargaining position. For example, the United States delayed its withdrawal of obsolete tactical nuclear missiles from Europe for several years in the 1970s for fear of affecting the NATO position in MBFR. Similarly, the only conceivable reason for the United States to retain its antiquated (and unsafe) Titan II ICBMs is for bargaining purposes in SALT.

It is also possible for a nation to use arms control as a means of blunting pressures for unilateral force reductions and for rallying domestic support for new defense expenditures. The MBFR negotiations were in part an effort by the Nixon Administration to head off Senate pressures for a reduction in the number of U.S. troops deployed in Europe. In this case, the instrument of arms control was used to protect existing force levels. The 1979 NATO decision to proceed with the development of long-range theater nuclear forces while simultaneously exploring the possibility of limitations on such forces was more an effort to secure consensus within the alliance than a serious offer to negotiate with the Soviets. In this case, arms control was used as a mechanism for forging alliance solidarity.

A final potential cost is the danger of illusions fostered by arms control. One is well known and generally appreciated: the sense that nations that are negotiating won't start fighting. There is an understandable tendency among liberals to assume that so long as the parties are talking, problems are manageable and on the way to resolution. Many critics of SALT II feared that ratification of a new

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

treaty would tranquilize the American people and cause them to lose interest in necessary defense modernization. But this tranquilizing effect operates even while negotiations are going on. The muted public reaction in the United States to the tremendous expansion of Soviet strategic forces in the early 1970s was in part a function of the ongoing SALT negotiations.

There is another illusion, less often appreciated, that arms control may also generate. It is often assumed that arms control agreements promote détente and have other useful political consequences. And it is often assumed that there is no harm in trying, that a nation assumes no risk in entering a negotiation. In fact, a failure in arms control can jeopardize many other elements of a diplomatic relationship. If negotiations generate more acrimony than accord, the result might well be a general deterioration in bilateral affairs.

The manner in which SALT II was set aside made it a poor test of the argument that rejecting the accord would have catastrophic consequences for future relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. But in the American political system it is entirely possible that the termination of arms talks could generate an overreaction of pessimism and gloom, and make relations worse than if the negotiation had never taken place. Arms control therefore risks exaggerating the fluctuations that seem to typify American foreign policy. If the United States takes too much goodwill into negotiations, it may also react too harshly to the failure of negotiations.

A Broader Vision of Arms Control

The 1970s demonstrated that arms control is neither an unbounded blessing nor an unmitigated disaster. There are risks and tradeoffs to be made in the pursuit of arms control, just as there are in any other area of defense and foreign policy. The costs are significant but not necessarily prohibitive. They should be taken more explicitly into account than in the past. Policymakers should also avoid talks when the likelihood of a positive outcome is low. Arms control, in the sense of pursuing explicit formal agreements, is not an all-purpose solution to the problems of international security. Neither is it the cause of all our defense difficulties.

It is important in the early 1980s to sustain the formal arms control dialogue between the United States and Soviet Union, as much for political and psychological reasons as military ones. The SALT process can easily be abandoned, but once scrapped, it will be far more difficult to resume when political conditions may be more favorable.

At the same time, we must remind ourselves that arms control can only provide marginal benefits to our security. It cannot be a substitute for defense expenditures. When used skillfully and under the right conditions, it can be a modest supplement to unilateral efforts, but it will never go far in relieving us of the obligation to shoulder the burden of defense.

It may well be that the fundamental problem of the U.S. approach to arms control in the 1970s was too much emphasis on formal negotiation and efforts to secure formal agreements, too much effort at enhancing security by putting precise limits on military hardware. In short, our arms control efforts may have been impeded by too mechanistic a view of the process.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Arms control is much more than two teams of negotiators glaring at each other across a table. It is primarily a way of thinking about the consequences of weapons and doctrines on the military environment, an effort to give some modest coherence and structure to an interstate relationship that involves the risk of war. It is an attempt, in an imperfect world, to establish guidelines for behavior and rules of engagement between adversary nations. Occasionally this effort involves formal negotiations aimed at producing treaties, but more generally it is an intellectual effort to anticipate and avoid the most dangerous aspects of a military competition.

Arms control is a flexible and varied enterprise. In the future it need not take the form nor play the role it did in the 1970s. If the early years of the 1980s seem to be a time to stand back from major new arms control initiatives, they are also a time to avoid hard decisions that may kill off the entire enterprise. What is needed now is serious and sustained thought about the military requirements of the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century. Only then can we determine what contribution arms control, in its various forms, might make to the future of our security.

References

[1]Raymond L. Garthoff, "Negotiating with the Russians: Some Lessons from SALT," *International Security*, 1 (4) (Spring 1977), and "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," *International Security*, 3 (1) (Summer 1978). For a contrasting view, see Fritz Ermath, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," *International Security*, 3 (2) (Fall 1978).

[2]Victor Utgoff, National Security Council staff member, in an address to the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Monterey, California, February 1, 1978: "Even if the U.S. could attain strategic superiority it would not be desirable because I suspect we would occasionally use it as a way of throwing our weight around in some very risky ways."

[3]For SALT I, see John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973). The companion volume on SALT II is Strobe Talbott, *Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979). A more general review of SALT bureaucratic history can be found in Thomas W. Wolfe, *The SALT Experience* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1979).

[4]Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1981*, p. 66.

[5]Colin S. Gray, "SALT II: The Real Debate," *Policy Review*, 10, (Fall 1979): 11-12.

[6]Henry A. Kissinger, "The Future of NATO," *The Washington Quarterly*, 2 (4) (Autumn 1979): 3-12.

[7]Leslie H. Gelb, "A Glass Half Full . . . ," *Foreign Policy*, 36, (Fall 1979): 21-32.

[8]Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960) and *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale, 1966).

[9]See, for example, Henry S. Bradsher, "Administration Hasn't Worked Out Approach on Anti-Satellite Weapons," *Washington Star*, June 6, 1978, p. 4.

[10]For a good review of the negotiating difficulties, see John Borawski, "Toward Theater Nuclear Arms Control?" *The Washington Quarterly*, 3 (1) (Winter 1980): 84-99.

[11]A typical critique is Robert C. Johansen, "Arms Bazaar," *Harper's*, May 1979.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RICHARD BURT

The Relevance of Arms Control in the 1980s

ALTHOUGH IT IS AN EXAGGERATION TO ARGUE that arms control has failed, it is clearly in trouble. A new phase of superpower tension, the product mainly of Soviet activism in the Third World and inconstancy and confusion in American foreign policy, also seems to have marked the end of an era of East-West negotiations over controlling military forces. Negotiations in some areas, such as reducing NATO and Warsaw Pact force levels in Central Europe, are continuing, but arms control, for the present at least, no longer forms part of a wider process of political accommodation. Although the Carter Administration struggled mightily to insulate the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks from other facets of the superpower relationship, this heroic (if politically naive) effort failed in 1980, when Senate action on ratifying the long-delayed agreement was deferred indefinitely after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Without SALT, other arms control enterprises—namely efforts to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test ban and to control the testing and deployment of antisatellite weapons—are also in eclipse. Meanwhile, concern in Washington over Western military weakness in the region surrounding the Persian Gulf has ended President Carter's interesting and controversial attempt to engage Moscow in a dialogue over conventional arms transfers and the deployment of naval forces in the Indian Ocean.

It is thus tempting to conclude that a series of disruptions and possible misunderstandings in Soviet-American relations, capped by Afghanistan, are mainly to blame for the current malaise in arms control. And it is equally tempting, in turn, to assert that if the two sides are able—in one, two, or five years—to reestablish a working political dialogue, arms control will experience a renaissance. It is undoubtedly true that Soviet-American détente during the 1970s was a political prerequisite to progress in arms control. But this does not necessarily mean that if the political conditions for Soviet-American accommodation once again become ripe in the 1980s, arms control will reemerge as a chief avenue for exploring solutions to international security problems. Indeed, as this essay will attempt to show, arms control, whatever its salience for the Soviet Union, is unlikely to play a major role in assisting the United States and its allies in addressing a new range of military problems in the 1980s. To accomplish this aim, four questions will be addressed:

1. What security problems is the West likely to encounter in the coming decade, and how relevant will arms control be to their solution?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

2. What basic assumptions about military competition underlie the negotiating process, and how applicable are they to the strategic environment of the 1980s?

3. What is the relationship of current arms control practice to past arms control theory?

4. What unilateral options for solving military problems will be available to the West in the 1980s, and how should these options be integrated with a strategy for arms control?

Arms Control and the Emerging Security Environment

Although frequently given to hyperbole, Henry Kissinger was probably right when he asserted recently that the United States in the 1980s was moving into as perilous an era as any in its history.[1] For the foreseeable future, the United States and its allies will be forced to contend with security challenges that are unprecedented both in scale and complexity.

- The threat of using nuclear weapons has been the bedrock of Western deterrence for thirty years, but it will be difficult for the United States to maintain the existing conditions of parity in strategic forces with the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Spending somewhere in the vicinity of two-and-a-half times more on strategic forces than the United States, the Soviet Union possesses a momentum in offensive and defensive strategic systems that should give it an advantage in most, if not all, of the "static" indices of strategic capability (missile throw-weight, equivalent megatonnage, total warheads) by 1985. More important, American strategic forces, at least through 1985, will be inferior in many respects to the Soviet arsenal operationally. For example, the most reliable and responsive component of the American strategic triad—the Minuteman ICBM force—has become vulnerable, in theory, to a Soviet disarming strike. Although the United States will retain an undisputed "assured destruction" capacity against the Soviet Union through the decade, the implications of an eroding balance in both static and operational capabilities for Soviet behavior and Western political and military cohesion could be enormous.

- In the European theater, the traditional Soviet advantage in conventional (and chemically armed) forces is being complemented with a new family of nuclear weapons, such as the Soviet SS-20 IRBM and the Backfire bomber. In responding to these developments, the alliance is moving tenuously to deploy a new generation of land-based ballistic and cruise missiles in Central Europe. But the SS-20 and Backfire are only the most visible of a comprehensive program of nuclear modernization that includes new nuclear-capable aircraft and several new nuclear battlefield support missiles. As in the area of long-range forces, Western options are gradually being narrowed to relying on the threat of massive escalation for deterrence, an alternative that in peacetime is likely to lack credibility, and in wartime is likely to be viewed as suicidal.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

- In other regions, the growth of Soviet power projection capabilities will coincide with growing Western dependence on resources in the Third World, particularly oil from the Persian Gulf. In some regions, perhaps Southeast Asia, the West will be able to rely on continuing Sino-Soviet hostility to deter any Soviet threats to Western access, although even here it is dubious that Beijing is willing and able to offer an effective counterweight to the emerging Soviet-Vietnamese axis. In other areas, such as the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, the West, mainly the United States, will be obliged to act as an outside guarantor of stability. Yet the problem of defending against Soviet military intervention or large-scale local conflicts that could jeopardize Western oil supplies are enormous: the political prerequisites for establishing a collective security system in the region are absent, and the Soviet Union enjoys major geographical advantage in moving forces into the area. The deployment of American naval forces into the Indian Ocean and, later on, the existence of an American rapid deployment force will give the West something like a trip-wire defense in the region. At best, a rapid deployment force could possibly deter Soviet intervention, but, at worst, its deployment might only trigger a large-scale military disaster. Meanwhile, the effort to shore up the American presence in Southwest Asia will surely come at the expense of discharging military commitments in other areas, such as Northeast Asia, Central Europe, and the eastern Mediterranean.

- The challenges posed by the expansion of Soviet military power into the Third World will be exacerbated by regional violence and decay. In the 1980s the West will not only have to contend with persistent regional rivalries and disputes, such as the Arab-Israeli impasse. There are also signs that economic strains (provoked, in part, by the explosion in oil prices), coupled with cultural and political disruptions, such as the Islamic resurgence, could lead to the disintegration of existing rule in several countries, including Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. The strategic problem in this context is not so much that the Soviet Union, bent on conquest, will decide to exploit internal chaos to intervene with military force. It is that both superpowers, possessing conflicting commitments and differing perceptions of how rapid change in the Third World could affect their interests, could find themselves swept into a series of confrontations in unlikely locales. In the Third World, at any rate, World War I seems to offer a better model than World War II for understanding how the major East-West conflict could get under way.

How successful will arms control negotiations be in addressing these different challenges? It is, of course, asking too much from arms control to expect it to cope with a World War I scenario in which Moscow and Washington find themselves at the brink of war after becoming embroiled in a regional conflict, such as the most recent Irani-Iraqi war. Formal confidence-building measures, like the hot line established in the 1960s between Washington and Moscow, can reduce uncertainties in time of crisis, but the management of severe tension requires human judgment rather than technical fixes.

Indeed, there has been a tendency for military planners and arms controllers alike to approach security problems in the Third World from far too narrow a

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

perspective. For instance, an underlying assumption of the Carter Administration's unsuccessful effort to negotiate constraints on Soviet and American transfers of conventional weapons to Third World regions was that arms were the cause, rather than the reflection, of deep-seated national antagonisms. As Richard Betts points out, this approach "implies a condescending and naive view of the Third World, as if backward countries would not be at each other's throats without the malign impetus of extra available weapons."[2] Equally, understandings on arms transfers or the deployment of Soviet and American forces in strategic areas, such as the Indian Ocean, presuppose a degree of political cooperation in dealing with regional disputes that is clearly absent. As long as the two superpowers aggressively compete for influence in the Third World, neither will have any strong incentives for controlling their capacity to project military power. This said, it is also clear that the problems the West confronts in the Third World do not have purely military solutions. Discussing Southwest Asia, for example, Richard Haass has written: "The flow of oil at affordable prices, the domestic stability of key allies, the impact of nuclear proliferation in South Asia, many forms of Soviet and Cuban intervention—all will resist direct treatment by both arms and arms control."[3] The answers to these challenges, he rightly suggests, are not to be found in arms control or military buildups, but in a judicious combination of other initiatives, including diplomacy, economic aid, and intelligence collection.

But even in the more traditional realm of East-West military competition—in Western Europe and in strategic nuclear forces—there are strong reasons for believing that arms control is unlikely to possess much utility in the coming decade.

To begin with, despite the best hopes of arms control proponents in the West, existing negotiations have had little discernible impact on Soviet thinking about military forces. Accordingly, whatever else negotiations at SALT and in other forums have produced, arms control during the 1970s failed to produce a shared consensus between the two sides over the role of military power; in particular, how various weapons deployments affected the character of the overall military balance. Without such a consensus, negotiators have failed to work out solutions to such problems as the emerging vulnerability of land-based ICBMs. For instance, since Albert Wohlstetter's path-breaking article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1957, it has been an article of faith within the Western strategic community that the United States and the Soviet Union should avoid taking military steps that could threaten the survival of the other side's strategic forces. In this way, it was argued, neither side would have strong incentives for launching a preemptive nuclear strike in time of deep crisis. Since 1969, at SALT, the United States has championed controls on weapons, such as antiballistic missile defenses, that were understood to threaten "strategic stability." In its famous March 1977 proposal, for example, the Carter Administration tabled a proposal that from a traditional arms control perspective would have restructured both sides' arsenals along more stable lines: the most threatening (and vulnerable) component of both sides' forces—fixed-site ICBMs—would have been deemphasized, while each would have been free to build up its more secure sea-based missile and bomber forces.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Although a host of explanations have been offered to explain Moscow's rejection of the proposal, the Soviet strategic program during the last fifteen years offers strong support for the conclusion that if Moscow does possess a concept of strategic stability, it is not the one that has guided American defense policy or negotiating strategy at SALT. It is futile to debate whether, as some writers have suggested, Moscow is acquiring the capacity to "win" a nuclear war. Instead, it is sufficient to note that, rather than mirroring Western concepts of deterrence, Soviet strategic programs, from the deployment of countersilo ICBM forces to the orbiting of antisatellite weapons, tend to reflect the preference for nuclear war-fighting found in Soviet literature. What the experience so far at SALT reveals, along with the record at the MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction) talks in Vienna, is that, lacking any agreed notion among negotiators over what constitutes stability, the most likely outcomes of arms control are agreements like the SALT II treaty—accords that ratify rather than restructure the prevailing character of the military balance. This is clearly one important reason why the Vienna talks continue to be stalemated: while there are sound political reasons for the West to insist on parity in troop levels in the center region, the Soviet Union possesses equally strong incentives for maintaining its existing superiority.

Of course, doctrinal convergence is not a prerequisite for arms control agreements, and nations sometimes enter accords that run contrary to their doctrinal proclivities. Even though the Soviet concept of deterrence seems to place great emphasis on the ability to limit damage in a nuclear conflict, Soviet negotiators in 1972 finally agreed to severe restrictions on antiballistic missile deployment. But this was hardly because Soviet planners, as some Western observers argued at the time, were persuaded that mutual nuclear vulnerability offered the only rational basis for designing and sizing strategic forces. Instead, a much more plausible explanation for Moscow's action was that with the American Safeguard ABM system about to go into deployment, a hardheaded decision was taken to close off competition in a realm where the United States was seen as possessing important technical advantages.

The major question now is whether the United States will possess the leverage in the 1980s to force Moscow to take similar actions in future negotiations. It is hazardous to make predictions, but it seems highly doubtful. Still in the process of deploying its fourth generation of ICBMs (the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19), the Soviet Union is likely soon to begin testing a series of four or five new land-based missiles, some of which could conceivably be deployed in a mobile mode. At the same time, Moscow is also said to be developing two new strategic bombers. At sea, the Soviet Union is deploying a new long-range SLBM, the SS-N-18, aboard its *Delta*-class SSBN, and is testing another SLBM, the Typhoon, for deployment aboard a new class of submarines. In the defensive area, the Soviet Union's gradual augmentation of its civil defense complex continues; development of antisubmarine warfare forces is accelerating; the modernization of Moscow's ABM system is reportedly underway, and testing of antisatellite systems, after an eighteen-month lull, has started again.

After a period of limited growth, the United States is now preparing for a new period of strategic modernization, at least in the area of offensive forces.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The navy's new class of Trident SSBN, with the long-range C-4 missile, is now being deployed, and the air force in 1982 will begin receiving long-range cruise missiles for deployment aboard the aging B-52 force. The air force will also soon begin to modernize the Minuteman force with a higher-yield warhead, the MK12A, and has started engineering development of a land-mobile ICBM, the MX. It is unlikely, however, that these programs will provide American negotiators with the necessary bargaining capital to achieve arms control solutions to such pressing problems as ICBM vulnerability. Through most of the 1980s the United States will lack the means of matching Moscow's capacity to threaten American ICBMs. With the MX, which is scheduled to be fully deployed in 1989, the United States will, for the first time, possess a system capable of threatening a large fraction of Soviet ICBMs and, in theory at least, of surviving any Soviet threat. But it is hard to see how the MX could be used as a "bargaining chip" in any future SALT negotiation. Although Moscow might be willing to agree to accept a permanent ban on the deployment of mobile missiles to stop the MX, in such an accord the Soviet Union would continue to retain its capacity to threaten fixed-site American missiles. Thus, to address this problem, American negotiators would need to insist that in order to give the mobile missile option, the Soviet Union would have to dismantle a good portion of its existing fixed-site missile force. As desirable as such a proposal would be from Washington's perspective, it would hardly be negotiable from Moscow's. This seems particularly true given the tenuous base of domestic support for the MX. As long as it appears that the system will never actually be built, why should Moscow make any concessions in negotiations to head off its deployment?

Similar problems would exist in any future negotiations covering theater nuclear forces in and around Europe. A basic rationale for the December 1979 decision by the alliance to deploy 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles in Central Europe was to provide Western negotiators with the necessary bargaining leverage to limit Moscow's further deployment of the SS-20 IRBM and other forces targeted against Western Europe. But even with the new systems, the West is almost certain to be at a major disadvantage in the theater nuclear realm in the mid-1980s. With the Soviet Union in the process of deploying several new nuclear-capable aircraft and missiles targeted against NATO, it is almost impossible to envision a negotiating proposal that would be attractive to the West while standing a chance of being accepted by Moscow.[4]

Even if Western negotiators find themselves with enough leverage to gain Moscow's interest in new agreements, arms control negotiations are still likely to get bogged down for other reasons. Leslie Gelb has noted that as negotiators at SALT search for a more comprehensive agreement to replace the constraints placed on land-based and sea-based launchers in 1972, the negotiations have grown infinitely more complicated.[5] In 1979 a technical disagreement over the extent to which the Soviet Union was to be allowed to encode missile telemetry almost derailed the entire SALT II treaty. In the future, disagreements over technical issues associated with verification or other issues are likely to grow more common. For example, the favored approach for addressing possible restrictions on theater nuclear forces is to discuss them within the framework of SALT. But if, as suggested above, a desirable outcome to limiting theater nuclear forces

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

does not exist, the next phase of SALT could become a hostage to disagreements on this issue alone.[6] As Gelb and others have suggested, one solution is to simplify arms negotiations. The problem with this proposal is that in the complicated security environment of the 1980s, simply drawn arms agreements are unlikely to be of much military value. In fact, this seems to be the fate in store for the MBFR exercise. Although perhaps important symbolically, an agreement on establishing equality in manpower levels in Central Europe would probably have no discernible effect on the capacity of the Soviet Union to launch a "short-warning" blitzkrieg against the alliance. In actuality, if a MBFR agreement, as some fear, jeopardized NATO's capacity to generate and mobilize large numbers of reserve forces on short notice, an accord on troop reductions could work to weaken the alliance.

As the MBFR case illustrates, perhaps one of the salient characteristics of arms control in the 1980s will be its irrelevance to new military problems. Having failed to bring about stylized conceptions of stability elaborated by Western thinkers two decades ago, the East-West military balance is evolving to a point where operational effectiveness, as opposed to overall force size, is emerging as the key factor in assessing the balance. Thus, as Steven Canby and Philip Karber have pointed out in recent years, the Soviet Union's key advantage in Western Europe lies with its "combined-arms" approach to land warfare, which enables Soviet forces to orchestrate firepower (artillery, rockets) and maneuver elements (armor, mechanized infantry) to cope with such NATO improvements as precision-guided antitank weapons.[7] But the Soviet combined-arms approach can only indirectly be influenced through negotiations because it depends less on gross numbers than on such "invisible" attributes (for arms control) as command, control, and communications (C^3), and ground force doctrine. In the area of strategic forces, a similar phenomenon is at work. In the 1960s and 1970s quantitative differences in American and Soviet forces—both in overall size of arsenals as well as individual weapons attributes—were seen as key to judging the capabilities of the two sides. But in the postparity era, other factors will take on greater importance. In the 1980s the most important elements of the balance in long-range forces will be those that relate to force effectiveness—target acquisition; command, control, and communications; force redundance, survivability, and endurance. These attributes, unlike missile launchers, warhead numbers, and throw-weight, are difficult to measure and are thus less amenable to control in negotiations. As C^3 and other factors of force effectiveness take on greater importance in judging the capabilities of the two sides, it may become necessary to distinguish between two separate strategic balances; a *symbolic* balance, based on static hardware counts, that is of primary interest to the arms control community, and an *operational* balance that represents the real capacities of the two sides to engage in nuclear combat.

Arms Control as a Problem

Although negotiations in the 1980s appear unlikely to grapple with the major military challenges confronting the United States, arms control could create a variety of obstacles to surmount them unilaterally. The problem is not simply that arms control is irrelevant, but that current negotiating approaches are based

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on assumptions about East-West military competition that, if once accurate, are no longer valid. It is now a cliché that arms control cannot serve as a substitute for an adequate defense posture. But in many respects Western negotiating strategy in many areas seems to assume that it can. Indeed, some of the basic beliefs that underpin Western thinking about arms control seem to rule out the possibility of achieving greater compatibility between negotiating policy and military strategy.

Three fallacies of arms control, in particular, are worth mentioning. The first is that arms competition can, and should, be frozen by agreement. The notion that there is some perfect equilibrium in the military state of affairs that can be defined and sustained through agreement is a recurring one in history. In the early 1930s, for example, some of the best minds in Europe attempted to define ways of bolstering military stability by prohibiting the deployment of "offensive" weapons. But, just as American and Soviet negotiators discovered in the 1970s, these Europeans found that stability is an elusive concept. Although British experts maintained that the tank was an offensive weapon and should be controlled, French military planners saw them as primarily defensive systems, and argued that they should be unconstrained. Similarly, Britain, as a maritime power, wanted limits to be placed on submarines. Greece, concerned about offensive threats from the sea, asserted that submarines were defensive arms, and resisted any controls. But notions of stability do not merely depend on one's geostrategic situation. Definitions of stability are also highly dependent on the existing state of technology and the relative state of the balance. For example, in the early 1960s, when the United States possessed a credible counterforce capability against the small Soviet long-range force, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's concept of a "no cities" nuclear strategy seemed a stabilizing option in the sense that, together with a growing American civil defense and bomber defense effort, it provided few incentives for the Soviet Union to undertake a nuclear strike. Toward the end of the decade, however, McNamara himself recognized that a damage-limiting strategy had been ruled out by the growth of Soviet offensive forces, and proposed instead that stability should reside mainly in the capacity of the two sides to threaten each other's cities and industry. In advocating a mutual assured destruction strategy, McNamara strongly resisted the deployment of ballistic missile defenses, a position that was codified in the 1972 ABM treaty.

Although strongly condemned by Donald Brennan, among others, it is at least arguable that the ABM treaty contributed to stability within the military environment of the early 1970s, when neither side's offensive retaliatory capacity was under threat. But in an era when American ICBMs are becoming vulnerable to Soviet attack, and when Moscow is engaged in a sustained effort to bolster its strategic defenses, the contribution of the ABM treaty to stability has become questionable. There is still a case to be made for prohibiting either side from defending urban areas with ABMs, but the constraints within the ABM treaty on protecting land-based ICBMs and other military facilities have foreclosed an important solution to the Minuteman vulnerability problem in the coming decade. Either deployed around the existing Minuteman force or, more effectively, in conjunction with a multiple-aimpoint MX system, point-defense ABMs are likely to offer the most cost-effective means of countering the Soviet

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countersilo threat. An arms control accord that might have been conducive to stability in an earlier phase of the strategic competition has probably become counterproductive in another.

A second fallacy is that new weapons that threaten arms control negotiations somehow also pose a danger to military stability. This fallacy can be seen to have operated in the case of the cruise missile at SALT II. It is not hard to understand why the cruise missile so severely complicated efforts to complete a new SALT treaty. The relatively small size of the missile and its compatibility with different launcher vehicles posed significant challenges to prevailing verification procedures. More important, the missile's potential utility both as a "strategic" and a "tactical" weapon created daunting problems of categorization. Thus there were strong incentives for American negotiators to find a formula for limiting land-based and sea-based versions of the system in the protocol to the treaty, while agreeing to deploy air-launched cruise missiles on heavy bombers alone. The irony, of course, is that although cruise missiles posed a threat to the SALT process, their deployment, particularly in theater roles, would be more than likely to strengthen deterrence. Clearly a second-strike weapon in a strategic role against the Soviet Union, their ability to offer more survivable basing modes at land and sea, and their possible marriage to a new family of conventional munitions, would bolster regional defenses in Western Europe and in other areas. New weapons technologies, of course, are not always desirable. In some cases, new systems can increase first-strike incentives and unsettle the political status quo. In the longer term, they can also force wrenching changes in prevailing patterns of military thought, as the development of the ICBM did in the 1950s and space-based laser ABM systems might necessitate in the 1990s. At the same time, new weapons technologies can sometimes help governments attain the three classical objectives of arms control: enhancing deterrence, shoring up defense if deterrence fails, and saving money. Had the SALT process been underway in the early 1960s, the Soviet Union, together with many arms control proponents in the United States, would have probably maintained that the deployment of Polaris SSBNs created verification problems and represented another destabilizing round of the so-called qualitative arms race. It did represent a new departure in military technology, but in a period of ICBM vulnerability, the deployment can hardly be viewed as anything but a beneficial development. If arms control is not a substitute for unilateral military initiatives, the costs for negotiations of deploying new systems must be measured against the military benefits that will be derived from their deployment.

The cruise missile case is also useful in highlighting a third fallacy of arms control: the belief that negotiating boundaries reflect military reality. As its name implies, the SALT process uses as its central organizing principle the idea that there is a distinct class of Soviet and American strategic arms. Although this may have been a generally accurate description of the state of technology in the 1960s, a new class of more flexible weapons, like the cruise missile, is making traditional distinctions between strategic and tactical arms obsolete. As a result, the SALT process, with its preoccupation with a mythical homeland-to-homeland nuclear balance between the superpowers, has become an inappropriate forum—for the West, a politically damaging one—for coping

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with weapons systems that are relevant to both intercontinental and regional warfare. SALT outcomes that limit these weapons are unattractive because they foreclose options for upgrading theater defenses and strengthening NATO. At the same time, agreements that exclude these systems are equally unattractive because, as the controversy over the Soviet Backfire bomber illustrates, both sides would be able to increase their intercontinental-range arsenals under the guise of expanding its theater forces. Because of the American nuclear commitment to Western Europe, the concept of a homeland-to-homeland balance fostered by SALT has always been pernicious. But, during a period in which the systems controlled by the process were not directly relevant to the defense of the European theater, bilateral agreements covering long-range forces were bearable. However, in a period when it is becoming increasingly difficult to disaggregate the Soviet-American strategic relationship from the wider East-West military balance, new SALT agreements could endanger the military interests and political cohesion of the Western alliance. Despite the superficial attractions of moving toward a more comprehensive negotiating forum, this problem will not be solved, as the alliance seems bent on doing, by incorporating Soviet and American long-range theater nuclear systems in negotiations in the next phase of SALT. Although discussing long-range theater systems at SALT would require negotiators to rigorously consider for the first time the implications of various negotiating outcomes for regional defenses, it could also foster an analytical decoupling between longer-range theater weapons and shorter-range systems deployed in and around Europe.

If SALT points out the dangers of trying, for purposes of negotiation, to isolate a functional category of weapons, other arms control exercises underline the problems of geographical compartmentalization. One of the principal drawbacks of the MBFR negotiations, for example, is the geographical asymmetries inherent in efforts to limit forces in an artificially bounded chunk of Central Europe. As an adjacent land power, the Soviet Union possesses vast advantages in projecting additional troops and firepower into the area. In a similar way, military reality was distorted by the geographical boundaries erected in the now defunct Indian Ocean negotiations launched by the Carter Administration in 1977. Freezing American and Soviet forces at sea while not imposing similar constraints on land-based maritime capabilities would have clearly worked against Western interests in Southwest Asia. While limiting the deployment of American carriers in the region, it would have left the Soviet Union free to expand numbers of Backfire bombers and other land-based naval strike aircraft that could be used in the area.

Rediscovering Arms Control and Revitalizing Defense Policy

In retrospect, it is curious that in the West, at least, arms control and defense planning seem to be working at cross purposes. Arms control, as a body of thought, developed in the late 1950s and 1960s as a realistic response to the obvious failure of classical disarmament initiatives, such as the Baruch plan in 1947, to head off an East-West nuclear arms race. As a starting point, the original arms controllers of two decades ago accepted the fact that the arms race could not be brought to an end without an amelioration in East-West political

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

competition. Thus the goal of arms control, expressed perhaps most eloquently by Hedley Bull nineteen years ago, was not necessarily to reduce military forces but to restrain their use in a world in which East-West competition would continue. In this way, Bull argued, "the promotion of international security is of course a matter of unilateral armaments policy as well as arms control. Military situations favorable to general international security may be brought by unilateral action, whether this takes the form of rearmament, disarmament or other forms."[8] Bull's point, of course, was that arms control, defined as "restraint internationally exercised upon armaments policy," was only one of a variety of means available to governments for seeking a more secure military environment.

Over the last twenty years, the notion of negotiation as an instrument of, as distinct from a competitor to, military policy has gradually weakened, as arms control has evolved from a theoretical pastime into an institutionalized activity. As a result, arms control has developed the same kind of mindless momentum associated with other large-scale governmental pursuits. Conceptual notions of limited durability, such as the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, have gained bureaucratic constituencies and have thus been prolonged beyond their usefulness. In the end, the goal of simply obtaining an agreement has tended to supplant more broadly defined security objectives. A basic rationale for pursuing force reductions in Europe, for example, was to dampen enthusiasm in the Senate in the early 1970s for unilateral withdrawals of American troops. That rationale has ceased to exist, but the MBFR dynamic continues. Institutional and conceptual inertia in arms control was also apparent in efforts by the Carter Administration in 1977 to ban the deployment of mobile ICBMs, despite the fact that the MX had emerged as the principal option available to the United States in coping with the imminent vulnerability of the ICBM force. A prohibition on mobile ICBMs might have made sense had the United States succeeded in ensuring the survivability of its existing fixed-site ICBMs at SALT. But the failure to work out a mutual solution to ICBM vulnerability made it imperative that the unilateral solution—a mobile ICBM—be protected in any new agreement.

More generally, the arms control debate has tended to revolve around obsolete conceptions of the Western security problem and the character of the Soviet-American arms race. Although the Soviet Union over the last decade has demonstrated its lack of devotion, or at least inattention, to arms control goals developed by Western analysts in the 1960s, much of the current debate seems to assume that decisions by the United States will have a major impact on Soviet thinking and actions. Thus the current debate over whether the United States, with the MX or a similar system, should acquire the capacity to threaten the bulk of Soviet land-based missiles has proceeded on the assumption that Washington can, and does, dominate the current course of arms competition. But Moscow has already acquired the capacity to threaten American missile silos. The choice implicit with the MX is not whether the superpowers should retain a system of mutual deterrence based on only targeting urban and industrial concentrations. The choice for the United States in the 1980s is whether it wants the Soviet Union to be the only superpower capable of destroying a large fraction of its adversary's strategic assets.

But it is too easy to blame arms controls alone for the problems that the West is having in adjusting to a new strategic environment. If arms control should

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

serve as a flexible instrument of military policy, military objectives need to be spelled out with more clarity than is now the case. The problems of outlining a military strategy for the United States and its allies in the 1980s are clearly enormous. Unlike earlier periods, there is today no general national security doctrine, such as containment, around which to organize defense policy. Nor do military planners possess the luxury of strategic superiority with which to avoid difficult choices. Instead, in an era of unprecedented Soviet military growth, the United States, still recovering from the shock of Vietnam, is profoundly uncertain over the meaning of the Soviet buildup and how to respond to it. Arms control, by promising to cope with the Soviet challenge while also restraining unnecessary military responses by the United States, seems to offer an opportunity for escaping a divisive and enervating debate over defense policy.

But, if the thesis of this essay is correct, for arms control to play a useful role, American goals in such areas as strategic doctrine, the relationship between theater nuclear and conventional forces, as well as maritime and projection capabilities, must be outlined in far greater precision than is now the case.

It is possible to suggest some of the attributes of an American defense policy for the 1980s. As appealing as it sounds to argue that the United States can respond to the growth of Soviet military power by emphasizing either long-range nuclear forces or local defenses, the era in which the West possessed such choices is gone forever. Outspending the United States in both nuclear and conventional forces, the Soviet Union over the last fifteen years has acquired a well-balanced and multifaceted capacity to wage war. Although emphasis on conventional forces will tend to raise the threshold for the Western use of nuclear weapons in local conflicts, a conventional-emphasis strategy could actually provide the Soviet Union with incentives to escalate to nuclear use in time of war.

The Soviet buildup thus means that local military balances and the Soviet-American strategic relationship have become more interdependent. Rather than subdividing the overall East-West military relationship into artificial compartments, American planners will have to investigate new ways in which long-range and theater forces can be integrated to respond to military threats across a wide spectrum. A mutually reinforcing strategy for theater and long-range nuclear forces would enable the United States to get away from relying on the obsolete and self-defeating dichotomy between deterrence and defense. The threat of escalation will continue to provide both sides with incentives for exercising restraint in local conflicts. But the degree of Soviet restraint will depend, in large part, on American possession of nonsuicidal options for escalation. Accordingly, a new emphasis must be placed on generating nuclear responses that are militarily meaningful—that is, nuclear responses that can effectively deny, as well as deter, the Soviet Union from achieving both limited and expansive military objectives.[9] "Parity," a political definition of force sufficiency, is not an adequate measure of military effectiveness because it fails to provide any operational requirements for long-range forces. "Flexibility" is likewise a poor measure of effectiveness because limited nuclear options, by themselves, have a suicidal quality, unless they form part of a broader concept for nuclear use and American forces are capable of waging a large-scale, sustained

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nuclear campaign. In the 1980s strategic sufficiency will depend on more than numbers and flexibility; it will require increasing attention to be paid to force responsiveness, survivability, and sustainability.

These qualities provide some indication of how some of the tough issues concerning American nuclear forces should be answered in the years ahead. For a start, the requirements of military effectiveness necessitate the acquisition of secure and survivable forces capable of threatening a range of military forces, including hardened military targets in the Soviet Union. At present, the MX appears to be the best candidate for this role. But there are numerous reasons to believe that the system may never be built. If the primary concern over the MX is its potential vulnerability to a surge in Soviet warheads, then technical options, such as marrying the system to ABM defenses, should be seriously examined. If these are found wanting, the United States should hedge its bets on the MX by making sure that the D-5 SLBM (the Trident II) will be available far sooner than 1990. Whatever happens, discussions over future American force posture should not become bogged down in a search for perfect technical fixes. In addressing strategic survivability, there is a real danger that the best could become the enemy of the good. On the defensive side of the ledger, there are a number of activities that need to receive more attention, including civil defense, antisubmarine warfare, and air defense. In space, the potential offered by new technologies, particularly lasers, needs to be examined concurrently with programs to reduce the growing vulnerabilities of American early warning, surveillance, and communications spacecraft.

The relationship between the superpower strategic balance and American military commitments abroad, particularly in Western Europe, is another area that must be reexamined. What special demands does the American system of extended deterrence for the alliance place on strategic force design? The answer to this question is important in thinking about the future of theater nuclear forces in an era when the Soviet Union will enjoy some advantages in the strategic nuclear realm. In a period of "clinging" strategic nuclear parity (as Senator Sam Nunn has called it), it is highly doubtful that theater nuclear weapons can be viewed as merely instruments for threatening escalation. Controlling the escalation process by providing NATO with a wider menu of realistic nuclear options has become an important priority. At present, the nuclear debate within the alliance still centers around the December 1979 NATO decision to deploy 572 long-range ballistic and cruise missiles in West Germany and four other West European nations. Although immensely important, this issue should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the alliance confronts a comprehensive program of theater nuclear modernization, ranging from intermediate-range ballistic systems to a new generation of battlefield support missiles and aircraft. Again, unless an effort is made to examine theater nuclear forces in totality—studying such controversial questions as enhanced radiation weapons and whether NATO needs a combined-arms doctrine for nuclear and conventional forces to maintain deterrence—the most important implications of the Soviet buildup will be missed.

Some basic issues are also being ignored in the area of conventional forces. In Western Europe the alliance is engaged in a long-term defense improvements program, but this effort is proceeding on an *ad hoc* basis, with little refer-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ence to the changing military environment in Europe. Some of the areas emphasized in NATO's long-term defense program, such as air defense and anti-armor forces, have long been ignored, and it is important that they at last receive some attention. At the same time, the program suffers from some important deficiencies.

First, it fails to recognize the implications of new nonnuclear technology. Rather than utilizing new technology to maintain existing military roles and missions, developments in such areas as command and control, target acquisition, and conventional munitions could be exploited in several lucrative ways.[10] For example, nonnuclear cruise missiles and remotely piloted vehicles could take over many of the deep-strike roles now assigned to manned aircraft in heavily defended rear areas in Eastern Europe, freeing these aircraft for more urgent ground support missions over the battlefield. Effectively utilizing new weapons technologies does not just mean using new weapons to perform old roles better. The key is to recognize that new technology permits new military tasks to be performed.

Second, NATO has failed to adjust its strategy and force structure to the new environment. Just as important as understanding the implications of new technologies is appreciating the need for changes in tactics. In this area, several ideas are worth exploring. For a start, as suggested above, NATO must explore ways of integrating its own nuclear and conventional (including chemical) capabilities to respond to the Soviet combined-arms approach to war-fighting in Western Europe. In addition, although the alliance, because of inferior numbers of men and equipment, cannot avoid being on the defense in Europe, this does not rule out the possibility of using selected NATO forces for offensive operations that could throw the attacker off balance. More generally, NATO, in the long run, needs to get away from the notion that the West could win a firepower-dominated war of attrition with the Warsaw Pact. Lacking very little defensive depth in the center, NATO—to hold its own in any future conflict—will have to fight a war of manuever. This will require, among other things, a new generation of combat vehicles and the establishment of large European reserve forces.

Third, more attention must be given to NATO's "flanks." Although the problem of defending Central Europe offers the most demanding military challenge, the ability of the alliance to deter possible Soviet thrusts (or political extortion) in northern and southern Europe is not guaranteed by maintaining the balance in the center. A military equilibrium in Central Europe does make any Soviet move against Norway or Turkey less likely, but local defenses are still necessary to protect the flank areas. In the north, Norway in recent years has made some progress in bolstering its own "trip-wire" defenses and in working with the United States and others on a reinforcement program in the event of attack. In the south, however, the picture is much gloomier, with the Greco-Turkish impasse over the Aegean and Cyprus obstructing political cooperation, and with Turkey's massive economic problems hindering Ankara from modernizing its armed forces. Ironically, as Turkey's military strength has ebbed, its strategic importance to Western interests in the Middle East has grown increasingly.

In the Third World, even more pressing military problems await resolution. For the United States, it has become increasingly apparent that the decade-old "one-and-a-half" war strategy will be of no value in the 1980s. The strategy,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which said that the United States needed to be able to fight a large conflict in Europe and a "half-war" in some other region, reflected the predominant views in the early 1970s that American security commitments around the world were contracting. But in the 1980s the United States will find itself burdened not only with traditional commitments in Western Europe and Northeast Asia, but with new commitments in Southwest Asia (Zbigniew Brzezinski's "third strategic zone") as well as new instabilities in the Caribbean and Central America and in Southeast Asia. The question, of course, is how these commitments, both old and new, can be discharged. In part, the answer will depend on how successful the United States is in getting Western Europe and Japan to take on new military roles in the Third World. It will also depend on decisions taken about the U.S. Navy, which will remain the primary means available to Washington for projecting American power into the Third World. But, after years of analysis, the debate over whether "sea control" or "power projection" should take precedence in the design of the navy is still unresolved. Although the growth of Soviet maritime power has made the sea control mission (defending the sea-lanes) seem a more pressing requirement, the concurrent growth of Soviet projection capabilities (military airlift and sealift) and political turmoil in vital regions have also made strategic access an equally important concern. The problem is that even if these doctrinal issues are resolved, some basic force structure questions will have to be addressed, such as the now familiar question of whether large-ship/small-fleet navies will be more desirable in the future than small-ship/large-fleet ones. In the area of power projection, meanwhile, other problems need to be addressed, particularly whether the most important contingencies in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere are likely to be ones in which small, rapidly deployed forces will be decisive, or whether larger, more slowly available forces with greater staying power will be crucial.

These questions make it clear that the United States, together with its allies, is at a turning point in military policy. The fundamental task now is to create long-term coherent plans that link military purposes to force structure and size. While this process is under way, arms control must inevitably take a back seat.

What Role for Arms Control?

As we have seen, new defense policies, adjustment in military doctrine, and unilateral force improvements, not arms control, are likely to offer the best solutions to the problems that will preoccupy Western planners in the years ahead. All the same, arms control agreements can create a degree of predictability that is useful both politically and militarily. In criticizing arms control, it is easy to lose sight of the uncertainty that plagued political leaders and military planners during the first half of the 1960s. In the early part of the decade, the tendency to exaggerate Soviet strategic programs led the United States to rush ahead with programs that by 1965 seemed unnecessary. However, American reactions in the early 1960s probably fostered a tendency in the latter half of the decade to underestimate Soviet strategic ambitions, an even more dangerous development. Whatever else SALT does, it should enable political and military authorities to agree on the character of the evolving strategic environment in the 1980s. The environment is clearly becoming more dangerous, and consensus

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over how the balance is shifting should enable policymakers to agree on a program for correcting deficiencies in the strategic posture.

But "optical parity" in launcher numbers (to use Colin Gray's term) and predictability at SALT are not the same as maintaining deterrence. In strategic forces, the maintenance of deterrence requires the deployment of American land-based systems in a more survivable basing mode and, more controversial, an enhanced ability to threaten military targets in the Soviet Union in the opening and later phases of any conflict. In the European theater, deterrence also requires survivable nuclear forces as well as more credible employment options. It could turn out that many options for bolstering deterrence in these areas could well complicate future arms control efforts. There is no obvious solution to this dilemma. Some observers, like Christoph Bertram, have argued that the emphasis in new arms control efforts should be shifted from limiting numbers and types of weapons to exploring agreements that would prohibit such "destabilizing" strategic behavior, such as threatening each other's retaliatory capabilities.[11] Yet, asking too much from SALT not only runs the risk of raising expectations that will surely be disappointed later, but it places a national security burden on the negotiations that it cannot bear. If there is a solution, it probably lies in asking arms control to do less instead of more. Regardless of whether the SALT II treaty is ratified, the United States, in any follow-on negotiations, should not seek severe quantitative reductions or tighter qualitative constraints. An accord that provides both sides with some flexibility for dealing unilaterally with their separately perceived military problems might not only be more negotiable but also probably more likely to strengthen deterrence. Scaling down ambitions for arms control will not totally eliminate the very real tensions between efforts to achieve agreements at SALT and unilateral efforts to bolster deterrence. But the first step toward wisdom in this area is to recognize that such a tension exists. Thus, if the SALT II treaty fades away or is finally rejected by the Senate, it would probably be unwise to rush ahead with an ambitious agenda of goals for SALT III. A scaled-down, simplified version of SALT II that merely sustains the existing ceilings on offensive launcher numbers might not only have a better chance of passing muster in the Senate, but would probably also be more appropriate for American requirements in a period of strategic uncertainty.

Although negotiations alone are unlikely to produce solutions to military problems, arms control, in conjunction with American defense initiatives, can offer some promising approaches to coping with new Soviet challenges. Probably the strongest military argument that could be made for the SALT II treaty was that by putting a ceiling on Soviet missile warheads through 1985, the agreement would, if extended, work to enhance the survivability of multiple-aimpoint basing modes for the MX. However, the main way that defense programs and arms control can interact in a positive fashion is by enhancing American negotiating leverage to achieve specific objectives, such as the 1972 ABM treaty. At the same time, problems can also arise from the inappropriate use of "bargaining chips" in negotiations. This is perhaps most clearly illustrated in NATO's decision to proceed with the modernization of long-range theater nuclear forces. Because of the sensitivity of nuclear deployment issues in some European states, governments were attracted to the idea of coupling an alliance

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

decision to proceed with the deployment of a new long-range system with an arms control offer to the East. Although this strategy has enabled the alliance to overcome domestic opposition in West Germany and elsewhere to modernizing American nuclear forces in Central Europe, in the longer run it could backfire. This is because it is hard to see why at this stage Moscow would be interested in any arms control proposal aimed at limiting long-range theater forces. Just as the MX is unlikely to arrest Moscow's current deployment of the SS-18, European-based cruise missiles, which will not undergo deployment for several years, are unlikely to coerce Moscow into dismantling its existing SS-20s. And even if the Soviet Union were interested in seriously exploring limits on long-range systems, it has strong political incentives to prolong any negotiations to create new doubts in the West over the advisability of proceeding with negotiations. By making arms control, as the alliance has done, an indispensable component of any program for restoring a credible theater nuclear posture, the West has given Moscow an open invitation to interfere in NATO decision-making. At most, if the alliance proceeds with the deployment of several hundred medium-range systems during the next few years, it is conceivable that Moscow would accept some upper limits on the size of its long-range theater forces. But even this outcome may not be possible. By hoping (and, in some cases, pretending) that there is a negotiating solution to the problem of Soviet theater nuclear expansion, when in reality there is not, the alliance runs the risk of being criticized for using arms control as a "fig leaf" to justify new military programs.

Although it has become conventional wisdom that arms control considerations should be taken into account in shaping defense policy and programs, it is interesting that so little thought is given to how existing negotiations should be adapted to changing military realities. For example, changes might be profitably made to existing approaches at MBFR. Although manpower ceilings remain a useful political, if somewhat irrelevant military, goal, ceilings on equipment raise awkward problems in a period in which the alliance is engaged in upgrading its conventional capabilities and thinking about nuclear modernization. Given the character of the Warsaw Pact threat, arms control outcomes that constrain the use, rather than the size, of military forces in Central Europe would be of some utility. This, of course, is the essential function of confidence-building measures ("associated measures," in MBFR parlance). But MBFR may not be the best place to negotiate arms control in Europe. Especially if equipment limits, instead of manpower or confidence-building measures, are going to be the focus for negotiations, the French proposal for a European disarmament conference treating conventional forces "from the Atlantic to the Urals" makes far more strategic sense than continuing to do business in Vienna.

The possibility of revising existing arms control arrangements to bring them more into line with emerging military realities should also not be overlooked in the next few years. Revision of the ABM treaty to facilitate the deployment of hard-site missile defenses is an especially interesting option. So far it has received little serious consideration out of fear that tampering with the 1972 treaty could lead to an unraveling of the entire agreement. The deployment of hard-site defenses might not only enhance the survivability of multiple-launchpoint ICBM basing systems, but it might even rule out the need for deceptive basing modes altogether by giving a new lease on life to fixed silos. In 1982 Washington

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and Moscow are scheduled to hold their second review conference on the ABM treaty; this would seem the appropriate time and place to consider changes to the agreement.

Finally, although some negotiations might be usefully rechanneled and replaced, others should probably be abandoned for good. Prime candidates are the Indian Ocean naval limitations and controls on conventional arms transfers. Not only is the concept of a "naval balance" in the Indian Ocean analytically unsound, but the goal of the negotiations—to freeze American and Soviet naval deployments in the area—is hardly compatible with growing Western security concerns in the region. At the very time that the region is taking on greater importance to the West, the Iranian revolution, radical currents in Arab politics, and, of course, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have made naval forces the only reliable way for the United States to project power into the area, at least for the time being. Arms transfers, meanwhile, provide the United States and its allies an indirect means of projecting power into Southwest Asia (and other regions), and constraints on Western flexibility in this area also seem inappropriate at present. More important, agreements covering Soviet and American military activities in the Third World are unlikely to get to the core of Soviet-American competition, which is primarily political. What is necessary is the establishment of more broadly framed "rules of the road" for American and Soviet behavior in regional conflicts, of the sort envisaged by Henry Kissinger in the halcyon days of détente. It may be possible, at some time in the future, to work out such rules of engagement for the two superpowers in the Third World, which might then lead to traditional agreements on naval presence, arms sales, and the like. But the prospects of doing this any time soon do not seem bright. Thus, as the American experience in the Middle East has shown, unilateral remedies—military, political, and economic—will offer more opportunities for the United States in the Third World than mutual agreements with the Soviet Union.

References

[1]Speech to the Society of Newspaper Editors, reprinted in *The New York Times*, April 6, 1980.

[2]"Arms Trade Control," in *Arms Control and Defense Policy: Finding A New Balance*, Richard Burt (ed.) (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, forthcoming).

[3]"Arms Control and the Indian Ocean," Ibid.

[4]See Michael Higgins and Christopher J. Makins's critique of NATO's current approach to nuclear arms control in Europe, "Theater Nuclear Forces and Grey Area Arms Control," in *Continuity and Change in the Eighties and Beyond*, Sixth National Security Affairs Conference, 1979 Proceedings, pp. 29-51.

[5]Leslie Gelb, The Future of Arms Control: A Glass Half Empty," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1979.

[6]In fact, a complicated linkage between theater nuclear forces and SALT has already emerged, even before any negotiations have started. As of this writing, the Soviet Union has said that no agreement covering theater nuclear weapons could go into effect until SALT II was ratified.

[7]See Philip Karber's discussion of Soviet tactical adjustment to NATO's armor defense improvements, "The Soviet Anti-Tank Debate," *Survival*, May/June 1976, pp. 105-11.

[8]Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961), p. 77.

[9]At least in declaratory policy the United States is moving toward such a "countervailing strategy," what Harold Brown called "our capacity to deny gain from aggression (by any measure of gain)." *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 61.

[10]The most extensive discussion of the possibilities offered for the alliance by new technology appears in *Beyond Nuclear Deterrence*, Johan Holst and Uwe Nerlich (eds.) (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

[11]Christoph Bertram, "Arms Control and Technological Change: Elements of a New Approach," Adelphi Paper no. 146 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), Summer 1978.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GEORGE RATHJENS AND JACK RUINA

Nuclear Doctrine and Rationality

THE CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME illustrate how distant we are from a common perspective on arms control and defense policy, particularly on matters relating to strategic arms. The diversity of informed opinion about specific issues of nuclear policy, weapons procurement, and arms control reflect differences in some fundamental beliefs and assumptions about the role and utility of nuclear weapons, and about the likely behavior of national leaders when coping with a potential or ongoing nuclear crisis. Detailed discussion of specific defense and arms control questions, such as the value of SALT or the need for MX, too often obscures these underlying differences. Here, we attempt to outline briefly our beliefs and perspectives on some basic nuclear questions and to indicate where and why we differ from some of the authors in this volume and its companion, the Fall 1980 issue of *Daedalus*. We identify five linked issues that we believe can help get to the heart of some problems of strategic arms policy.

The U.S.-Soviet Strategic Nuclear Balance

In one fundamental measure, the United States and the Soviet Union have parity in strategic nuclear forces, and no currently known technology threatens to alter this balance in the foreseeable future: each is able to destroy the other many times over. This has been the case for about two decades, neither side being able to acquire the technical/military means to prevent its own destruction. Each side, by either increasing the quality or quantity of its nuclear weapons, and usually both, has been able to stay well ahead of any potential threat to its "assured destruction" capability. Though stated repeatedly, we believe this is a fundamental factor to be kept constantly in mind when considering nuclear policy issues or when assessing whether either side has an edge in nuclear capability.

Two factors have created this balance: nuclear weapons can be made highly destructive, and for the superpowers, they are very cheap. They can cause extremely severe damage in a short period of time to an opponent's homeland, at a cost orders of magnitude less than conventional weapons. Arguments based on the prenuclear history of the behavior of nations, therefore, have limited relevance for dealing with confrontations that threaten the use of nuclear weapons.

To emphasize this measure of parity, however, is not to say that the strategic nuclear forces of both sides are the same. Of course there are differences,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and it is judgments about the military and political significance of these differences that constitute the strategic debate.

- The Soviets have been increasing their nuclear force size rapidly in the last decade. They now have substantially more total yield than the United States and are reaching U.S. levels in numbers of nuclear warheads.
- The Soviets have concentrated their weapons in land-based missiles, with fewer in submarine-launched missiles and relatively few in long-range bombers. U.S. forces are more equally divided among each of these elements of a "triad."
- Guidance technology is such that both sides can develop land-based missiles sufficiently accurate to destroy (operational uncertainties aside) essentially all of the other's fixed land-based missiles. The United States is ahead in the technology, but the Soviets, by employing accurate guidance systems in their substantially larger land-based forces, could threaten destruction of a large fraction of our land-based missiles within the next several years; earlier than we could threaten theirs.
- However, since fixed land-based forces represent about 30 percent of the total U.S. strategic force, but about 65 percent of the Soviets', such growing "counterforce" capabilities, when and if they materialize fully, could threaten very different fractions of each side's total nuclear forces.
- By virtue of superior technology and advantageous geography, the U.S. submarine-launched force is less vulnerable to conceivable antisubmarine technology than the Soviet force.
- Differences in demography mean that a given number of nuclear weapons could do more damage either to one side or the other, depending on precisely what is being targeted and how damage is assessed.

Also, the role and utility of nuclear weapons as seen by the political and military leadership of each side is surely different and probably varies with time.

The Soviets obviously fear "encirclement" by the United States, Western Europe, China (all three nuclear-capable), and Japan. Also, they have an alliance system that is sustained primarily by intimidation. The United States, on the other hand, is deeply anxious about the vulnerability of its oil supplies and those of its allies, and possible Soviet military actions in the Middle East that could jeopardize these supplies. Each side, frustrated by its impotence to deal with its respective problems, looks to a greater *nuclear* capability as somehow giving it an advantage (how, is not clear to us).

Nevertheless, we believe that each side views an all-out nuclear exchange as the ultimate catastrophe, and will want to avoid confrontation that raises the possibility of nuclear war to a significant level. Totally irrational behavior by national leaders is of course conceivable, but, given the realities of the essential

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

equivalence that exists, we see no way to prevent reckless nuclear brinksmanship or to mitigate significantly its consequences through technical or military means. In such a case, we will have to rely primarily on political and diplomatic means (and good luck) to avoid a catastrophe. Some danger of a nuclear holocaust will persist unless nuclear weapons are eliminated, and this does not appear likely in the foreseeable future.

Assured Destruction

Logical, appealing, and humanitarian arguments can be made, and have been, that it is an obscenity to hold as hostage in each of the superpower countries man and all his works. We share this view with most of the people who have thought about nuclear weapons, including arms control advocates. Thus we are always astonished when it is suggested, as it often is, that arms control advocates have special attachment to the concept of assured destruction and for this reason look with disfavor on military measures that might limit damage to people and societies from strategic weapons.

The notion of deterrence based upon mutual assured destruction is an inevitable consequence of the existence of powerful strategic nuclear forces, whether targeted against military and industrial installations—as we understand is the case, at least for U.S. weapons—or against people and cities, and whether or not attempts are made to deploy defense against them. A mere 1 percent of the Soviet strategic forces reaching the United States could destroy more than fifty of our largest cities (each to a far greater extent than Hiroshima). Even a Soviet nuclear strike directed only at the destruction of our remotely located ICBM bases would likely kill millions of Americans. U.S. nuclear attacks against the Soviet Union would kill as many Russians.

To deny an opponent an assured destruction capability would require destroying or defending against essentially his whole force, and this cannot be done with any known technologies. Whatever efforts the United States and Soviet Union might make to deny this capability to the other, by deploying defensive systems or by increasing their capability to destroy the opponent's forces first, will almost certainly be futile, because these efforts will lead to more nuclear offensive arms for both and may add to the danger of a nuclear holocaust.

Setting aside the possibility of radical nuclear disarmament as Utopian for the near-term, or of radical changes in technology, the interesting questions relating to nuclear arms are not whether either or both superpowers should maintain assured destruction capabilities—they will—but the extent to which each should try to do more by tailoring its forces for "controlled response," "nuclear war-fighting," or "escalation dominance" as well. We know of no advocates of assured destruction, but we know many who believe that, since we have an assured destruction capability, we need very little else.

ABM Defense

There are significant differences in policy and technical assessments relating to ABM defense in the protection of cities and in the protection of hardened military targets such as ICBM silos. We have no technology to protect cities

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

effectively against a nuclear attack, since even a little "leakage" of offensive weapons (as explained above) would be devastating. This contrasts markedly with the prenuclear situation where an air defense capable of destroying only a small fraction of attacking aircraft could still be effective, since it took either many raids or a very large fraction of the enemy's total bomber force to destroy a single city. It is misleading to think in prenuclear terms, visualizing a competition where offensive and defensive technologies can be in the lead at different times. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons puts such a heavy burden for high performance on the defense of urban targets, that the competition is overwhelmingly one-sided.

Our central argument against ABM defense of urban-industrial areas is based on an assessment of technological realities and not on abstract strategic principles or ideologies. ABM defense of population (again, with feasible technology) is likely to be futile and wasteful; the deployment of defenses, or even, in some cases, the anticipation of deployment, would likely stimulate offsetting offensive arms deployment. Even the threat of a possible Soviet deployment of a technologically primitive ABM system in the sixties stimulated U.S. MIRV deployment, thereby multiplying U.S. missile warheads manyfold.

The ABM treaty was viewed by many as a way to avoid such stimulation of the arms race. Given the relatively low cost of maintaining their assured destruction capabilities and the motivations of both superpowers to do so, defenses could lead to arms increases while providing, at best, an illusion of protection. It is truly disappointing that even with the ABM treaty, both sides (but particularly the Soviets) have not slowed the pace of upgrading their strategic missile forces. Yet the treaty *is* a qualified success: without it, pursuit of offensive arms would likely have been more aggressive, and with it, there is greater hope that we can agree to reduce nuclear arms.

In contrast to urban defense, protecting hardened missile sites against attack by adversary missiles may be technically feasible, since it places much less of a burden on the defense. Because no single ICBM is of special value, and because both superpowers have many, destruction of a substantial fraction may be acceptable; because the targets are hard, the defense need intercept only warheads that are likely to impact very near the target, and it can wait to do so until they are quite close to the target. In the case of urban defense, interception must take place miles away from the city if it is to provide protection from heat and blast effects, and perhaps hundreds of miles away if it is to provide protection from radioactive fallout.

However, most of the ABM systems considered for missile site protection in the past have been based on components much like those that could be used for defense of urban-industrial and soft military targets. Thus the deployment of ABM defense for missile site protection could be seen as foreshadowing a defense of cities, triggering improvements in adversary offensive forces to offset projected effects of defenses of these targets. It is the cogency of this line of argument that resulted in the inclusion of the hard-site ABM defense in the treaty, severely limiting ABM defenses.

It is interesting to recollect here that the United States was deeply concerned at the time of SALT I negotiations about the possible upgrading of the relatively obsolete Soviet air defense system to be effective against ICBMs. Such air defense upgrading possibilities—in our view, remote then and now—were of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sufficient concern to be explicitly prohibited by the treaty. Imagine how much greater the concern if a modern ABM system, however limited in capability, were to be deployed and exercised with cadres trained in its operation. There would surely be concern that it would be but a simple step to move from a system of this type to a large, urban ABM defense. The possibility of this reaction to the ambiguities inherent in a deployment of hard-site defense is a strong argument against modifying the treaty to permit defense of missile sites.

Still, ABM technology has advanced, not as significantly as many proponents suggest, but enough that the offense-defense balance for hard-site defense, though *not* for urban defense, may have shifted, or may shift, to the point where defense will be technically attractive. Should that prove to be the case, judgments would still have to be made about the political complexities entailed by reopening the ABM issue and jeopardizing the treaty, or at least requiring us to manage with a more complex one.

Flexible Response, Escalation Dominance, and Other Nuclear War-fighting Concepts

Views about the utility of nuclear weapons vary greatly. At one end of the spectrum are those who would argue that with mutual assured destruction capabilities a nuclear exchange is unthinkable for both superpowers. Neither side could risk using nuclear weapons first against the other, no matter what the provocation, and surely neither side needs large quantities of sophisticated weapons in confronting a weak opponent. This leads to a paradox: the larger the stockpile of nuclear weapons, the more remote its deliberate use and the more it can be, and should be, ignored as a factor in conflict resolution.

At the other end are those who contend that damage, even in the event of a full-scale nuclear exchange, could be kept to tolerable levels with defenses and other damage-limiting measures. They argue that the United States has no alternative but to use nuclear weapons in response to extreme Soviet provocation, and thus must be in a position to control escalation and *win* at whatever level war is fought. They conclude, therefore, that planning for the use of nuclear weapons ought not to be qualitatively different from planning for the use of nonnuclear weapons.

What role nuclear weapons might have has caused recurring anxiety in the United States. Henry Kissinger, in arguing for continued intensive development and testing of nuclear weapons, wrote in 1958: "The essential purpose of having a wide range of clean and discriminating weapons is to give the free world an option which does not involve either immediate catastrophe or surrender."[1] President Nixon (could Kissinger have been in the shadows?) said essentially the same thing in 1970. "Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? Should the concept of assured destruction be narrowly defined and should it be the only measure of our ability to deter the variety of threats we may face?"[2]

The interest continues in having nuclear weapons that can deter nonnuclear provocations (e.g., Soviet invasion of Western Europe or Soviet take-over of Middle East oil fields) by making a U.S. first-use credible. There has also been

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

interest in being able to respond in a limited way to possible first-use of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union, the most discussed scenario involving a disarming attack by Soviet missiles against U.S. ICBM sites. Both Soviet extreme nonnuclear provocation and Soviet first-use call for weapons to cope effectively with crises in ways that would not automatically escalate to an all-out exchange. Concern with such problems has led to a proliferation of concepts such as flexible response, graduated response, escalation control, escalation dominance, and so on, for limited war options: nuclear wars that are, in varying degrees, "thinkable."

What is envisaged in limited nuclear war-fighting is the use of nuclear weapons to destroy adversary forces or war-making potential, for example, tank concentrations, airfields, nuclear storage sites, missile launching sites, oil refineries, power plants, and steel mills. The assumption is that the execution of attacks against such targets could avoid provoking an adversary response that is escalatory in nature. The argument goes that, to achieve this, the United States must have the capability to limit the nature of the attack to avoid excessive collateral damage and have capabilities to escalate a step at a time, with superior forces at each level. For this purpose one must postulate a number of stable, defined levels of conflict.

Theoretically, then, U.S. response could be, and should be, flexible and graduated. Escalation could be controlled with the United States in a position of dominance at each level, so that an opponent's moves to escalate from one level to the next would be deterred, and we would be ahead at whatever level the war stops. All this implies that the command and control structure (both the people and the equipment) would remain operable, the leadership of both sides having adequate knowledge of what is happening to cope with the crisis and to control effectively the nuclear forces.

It is hard to argue with the goal of developing military means to deter high levels of aggression, and even the concepts of limited war-fighting are logical in the abstract. But these notions are based in one way or another on extrapolations from past experience with conflict. We have had essentially no experience with nuclear conflict and how nations might behave when quick and total destruction is a possible consequence of their actions. It may well be that all these thoughts about national behavior in nuclear crises are totally unrealistic. In addition, we have difficulty with these notions when we consider the following:

First, a spasmodic all-out retaliatory attack is hardly the only response the U.S. strategic forces are *now* capable of. Our forces have, or can be readily modified to have, more flexibility than they are usually given credit for in strategic analyses. There is no reason why some number of strategic missiles cannot be equipped with single small warheads, so that even with existing accuracy of delivery, they would be capable of destroying many different target types with less collateral damage than is likely with existing warheads. We note particularly that with the ABM treaty, essentially every facility in each country is an easy target. Therefore, those who argue for flexibility are really only arguing for more than the substantial flexibility we already have. Increasing the numbers and the yield of missile warheads in our strategic capability (in combination with improved accuracy, as would occur with the implementation of the MX

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

procurement plan) would only be for the purpose of including the threat of destroying essentially all Soviet ICBMs (the bulk of their strategic force). We believe that proponents of such use often underestimate damage to population, and we are deeply concerned about the impact on U.S. security of Soviet reactions to the procurement of such capabilities. In their nervousness, they could be more likely to push the nuclear button in time of crisis, or they would likely be motivated to build more, and perhaps even more troublesome, nuclear forces.

Second, escalation control after the nuclear line is crossed is likely to be more difficult than many proponents of limited war options suggest. Lines of demarcation between different levels of conflict are hardly clear and will be far less discernible in a crisis. The clearest and perhaps only real "firebreak" is between the use of nuclear and nonnuclear weapons. A nuclear explosion is a nuclear explosion, no matter how small (or clean), and is readily recognized for what it is. Many military leaders agree that limited nuclear wars are hardly controllable. To the extent that they might be controllable, it will be by political and diplomatic actions and sanity in time of crisis, not by having a large variety of nuclear weaponry.

Third, there is a great deal of uncertainty regarding how national leaders might act in a severe crisis. So far we have seen great sensitivity to the dangers of a nuclear exchange during confrontations and, therefore, less brinksmanship than one might have feared. But human behavior is not totally predictable, particularly in crises, and this alone acts as a significant deterrent to extreme provocations.

Fourth, many different scenarios can be, and have been, conceived for limited conflict, and it will be impossible to achieve dominance, however measured, for each level of conflict and for each scenario. It is particularly unfortunate that at the present time disproportionate attention is focused on trying to achieve dominance, or at least to deny it to the Soviet Union, in scenarios that seem especially improbable and where efforts to prevent further escalation would seem most likely to fail. We refer to the concept of a disarming attack by one side against the other's ICBM force.

We have no simple answers to the dilemma of extending deterrence—nor does anyone else—but we would make the following observations, assuming issues in controversy between the superpowers.

1. Whether either will be deterred from the use of force or from escalating the level of conflict from, say, the use of conventional weapons only to some use of nuclear weapons will depend at least as much on the commitment of either or both countries to the specific issue involved and the personalities and interactions of decisionmakers as on the specifics of nuclear capability.

2. Uncertainty about the course of events that would follow any use of nuclear weapons will be the main determinant of decision-making by either

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

side. This, combined with the full awareness of the enormity of destruction should escalation run its course, means that improvement of flexible response capabilities is likely to have little effect on deterrent capabilities.

3. This is not to say that such improvements may not be worth making. They may be, but reasonable judgments will depend on considerations of cost and likelihood of adversary response to (in terms of weapons acquisition, doctrinal changes, and political and military action) specific changes proposed. General suggestions for greater flexible response or escalation dominance capabilities may be enticing but are not very useful.

4. To some degree there *is* a choice to be made between investing in greater flexible response capabilities and relying more on uncertainty of unacceptable escalation as the means of maintaining extended deterrence. In considering this tradeoff, however, many advocates of greater flexible response capabilities overestimate their political or military utility, or both, because, in large measure, they have discounted the factors discussed in points (1) and (2) above.

5. As the level of conflict increases, the relative utility of having superior flexible response capability will diminish dramatically, because the consequences of further escalation become increasingly unacceptable. Thus superiority in conventional capabilities may be of considerable importance, but once the issue turns to the use of any nuclear weapons, greater flexibility will be much less meaningful because of the reasons already mentioned in points (1) and (2).

Arms Control

We believe that claims about the danger to the United States from past arms control agreements and fears about dangerous consequences of ratification of SALT II are unjustified. But we also believe that claims about the benefits of SALT have been exaggerated.

Those past agreements that are most relevant here are the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) and SALT I ABM treaty. The LTBT has not slowed nuclear weapons development, but it has completely stopped all atmospheric testing by the United States and the Soviet Union since 1963. In all likelihood, the rate of atmospheric testing would have decreased substantially even without the treaty because of environmental concerns. However, the decision to stop atmospheric testing completely would have been very hard to make unilaterally and to sustain.

The primary benefit from the LTBT has been the virtual elimination of worldwide background radiation from nuclear fallout. But there was also an arms control "fallout": the halt in atmospheric testing has had some inhibiting effects on the development of certain troublesome weapon systems capabilities by keeping both sides from having more complete information about weapons effects.

The ABM treaty proscribed ABM deployment beyond two sites for each country and probably slowed development. Although both sides seemed to be pursuing the ABM deployment options only halfheartedly, it may well have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been that, without the treaty, we would now see sizable ABM defense deployments on both sides. Had this occurred, there would have been more pressure for the development of more and better strategic weapons. Also, we would have less flexibility in the use of strategic weapons than we currently have. On the other hand, fears that the United States would be lulled into apathy and inaction by the treaty have certainly been unfounded.

We must also note that these agreements have been attained at a price, even for arms control. In the internal negotiations to achieve consensus for specific agreements, more arms activity in areas not to be limited is often offered in exchange. For example, the LTBT resulted in an intensification of nuclear weapons development and testing rather than a decrease; SALT I stimulated the early development of cruise missiles in the United States and probably had similar effects in the Soviet Union; and the MX was certainly helped by the pursuit of Senate support for SALT II.

Also, although SALT-inspired public discussion about strategic issues has probably been beneficial, debates about SALT have unfortunately focused attention on comparisons of the nuclear balance that have exaggerated both the importance of strategic weapons and of presumed deficiencies in the U.S. strategic weapons posture. Nevertheless, it can be argued that SALT should be continued, if for no other reason than that it provides a channel of communication for discussing life-and-death issues with the Soviets, perhaps helping to eliminate some extreme misunderstandings about each other's nuclear activities. Moreover, SALT can, in principle, lead to agreements to limit (or ban) weapons programs and activities that would be wasteful, futile, or particularly mischievous. However, SALT cannot be expected to limit weapons that both countries (given the negotiation with all their respective internal constituencies) perceive to be significant for their security; it is not likely to lead to deep reductions (i.e., by a factor of four or more) in strategic weapons (we are not even clear that such a move would be truly beneficial, good as it sounds); and, most important, SALT cannot directly and measurably lower the probability of nuclear catastrophe, although it may help to improve the political climate, which, in turn, may mean that the probability of confrontation will be reduced.

In summary, while SALT may again be a significant and relevant process for the U.S.-Soviet relationship and for international security, it will not provide a "fix" to the dangers of nuclear technology and of unfortunate developments in international relations.

REFERENCES

[1]Henry A. Kissinger, "Nuclear Testing and the Problem of Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1958, p. 10.

[2]U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace. A Report to the Congress by President Richard M. Nixon, February 18, 1970.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Notes on Contributors

ROBERT R. BOWIE, born in 1909 in Baltimore, is Clarence Dillon Professor of International Affairs *Emeritus*, Harvard University. He is the author of *Shaping the Future* (1963) and *Suez 1956* (1974), and many articles on foreign policy, strategy, and policy-making; and co-editor of *Studies in Federalism* (1953). During his long career he has held many important government posts.

HARVEY BROOKS, born in 1915 in Cleveland, is Benjamin Peirce Professor of Technology and Public Policy, Harvard University. He is the author of *The Government of Science* (1968) and many articles on acoustics, nuclear reactor physics, solid state physics, and science and public policy. He has served on the President's Science Advisory Committee and several national boards, and as president of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences from 1970 to 1975.

RICHARD BURT, born in 1947 in Santiago, Chile, is National Security Affairs correspondent, Washington Bureau, *The New York Times*. He is the editor of *Defense Policy and Arms Control: Finding a New Balance* (forthcoming), and the author of "Defense Budgeting: The British and American Cases" and "New Weapons Technologies: Debate and Directions," both published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, where he was assistant director from 1975 to 1977.

WILLIAM HYLAND, born in 1929 in Kansas City, Missouri, is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University. He has served in the Department of State and as deputy assistant to the president for national security from 1975 to 1976.

WILLIAM KINCADE, born in 1939 in Cleveland, is senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and executive director of the Arms Control Association. He is the co-editor of *Negotiating Security: An Arms Control Reader* (1979), *Approaches to East-West Arms Control* (1979), and *Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s: Perspectives and Proposals* (forthcoming). He has served as a consultant to members of Congress on national defense, arms control, and international environmental activities.

JOSEPH KRUZEL, born in 1945 in Goldsboro, North Carolina, is with the Department of Political Science at Duke University and a consultant in the Department of Defense. He is the author of several articles and monographs on arms control and defense strategy.

MICHAEL NACHT, born in 1942 in New York City, is associate professor of public policy and associate director of the Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. He is the author of a number of articles on nuclear strategy and arms control, and political-military affairs.

UWE NERLICH, born in 1930 in Flensburg, West Germany, is director of research at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Ebenhausen, West Germany. He is a member of the council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and vice-president of the European-American Institute for Security Research in Los Angeles. He is the co-editor of *Beyond Nuclear Deterrence* (1977), and the author of numerous articles on Soviet-American and U.S.-West European relations, defense, arms control, and West European foreign policies.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GEORGE QUESTER, born in 1936 in Brooklyn, is professor of government at Cornell University. He is the author of *Deterrence before Hiroshima* (1966), *Nuclear Diplomacy: The First Twenty-five Years* (1970), *The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation* (1973), and *Offense and Defense in the International System* (1976).

GOERGE RATHJENS, born in 1925 in Fairbanks, Alaska, is a professor in the Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has written many books and articles on nuclear strategy, particularly the relation to technology, arms control and disarmament, and the relationship between nuclear power and nuclear weapons proliferation. He has held important positions in the Department of Defense, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Institute for Defense Analyses, and the Department of State.

JACK RUINA, born in 1923 in Rypin, Poland, is a professor in the Department of Electrical Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He has written many articles, and contributed to many volumes, on the nuclear arms race, defense policy, and defense technology. He has served the federal government in numerous capacities, and is at present senior consultant in the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The American Academy of Arts and Sciences has moved into its new House in Cambridge, Massachusetts. *DÆDALUS* readers should note the following changes of address.

All inquiries and correspondence regarding subscriptions and orders for back issues of *DÆDALUS* should be directed to:

Daedalus Subscription Department
1172 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02134

For all other matters, the new address for the *DÆDALUS* editorial offices will be:

Daedalus
Norton's Woods
136 Irving Street
Cambridge, MA 02138

Also, our subscription and back copy services are now being computerized. We believe this will result in greatly improved service to *DÆDALUS* readers, but during the period of transition there may be, unavoidably, some difficulties. We hope that readers who experience problems will understand and bear with us. Above all, we ask you to notify us at once if an issue does not reach you promptly or is not properly addressed.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DÆDALUS Studies in Print

DÆDALUS is now listing an annotated bibliography of issues currently available, grouped by subject matter, as a regular feature to help readers order selected studies on particular topics, themes, and problems.

Each *DÆDALUS* issue represents several years of research and discussion among distinguished authorities, and many issues have become standard texts in their fields. Because they often address unusual topics through interdisciplinary discussions, not readily available elsewhere, there is a continuing demand for these studies both in single copies and in quantity for classroom use.

Orders should specify the quantity and date of the volumes desired, and are payable by accompanying check, Master Charge or Visa card number, or institutional purchase order.

Prices

single copies:	$5.00
bulk orders (5 copies or more):	$4.00

A tear-out order card for *DÆDALUS Studies in Print* is provided in this issue, and should be returned to:

DÆDALUS Studies
American Academy of Arts and Sciences
1172 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02134

This bibliography of DÆDALUS Studies in Print *supplements the periodic listing of issues in and out of print. A complete list of currently available issues of* DÆDALUS *can be obtained by writing to the address noted above.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DAEDALUS Studies in International Affairs

U.S. DEFENSE POLICY IN THE 1980s (Fall 1980). Provocative essays on U.S. regional security and defense policies for the changed world of the 1980s, when we are no longer virtually invulnerable, and when the realities of new weapons technology call for the rethinking of arms control. Authors include Shahram Chubin, Sidney D. Drell, Colin S. Gray, David Holloway, Richard Pipes, Allen H. Whiting, and others.

LOOKING FOR EUROPE (Winter 1979). A study of the changing political and social forces shaping contemporary Europe and the European community. Authors include Stanley Hoffmann, Suzanne Berger, Albert Bressand, David Watt, Uwe Nerlich, Pierre Hassner, Archie Brown, and Juan Linz.

OLD FAITHS AND NEW DOUBTS: THE EUROPEAN PREDICAMENT (Spring 1979). In this companion volume to *Looking for Europe*, ten noted authors ask how well Europe has assimilated the rapid social and cultural changes of recent years. Alain Besançon, François Bourricaud, Asa Briggs, Hilary Land, Ray C. Rist, and others examine Europe's shifting perceptions of labor, women, the Church, schools, media, the professions, language, and the Third World.

A NEW AMERICA (Winter 1978). The authors address the bewildering changes—in attitudes as well as institutions—that have altered America's position in the last fifteen years. A wide range of topics including relations with the Soviet Union, the Middle East, monetary policy, and domestic research and professional resources are considered by McGeorge Bundy, Daniel Yergin, Nancy Wardell, Adam Yarmolinsky, Pierre Nora, and others.

ARMS, DEFENSE POLICY, AND ARMS CONTROL (Summer 1975), guest-edited by Franklin A. Long and George W. Rathjens. Authoritative analyses of the major factors, domestic and international, influencing U.S. arms control policy and its place in American defense strategy. Contributors include Graham Allison, Les Aspin, Harvey Brooks, Paul Doty, Richard Falk, and Marshall Shulman, among others.

HOW OTHERS SEE THE UNITED STATES (Fall 1972). A diverse group of humanists and social scientists from abroad see the United States in retreat from its ambitious aspirations to remake the world in its own image. Authors include Raymond Aron, Achille Albonetti, Jagdish Bhagwati, Annie Kriegel, Octavio Paz.

Continued

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONDITIONS OF WORLD ORDER (Spring 1966). This study embodies the results of a major interdisciplinary conference on the conditions of world order. Scientific, philosophic, political, and economic viewpoints are represented by Raymond Aron, Henry Kissinger, Stanley Hoffmann, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Lord Gladwyn, Jan Linbergen, C. H. Waddington, and others.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DAEDALUS Studies in Social Issues and Social Thought

THE END OF CONSENSUS? (Summer 1980). An examination of the divisions in contemporary American society that make consensus—in national political parties, the domestic economy, education, and foreign policy—near-impossible to achieve. Essays by J. Myron Atkin, Allen H. Barton, Barry Bosworth, Morris P. Fiorina, David Vogel, and others.

THE STATE (Fall 1979). This volume suggests why the state, despite its expanding role in social affairs, is no longer an institution whose well-being can command a nation's attention in the way it once did. Authors include Harry Eckstein, George Kelly, David Apter, Annie Kriegel, Hedley Bull, and six other leading authorities.

A NEW AMERICA? (Winter 1978). The authors address the bewildering changes—in attitudes as well as institutions—that have altered American life during the last fifteen years. Morals and manners, cultural institutions, the workplace, the professions, social policy, and the media are among the topics considered by McGeorge Bundy, John T. Dunlop, Elizabeth Hardwick, Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Steven Muller, Pierre Nora, and others.

POST-TRADITIONAL SOCIETIES (Winter 1973). Guest-editor S. N. Eisenstadt insists that "new ways of looking at certain central problems of modernization and development" are needed to understand the interaction of tradition and change in the fourteen countries, ranging from the Soviet Union to Senegal, that are examined in this volume. Authors include Heinz Bechert, Ernest Gellner, Edmund Leach, Şerif Mardin, Ashis Nandy, Nur Yalman, Abdelkader Zghal.

PERSPECTIVES ON BUSINESS (Winter 1969). An interdisciplinary and international group examines some of the old and new conceptions underlying business practice, the interdependence of business and government, and the modern corporation and its future. Authors include Neil W. Chamberlain, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Michel Crozier, Eli Goldston, Andrew Shonfield, Leonard S. Silk, and Raymond Vernon.

PHILOSOPHERS AND KINGS: STUDIES IN LEADERSHIP (Summer 1968). Erik H. Erikson, Stanley Hoffmann, Dankwart A. Rustow, and Henry A. Kissinger, among others, produced this classic study of leadership as a process of innovation and interplay between private personality and public performance. Among those considered: Ghandi, Lenin, Nkrumah, de Gaulle, Bismarck, James Mill, William James, and Newton.

Continued

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AMERICA'S CHANGING ENVIRONMENT (Fall 1967). The first in a series of publications that grew out of a study initiated by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences entitled *Planning the American Future*. The economists, political scientists, city planners, and conservationists who contributed to this pioneering examination of problems of air pollution, urban congestion, and resource management include Robert S. Morison, Roger Revelle, S. Dillon Ripley, Aaron Wildavsky, and Nathaniel Wollman.

TOWARD THE YEAR 2000: WORK IN PROGRESS (Summer 1967). Daniel Bell, chairman of the American Academy's Commission on the Year 2000, calls this volume "an effort to indicate how the future consequences of present public-policy decisions, to anticipate future problems, and to begin the design of alternative solutions so that our society has more options and can make a moral choice." Herman Kahn, David Riesman, Eugene V. Rostow, Gardner C. Quarton, and Samuel P. Huntington are among the contributors to this major initiative in predictive social thought.

COLOR AND RACE (Spring 1967). Treating the subject in a worldwide setting, this volume documents evolving attitudes toward racial differences and considers the cultural, social, physical, and political forces that contributed to the world situation in the sixties. Roger Bastide, E. R. Braithwaite, Harold R. Isaacs, Colin Legum, Philip Mason, and Edward Shils are among the contributors.

THE NEGRO AMERICAN (2 VOLS., Winter 1966). This landmark study of the 1960s assesses discrimination in the areas of unemployment (vol. 1), education, business, housing, and the family (vol. 2). Rashi Fein, Philip M. Hauser, and Daniel P. Moynihan conclude that whatever the legal and political gains made by blacks in the middle 1960s, their *economic* gains were, for most, negligible. The American Academy Conference on the Negro American (transcript in vol. 2) is a major historical record of the debate of the 1960s, with Robert Coles, John Hope Franklin, Oscar Handlin, Kenneth B. Clark, Talcott Parsons, Ralph Ellison, and others.

EXCELLENCE AND LEADERSHIP IN A DEMOCRACY (Fall 1961). What are the qualities, the historical circumstances, the psychological demands of leadership? How has American pluralism affected leadership? What is the American ideal of excellence? James MacGregor Burns, Henry Steele Commager, David C. McClelland, Robert S. Morison, Henri Peyre, Adam Yarmolinsky, and others offer constructive criticism of American society.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DAEDALUS Studies in Education

AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: TOWARD AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE (Fall 1974–Winter 75). Five years of research and discussion in the Assembly on University Goals and Governance led to these two landmark volumes—over 700 pages by eighty of America's most distinguished educational leaders—in what has become a definitive source for study of the contemporary university, its problems, and its choices.

Volume I: C. Vann Woodward, Willard Quine, James A. Perkins, Theodore Hesburgh, Derek Bok, B. F. Skinner, and many others.

Volume II: Authors include Robert Wood, Charles Hitch, John Kemeny, Daniel P. Moynihan, Gerard Piel, Richard Lyman, David Riesman, and Kenneth Boulding.

THE FUTURE OF BLACK COLLEGES (Summer 1971). Essays on the consequences for black colleges of the Supreme Court decision of 1954. This is a penetrating study of a subject still very much with us—by Elias Blake, Jr., Andrew F. Brimmer, Henry Allen Bullock, Vivian W. Henderson, Patricia Roberts Harris, Tobe Johnson, C. Eric Lincoln, Thomas F. Pettigrew, Michael R. Winston, and others.

THE EMBATTLED UNIVERSITY (Winter 1970). Written at the height of the student movement, these essays reflect a critical period in American higher education. Notable analyses by Morris Abrams, Jill Conway, Erik H. Erikson, Stanley Hoffmann, Clark Kerr, and Salvador and Zella Luria.

STUDENTS AND POLITICS (Winter 1968). An authoritative study of the student movements of the sixties in the West, the East, and the Third World. Authors include Philip G. Altbach, Martin Duberman, Myron Glazer, Seymour Martin Lipset, A. H. Halsey, Frank A. Pinner, Robert E. Scott, Michiya Shimbori, Josef Silverstein, and others.

THE CONTEMPORARY UNIVERSITY: U.S.A. (Fall 1964). A prescient study of the issues that confront American universities in the last decades of the twentieth century, this volume retains topical as well as historical interest. Douglas Bush, Stanley Hoffmann, Clark Kerr, Robert S. Morison, Peter Rossi, and Julius Stratton are among the distinguished contributors.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED